About the Cover

Kyung Chyun is an illustrator working in Oakland, California. She attended California College of the Arts in San Francisco for BFA in Illustration. Kyung was born and raised in Seoul until the age of twelve when she immigrated to the states. She considers illustration and art to be her American dream as much as that sounds corny. Honors include 2015 New York's Society of Illustrators scholarship.

Her portfolio can be found on kyungchyun.com.
About the ISJ

The Islamophobia Studies Journal is a bi-annual publication that focuses on the critical analysis of Islamophobia and its multiple manifestations in our contemporary moment.

ISJ is an interdisciplinary and multi-lingual academic journal that encourages submissions that theorizes the historical, political, economic, and cultural phenomenon of Islamophobia in relation to the construction, representation, and articulation of “Otherness.” The ISJ is an open scholarly exchange, exploring new approaches, methodologies, and contemporary issues.

The ISJ encourages submissions that closely interrogate the ideological, discursive, and epistemological frameworks employed in processes of “Otherness”—the complex social, political, economic, gender, sexual, and religious forces that are intimately linked in the historical production of the modern world from the dominance of the colonial/imperial north to the post-colonial south. At the heart of ISJ is an intellectual and collaborative project between scholars, researchers, and community agencies to recast the production of knowledge about Islamophobia away from a dehumanizing and subordinating framework to an emancipatory and liberatory one for all peoples in this far-reaching and unfolding domestic and global process.
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Editorial Statement  

Trump and the Collapse of Neoliberal Economic Order!

The string of right-wing political parties gaining the upper hand in elections across Europe and now joined by Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. election points to a much bigger phenomenon: the collapse of the neoliberal economic and political order. Consequently, focusing on each election outcome across Europe and the U.S. misses the overall global picture and the economic, political and social trends that are at work, which are transforming the world as we know it. Debating the massive influx of immigrants from the global south and from war-torn countries, loss of jobs and decline in income levels in the global north and the rapid demographic shifts caused by them masks the real causes behind them.

The economic and political instability across the global south was brought about by policies that have been put in place over a long period of time. These policies were supported by liberal and conservative parties alike in the U.S. and Europe with devastating impacts across the globe. Political elites across the globe bought into a neoliberal economic model that called for privatization, leveraged financing, expanded public debt, de-regulation, free movement of capital and a manufacturing shift to countries that provided the cheapest labor cost and fewest environmental protection guidelines. Overseeing this neoliberal order was the World Bank and the IMF, the structural bouncers for the global financial system.

In a short period of time, the neoliberal economic and political models became the effective blueprint for every country seeking to enter into the global market. Entry into the global market meant disruptions to the local industry and economy, as well as increased dependence on multi-national corporations for downstream assembly jobs and opportunities. More than anything else, the global market was driven by trickle-up economics to the Northern Hemisphere, and a financial pipeline was set up that sucked every possible penny from the Southern Hemisphere. Neoliberal economic and political order translated into massive uprooting of work force which was coupled with the intrusive long arm of Northern Hemisphere agribusiness that laid claim to vast arable lands and the displacement of farmers from ancestral lands.

By disrupting industry and agriculture in the Southern Hemisphere, the multi-national corporations from the global north—which were supported by political elites in the North and corrupt elites in the South—created the needed conditions that resulted in civil and regional wars. Even when we think of the
ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, the real stimulus for conflicts in the region centers on oil and natural gas first and foremost, which gets masked by a fictitious and fomented religious tension. Furthermore, the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya are intertwined with oil interest and the desire to limit China’s access to this most valuable and strategic resource.

The economic destruction in the global south translated into an immigration wave to the North. In addition, the neoliberal economic project led to an intensification of political instability that fed existing cleavages in the global south and caused eruption of civil and regional wars centered on existing natural resources. Neoliberal globalization translated into a globalized trail of consequences, including black market arms trade, violence and the emergence of both state-sponsored and independently commissioned terrorism. The competition among the major players in the neoliberal economic order gave birth to the chaos and instability on the periphery with each state attempting to situate itself in a survival of the fittest type of discourse in a highly distorted market.

In similar ways but outwardly different, the neoliberal economic and political order had devastated working-class communities and blue-collar jobs across the global north. As jobs were shifted offshore, the pressure on domestic workforce was to give in to corporate demands for reduced wages, longer work schedules and scales of efficiency that translated into higher profit margins for corporations. Yes, technological innovations did play a role in some parts of the economy, but the shifting of the jobs was a feature that impacted all types of jobs, including those that are in the technology sector itself since manufacturing pursued cheap labor overseas.

Closing factories, reducing jobs and reducing real income in Europe and the U.S. had its mirror image in uprooting people from vast farm lands, destroying incipient industry, consolidating domination over natural resources and cementing oppressive political order in the global south. Facilitating ease in capital investments from the U.S. and Europe into Southern Hemisphere economies meant massive human dislocation and a pipeline of immigrants and refugees heading up to the North. Investments that were intended to increase the profit margins of multi-national corporations and capitalize central bank balance sheets in the U.S. and Europe is the primary driving engine behind the chaos underway across the globe, including the global north.
The collapse of the neoliberal economic and political order is visible across the global south, and the outcome has ushered in civil wars, military coups, ethnic and religious strife with hundreds of thousands, if not already millions, dead. Europe and the U.S. witnessed the loss of jobs, cyclical recessions, almost a depression level of loss in manufacturing and massive influx of immigrants and war refugees. The economic hardship meeting an influx of immigrants and refugees produced the needed subjectivity to marshal the xenophobic forces to the ballot box. Adding to the above, Europe’s and the U.S.’s resort to military intervention so as to cement hegemonic control of oil, natural gas and market shares in the Middle East and Africa added to the call to vote.

The election results in the U.S. and Europe over the past few years should be seen as a distorted response to the global crisis. Attempts to solve the problem by building walls, increased deportation and making immigration or human movement more difficult addressed the symptoms and not the real causes behind the crisis. Also, promising to bring back manufacturing jobs and massive infrastructure spending will create the illusion of problem solving since the underpinnings of the real crisis will not be touched. Furthermore, President-elect Trump has already ushered to the financial sector his readiness to remove whatever weak regulations that were put in place after the 2008 financial sector collapse.

Trump’s economic proposals, if adopted, and I have the feeling that they will rapidly be pushed through Congress and the Senate, will produce a much more accelerated levels of wealth concentration. The infrastructure spending will be carried out on the basis of debt financing that will be a boon to the banking industry, which is ready once again to leverage the economy for the benefit of the few. Furthermore, cutting corporate taxes and reducing the rates paid by the rich will re-introduce the discredited theory of trickle-down economics, which will end up costing jobs in the long run and creating another major financial crisis in few years from today.

The neoliberal economic order was cooked up in the global north, wedded into corrupt and militarized elites in the global south and produced the unfolding chaos across the world. Trump and extreme right-wing political parties across Europe are promising to bring about economic change to the middle and working class and the poor, but don’t hold your breath on such promises since this train has come around before and it left devastation and broken lives across the globe.
What is certain is that the rich will get even more obscenely rich, and the poor and the working class will be sold downstream again as a commodified product to be auctioned during election time. The whole edifice being constructed by right-wing parties and politicians is centered on monetizing working class pain and suffering into votes and seats of power, and then coming back and robbing the same people again. Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me. The neoliberal economic order is the problem, and shifting the blame or racializing the causes by targeting immigrants and Muslims is a right-wing game intended to prevent a real change from taking shape.

Hatem Bazian
University of California, Berkeley
Co-Founder, Zaytuna College

Maxwell Leung
California College of the Arts
Special Volume Editor’s Statement: Comparative Approaches to the Study of Islamophobia in Europe and Beyond

Farid Hafez
University of Salzburg

ISLAMOPHOBIA STUDIES JOURNAL

Published by:
Islamophobia Research and Documentation Project,
Center for Race and Gender, University of California, Berkeley.

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Comparing Islamophobia with other phenomena is nothing new. Recent scholarship in Islamophobia Studies primarily conceptualizes Islamophobia as a form of racism, especially within the Anglo-Saxon scientific community. At the same time, scholars in different areas of the world explore Islamophobia by drawing on the most popular and widest studied forms of racism, e.g. anti-Semitism in Germany, anti-Communism in the United States and anti-Black racism in Britain and the USA.

This special issue of the Islamophobia Studies Journal takes a closer look at comparative research on Islamophobia. Farid Hafez starts with an article on the state of the art of contemporary comparative studies on anti-Semitism and Islamophobia and takes especially German and English literature into consideration. He concludes in presenting blind spots of both traditions and identifies fruitful future research to be done. Fatih Ünal analyzes both phenomena in their structural and dispositional similarities and differences from a social psychological perspective based on a survey with young adults from Berlin. Also Henk Dekker and Jolanda van der Noll conducted a study based on Dutch youths’ attitudes toward Islam and Muslims, and their attitudes toward Judaism and Jews. They ask to what extent Islamophobia is empirically a unique phenomenon, or that it is not fundamentally different from negative attitudes toward other out-groups. They conclude that in order to understand individual differences in Islamophobia, one needs to consider cognitions and emotions targeted at Islam and Muslims specifically. Based on a comparative understanding of anti-Muslim racism in Hannover (Germany) and Vienna (Austria), Eva Kalny presents strategies of how to counter Islamophobia in the classroom. Ineke Van der Valk explores the state of the art of racism and Islamophobia Studies. She argues that unlike anti-Semitism, racism as well as Islamophobia are an under-researched field of study. She shows how academics, politics and the police struggle with social problems and concepts. Based on a case study on police practices she illustrated that the under-theorization and lack of recognition and know-how of problems related to racism and discrimination toward Muslims is not only detrimental for science, but also has undesirable practical implications. Peter O’Brien examines a form of resistance to Islamophobia in what he calls “Europhobia” (essentializing and distorting depictions of Europe [and the West] as thoroughly decadent, corrupt, and sadistic) by Islamists. With the category of “inverted othering”, he systemically compares Islamophobic and Europhobic discourse in Europe.

A theory-informed article, which discusses Islamophobia as anti-Muslim racism is presented by Fanny Uri-Müller and Benjamin Opratko. Wolfgang Aschauer presents the multidimensional nature of Islamophobia with the help of a Mixed Method Approach to construct the Attitudes Towards Muslims Scale (ATMS). Stephanie Wright looks at the recent discourse of Islamophobes in the USA on ‘Creeping Sharia’. She analyzes these recent discourses in light of broader historical and discursive practices in the United States. Two
cases are analyzed: the debates over the US Constitution in 1787-88; and anti-Mormon polemics in the mid-nineteenth century. Coskun Canan and Naika Foroutan demonstrate in their article what they call “the paradox of equal belonging of Muslims.” Adapting Axel Honneth and Ferdinand Sutterlüty’s model of normative paradox, they show how the ongoing process of social integration of Muslims produces reverse effects of disrespect. They present the first results of a representative telephone survey conducted among German citizens with more than 8,000 respondents. By using representative surveys from Germany (2005, 2007, and 2011), Marcus Eisentraut and Aribert Heyder try to examine several causes of Islamophobia. With the help of structural equation modeling, they investigate the effect of age and education on perceptions of Islam and Muslims.

ENDNOTES

1 Wolfgang Benz, Antisemitismus und Islamkritik: Bilanz und Perspektive, Metropol Verlag.


3 Growing up with racism in Britain, Socialist Review, October 2010 #351, ed. by Zita Holbourne/Weyman, Bennett/Hesketh, Benoit/Marcia, Rigg

Comparing Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: The State of the Field

Farid Hafez
University of Salzburg

ISLAMOPHOBIA STUDIES JOURNAL
VOLUME 3, NO. 2, Spring 2016, PP. 16-34.

Published by:
Islamophobia Research and Documentation Project,
Center for Race and Gender, University of California, Berkeley.

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Comparing Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: The State of the Field

Farid Hafez
University of Salzburg

“Vienna shall not become Jerusalem”
—Karl Lueger, Major of Vienna, c. 1910

“Vienna shall not become Istanbul”
—Heinz Christian Strache, Chair of the Austrian Freedom Party, 2005

ABSTRACT: In the European public discourse on Islamophobia, comparisons of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia have provoked heated debates. The academic discourse has also touched on this issue, an example being the works of Edward Said, where he alludes to connections between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Following the 2003 publication of the Islamophobia report produced by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), which discusses the similarities between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism, scholars in various fields began a debate that compares and contrasts anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Participants in this debate include Matti Bunzl, Brian Klug, Sabine Schiffer, Nasar Meer, Wolfgang Benz, and many others. To some degree, the academias of the German- and English-speaking worlds have conducted this discourse separately.

This paper surveys, to a degree, the state of the field of the comparative approach to studying Islamophobia and anti-Semitism as a pair, and also presents some central topoi and associated questions. It aims to highlight primary insights that have been gained from such a comparison, including how this comparison has been discussed and criticized, and what similarities and differences have been identified on which levels. It questions which epistemological assumptions were made in taking such a comparative approach, and which political discourses—especially regarding the Holocaust and the conflict in Israel/Palestine (which are not part of this discussion)—have shaped this debate in many forums, including academia. Furthermore, this paper discusses which possible aspects of comparative research on anti-Semitism and Islamophobia have not yet been explored, and where there could perhaps lay more possibilities for further investigation.

Keywords: anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, comparison, race, racism, discourse

INTRODUCTION

Soon after the introduction of the term ‘Islamophobia’ in public and academic debates, a debate arose regarding the possibilities and limits of comparative approaches and analogies with respect to the relationship between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Although Edward Said stated in his magnum opus, Orientalism, that anti-Semitism was Islam’s “strange secret-sharer,” and later also cited the similarities between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism, only a few scholars took this discussion up. One instigator of a lively academic debate on the subject after Said was the anthropologist Matti Bunzl, which was precipitated by his 2005 volume, Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in
This article was in response to a report on Islamophobia and anti-Semitism presented by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in 2003, and consequently led to a critical debate about Bunzl’s theories, which included commentaries by Brian Klug, Paul Silverstein, and others. This debate still stirs controversy, and is frequently a starting point of current arguments about the relationship between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism. Along with a number of monographs and anthologies, three journals have dedicated special issues to investigating the relationship between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in recent years: European Societies (2012), Ethnic and Racial Studies (2013), and Patterns of Prejudice (2014). German scholars, in particular, have dedicated time to studying this relationship, despite only a few being known in global academia or outside of the German-speaking world.

Meanwhile, claims of parallels between anti-Semitic and Islamophobic experiences, as well as discussions of the possibility and impossibility of such comparisons, have caused many public controversies. Brian Klug discusses the statement made in 2008 by Britain’s first Muslim minister, Shahid Malik, when he said, “I think most people would agree that, if you ask Muslims today what they feel like, they feel like the Jews of Europe.” A similar premise is contained in Wolfgang Benz’s op-ed published in 2010, where he states that a comparative approach in studying Islamophobia and anti-Semitism would be a sensible source of insights into a relatively new phenomenon (Islamophobia), drawing on the long-established field of anti-Semitism studies in Germany. This comparative perspective was also shared by Jews, such as the Dutch politician, Job Cohen. He was harshly criticized when, shortly after the electoral success of Geert Wilder’s PVV party in the Netherlands, he compared his mother’s sense of exclusion in the years leading up to World War II to the current circumstances of Muslims in Europe. Cohen, a Social Democrat, was then attacked as “Amsterdam’s decoy Jew.” But John Bunzl titled one of his op-eds The Protocols of the Elders of Mecca, deploying longstanding tropes in anti-Semitism studies.

This paper aims to provide an overview of the status of this intellectual examination and political debate, recounting the discussions and scrutinizing the fundamental questions raised, but also identifying some of the blind spots associated with such an undertaking. To begin with, in the following section, I will discuss the relevant political implications of this review. The second section will present the different levels of comparative analysis that have presently been covered and investigated. The following section will discuss the issue of race as a mutual blind spot of Islamophobia- and anti-Semitism studies. Next, will be discussed another topic that has received little attention: the use of both ideologies as a “tool of power.” In the concluding section, I will attempt to sum up the potentials of such comparative analyses.

**HOW MUCH POLITICS?**

In an interview of Sindre Bangstad with Matti Bunzl (both anthropologists) in 2009, the latter argued that “no comparison is neutral…. If one undertakes a comparison… in the broadest sense we can always find, between essentially any two groups, similarities and differences. And it is often a political choice or an analytic choice whether we want to foreground the similarities or the difference.” Bunzl defines the similarities and differences of both phenomena. Although he argues that “Islamophobia, in a political sense, is more pressing than anti-Semitism,” at the same time—in the context of some people arguing that Muslims are the new Jews of...
Europe—he emphasizes that “the fate of European Jewry, which we associate today with the catastrophe of the Holocaust, is not something that... is conceivable today for any population.” As such, in his view the parallels of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are that both groups “are imagined... as being Other, as being outside the frame of what is considered normal.” At the same time he stresses that, “while anti-Semitism was designed to protect the purity of the ethnic nation-state, Islamophobia is marshalled to safeguard the future of European civilization.” So, from a political perspective, Bunzl seems to be interested in gaining insight into patterns of both phenomena in an analytical sense, while not only distinguishing their function (nation-state versus supranational order), which could likewise be contextualized as part of different historical patterns, but also by especially making a political statement that “never again” (Holocaust) is a political reality. Certainly, such a wish would be shared by most people today (although there are exceptions, such as white supremacists), but it remains no more than a wish. As racism scholars Malcolm Brown and Robert Miles assert, ethnic cleansing in the West has happened since World War II, with the racialized Bosnian Muslims as the victims. Thus, other authors argue, in relation to the Holocaust, that it is “essential not to use that invocation of uniqueness to close down the possibility that a combined if not a comparative discussion of its horrors and its patterns of legitimation might be fruitful in making sense of modern racisms.”

Bunzl stands in stark contrast to David Cesarani, who goes as far as calling it “positively dangerous” to compare anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, and criticizes Bunzl for “downplaying anti-Semitism and exaggerating Islamophobia.” The main weakness of Cesarani’s argument, in my view, is that he treats “Muslim” and “Islam” as ontological categories. He is not one of those scholars who argue—based on long established insights into anti-Semitism studies—that Islamophobia tells us more about the Islamophobe than it tells us about Islam and Muslims.

An important political dimension, which is often inherent in a public debate on anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, is the historical uniqueness of the killing of six million Jews. Stating that anti-Semitism and Islamophobia have something in common is especially troubling to those in power who should fight Islamophobia more than they do. Along these lines, Sabine Schiffer and Constantin Wagner argue that it is “absurd to claim that Muslims today are in the same situation as Jews ‘back then’ ... instead, the goal should be to recognize racist mechanisms before even the threat of a comparable situation arises... The fact that we must assume that a total catastrophe is capable of repetition must be treated separately from the fact that the Shoah is a historically singular phenomenon, and that victims and perpetrators can be named specifically.” Such perspectives are rather rare in academic debates, to say nothing of public ones, and as Esther Romeyn analyzes from the Dutch perspective (which, in my opinion, can also be argued for many other European countries), the redemptive use of the Holocaust and the Shoah as lessons for a post-racial Europe serves a nationalist and racist conceit that constructs European identity against disenfranchised Muslim populations. She concludes:

If the Holocaust provides the moral compass of the new Europe, its lessons need to be universalized, and extended beyond the uniqueness of the Holocaust and the specificity of anti-Semitism and Jewish suffering to include all forms of exclusion, discrimination and intolerance.
In fact, one could even interpret Romeyn’s line of thinking as liberating the Holocaust from being misused and reduced to a historical incident, and from being constructed as a unique and “never again” possibility. I would also add that this reduction of anti-Semitism to the Holocaust is misleading and dangerous, as it not only blurs the historical dimension of anti-Semitism, but also makes it impossible to grasp contemporary anti-Semitism. Scholars like Micha Brumlik or Brian Klug, who—based on the assumption above—have worked with such a comparison, have decisively pointed out that comparison does not mean equation. Wolfgang Benz has added that the comparison of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia does not mean to equate Jews and Muslims as facing the same situation. On the contrary, comparing always leaves the question open as to whether one will find parallels, differences, or, in most cases, both. Brian Klug further points out that the question is whether analogies between the two phenomena are strong or weak. And, if one selects similarities or differences, this reflects, politically, the “larger agenda that we are promoting,” and “analytically, they depend on the enquiry that we are pursuing.” He then takes his argument a step further: “We can ask other questions: Are the two phenomena alike in terms of their sources or causes? Do they have a similar impact on the lives of Jews and Muslims? Is the scale of bigotry comparable?” In his article, Klug gives a simple answer to the question of whether anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are analogous. He says: yes and no. Furthermore, for the sake of shedding light on the social and political realities that confront us, if analogy helps us to do so, Klug invites us to embrace it. Additionally, Schiffer and Wagner argue that it is important to distinguish between comparisons on different levels. This is what will be done in the next section.

LEVELS OF COMPARISON

The Nature of Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia

Departing from an assumption that anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are based on imaginings and constructions, some scholars of psychology and psychoanalysis argue that anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are also “the shadow of Western civilization, a de-civilization of war and violence against the internal ‘other’ of Western civilization: Jewry and Islam, the crusades and the Shoah,” and hence share a common nature, a “deeply embedded culture” (Tiefenkultur). According to Wilfried Graf, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia both serve as the historical “collective preconscious” and “unconscious” in the Freudian sense, which can thus be historically, socially, and culturally coined, shaped, and changed. For Graf, on an ideological and collective level, they stand in for the vacancy left by Communism and Catholicism in the mid-1980s. According to him, both are surrogates for this emptiness.

Anti-Semitism, as the much more familiar object of investigation in much of the academic literature on the comparison of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism, clearly serves as the starting point of thought and argument on Islamophobia. It is not surprising that scholars like Moshe Zuckermann argue that, because anti-Semitism is taboo in Germany, and because anti-Semites cannot openly utter anti-Semitic statements anymore, Islamophobia may have become an outlet for hidden or latent anti-Semitism. At the same time, these analyses indicate a similarity in the meanings, as well as the functions, of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism.
While Matti Bunzl has argued that both Islamophobia and anti-Semitism function as the Other, Brian Klug adds that they share more attributes in relation to Europe. First of all, both religions have a troubled relationship to Christianity. According to Klug, while Christianity is portrayed as the forbearing, forgiving religion, Judaism and Islam are conceived as legalistic, vengeful, and merciless religions. Second, both religions have tended to be regarded as antithetical to Enlightenment. And third, both are part of the history of what Said calls Orientalism. The Jew was, for a long time, seen as the “Asiatic Oriental” within Europe, while the Muslim was the Oriental outside. Klug further points to the fact that the figures of Jew and Muslim were very different in the Enlightenment as well as in Orientalism, and, therefore, calls for further investigation into the logics that these representations imply. But there is no doubt a relation between the figures of Jew and Muslim in Western experience. One indication of this is that the most humiliated and physically degraded Jews in Nazi concentration camps were called Muselmänner, or Muslims, because the Nazis knew them as people who prostrated themselves on the ground.

**Historical Perspectives**

The historical dimension of comparison is, interestingly enough, a contested issue for some scholars. Some anti-Semitism scholars argue that Islamophobia is a very new phenomenon, while anti-Semitism is two thousand years old. Others have refuted this argument simply by pointing to Said’s famous Orientalism treatise, and many other historical works, showing that Islam has been Christianity’s “Other” from the Enlightenment to the present, despite there not being a traceable linear pathway. This restriction of the notion of Islamophobia to a contemporary object has consequently restricted comparative studies because anti-Semitism is generally perceived as a much wider, encompassing territory from Christian anti-Judaism/Judeophobia, to völkisch anti-Semitism, to secondary anti-Semitism. The historical restriction of Islamophobia to a solely contemporary phenomenon has excluded deeper, historically comparative, investigations.

In contrast to this line of argument, Anya Topolski has asserted that both anti-Semitism and Islamophobia have been the religious Others of a Europe perceived as Christian. But the implications of certain historical narratives have only been touched upon. A systematic analysis is missing. Psychoanalytical approaches—such as that of Freud himself—have stressed that some of the hatred towards Jews is based on deeply religious differences. Some anti-Semitism scholars argue that Jewish monotheism ultimately removes Christianity’s illusion of divinity. One could ask if the revelation of Islam’s last Prophet, Muhammad, namely that the Virgin Mary’s son would descend and “break the cross and kill the swine,” might also mark a symbolic dissociation in a dialectic relationship of the geographical and religious historical propinquity to monopolize truth.

However, even without immersing ourselves in psychoanalytical theory while remaining in the realm of culture, we cannot forget that images of Islam as a heretic cult—the Ka’ba as an idol, Muhammad as an areligious hedonist, and the anti-Christ himself—had been constitutive moments in Europe’s imagination and its creation. As Nxy Matar states, “Jews were stigmatized for ‘crucifying’ Jesus, so were Muslims stigmatized for circumcising Christians.” Glynnis Cousin and Robert Fine rightly point out that racism (including anti-Muslim racism) and anti-Semitism “have a connected history that is rooted in the formative period of European modernity,” which is linked to the “formation of homogenous Christian nations within a Europe that was achieved through the ‘exclusion’ of Jews and Moors.”
Cousin and Fine argue that, with two forms of violence—the expulsion and persecution of Muslims and Jews from Spain and the institutionalization of the Atlantic slave trade—the idea of “Europe” was born. But this is a rarely adopted historical perspective. After World War II, “race relations” focused on the disadvantaged and discriminated-against minorities, and Jews were increasingly seen as part of white Europe. But rather than creating bonds of solidarity between minorities with common histories, there arose a “competition of victimhood” between Jews and people of color. This can be said as much for Muslims and Jews.

The former head of the Berlin-based Center for Research on Anti-Semitism, Wolfgang Benz, who is a leading figure in the German-speaking debate on the relation of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, has supported a comparative approach of contemporary Islamophobia and historical Christian, as well as Völkisch, anti-Semitism. He reminds us that Jews were charged with well-poisoning in 1321, based on the notion that Muslims had incited them to do so. During the Reformation, Jews were portrayed as the companions of the devil, who had a pact with the Turks. He argues that, just as Jewish “emancipation” and the definition of German Jewish identity were at the heart of the debate regarding German anti-Semitism during the last century, such is the case now in Islamophobic debates. This time the question is not the emancipation of Jews, but the “integration” of Muslims.

Benz proceeds to list many parallels of how Muslims are similarly marked as “the Other” in comparison to Jews in Germany. Interestingly enough, a number of rhetorical strategies are nearly identical. Consequently, many scholars have concentrated on analyzing anti-Semitic and Islamophobic discourses.

**Analyzing Discourses**

Especially in Germany, where anti-Semitism has historically played a major role and is deeply enshrined in the society’s history, many scholars have emphasized the identical styles of arguments, images, and discourses used to exclude Jews and Muslims from the constructed “we.” Schiffer and Wagner were the first to present a large study of shared patterns in anti-Semitic and Islamophobic discourses, in which they identified “collective constructions, dehumanisation, misinterpretation of religious imperatives (proof by ‘sources’), and conspiracy theories.” The “parallel society” of Muslims becomes what was the Jewish “state within a state” in European societies. As political scientist Jana Kübel has shown, the link to religion is the very shared basis of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. In one instance, Islam is a religion, in the next it is culture, but it is always something alien. Religion, in this wider sense, becomes the common thread of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. The alien religion becomes the antimodernist object. The Islamic ummah (community) becomes the object in contrast to the nation, as was the case with the global Jewish community. While the global Jewish community was said to have exerted power due to its access to capital, the Islamization of the world is said to be happening via demographics and a number of Jihad projects. Behind mosques and synagogues lurks the parallel society, which is incompatible with the majority. The calls to assimilation in terms of how to build mosques and synagogues are based on a desire for homogeneity and national purity. Kübel also discusses obvious differences, such as the image of women. Gendered Islamophobia represents Islam as a masculine religion that oppresses women, while, in anti-Semitic thought, Judaism is a feminine religion, with the woman as a sexualized seductress.
In fact, the rhetorical parallels in the German-speaking context are almost too obvious, as illustrated by the following two examples. The far-right political party in Austria, the Freedom Party (FPÖ), used a slogan during an election campaign in 2004 saying that “Vienna should not become Istanbul.” Back in 1994, a similar slogan “Vienna should not become Chicago” had been used (referring to the black population in Vienna). But interestingly enough, Karl Lueger, the godfather of Adolf Hitler’s anti-Semitism, used the slogan “Vienna should not become Jerusalem,” referring to the many Jewish people (some of whom were traditional rather than assimilated). Another example would be the discourse on Verjudung. While Adolf Hitler himself accused the Socialist Parties of being verjudet (Jewified), the FPÖ argued during the Viennese election campaigns that the Social Democratic Party in Vienna was an Islamist party. Muslims were taking over the party, usurping it, they said. The Social Democrats would Islamicize the country and oppress women. A campaign slogan stated: “We protect women’s rights. The SPÖ makes people wear a headscarf.”

Although many of these discursive constructions are interesting to look at, as they reveal important insights into the discursive construction of the Other, one must always keep in mind that, in anti-Semitism and Islamophobia work, images of the Other are very fluid and can change easily, depending on the interests of the anti-Semite and the Islamophobe. Therefore, while the question of similarity and difference in an actual discourse may be helpful to understand exclusionary practices, they should not be seen as an end in themselves.

**Conspiracy Theories: Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia as Explanatory Categories**

Some scholars argue that only anti-Semitism claims to explain the whole world for anti-Semites, whereas Islamophobia works differently. According to those scholars, anti-Semitism is an irrational construct with little basis in reality, but a long history. Again, these authors treat Islam and Muslims as ontological categories, and, therefore, only support the Islamophobic discourses that they intend to critique and deconstruct. It seems they are blind toward the existence of Islamophobia in dominant groups, arguing that Islamophobia can only be found in fringe right-wing groups. But these are exactly the features that scholars like Mattias Gardell believe to constitute Islamophobia. In his analysis of Anders Behring Breivik’s manifesto, he argues:

Breivik evokes a Manichean struggle between the forces of Light and Darkness, alleging that the Western world is locked in an apocalyptic conflict with “Islam,” depicted as a sinister Being who tirelessly seeks the eradication of Christian Europe. Muslims are constructed as an imagined collective, by “nature” bestowed with inherent, timeless, and malevolent features said to derive from “Islam,” which sets them apart from universal man. The racist logic underlying the figure of the Eternal Muslim is integral to the theory of an Islamic world conspiracy that Breivik promotes, and allows Breivik to link Muslims “here” with the perceived threat from Muslims “there.”
In fact, such Islamophobic thought is not confined to Anders Behring Breivik. As other scholars have likewise shown in their research on Breivik’s manifesto, it draws on various source texts from the far right, but also on so-called mainstream public discourse. Let us consider two examples of such conspiracy theories that can be found elsewhere. One of the most prolific writers of Islamophobic texts, Hans-Peter Raddatz, from Germany, writes in his book, *From Allah to Terror* (Von Allah zum Terror):

No pope, no cardinal, no politician has demonstrated commitment to the interests of Islam, economic liberalism, the Mafia, and Freemasonry as comprehensively as Pope John Paul II, the esoterically trained Karol Wojtyla.65

Here, Islam becomes a force of evil, used to undermine real Christianity and European identity. In a manifesto published by a number of European right wing youth organizations, Islamists are portrayed as a force working together with Marxists, neo-liberals, and capitalists.66 Popularly cited literature, such as *Eurabia* by Gisèle Littman (Bat Ye’or), has become well-known in circles of Islamophobes, who echo its arguments that the world is being taken over. Such literature can also be found with more “mainstream” authors, such as the late Italian intellectual Orianna Fallaci, British polemicist Niall Ferguson, or the German economist Thilo Sarrazin. In addition, some documents have been “discovered” that are held up as proof of the conspiracy theory that Muslims want to take over the world. Similar to the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, a document called *An Explanatory Memorandum: On the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America* purports to explain how the Muslim Brotherhood wants to take over the USA, working in concert with the Muslim Brother, Barack Hussein Obama.67 These conspiracy theories reveal the notion, not of an inferior, but a “smart Muslim,” as it is the case with the figure of the “smart Jew.” An example is Geert Wilders’s statement on the war of Muslim elites: “Muslim elites wage a total war against the population everywhere in Europe. They continue with mass immigration and Islamization, which in the end leads to an Islamized Europe, a Eurabia.”68

But Islam does not become merely one force among many. In Breivik’s manifesto, Islamization is supported by various players. And as Gardell shows, in Islamophobic thinking, “Islam” gains agency of its own: “In Islamophobia literature, we encounter an ‘Islam’ that walks, talks, commands, oppresses, hates, deceives, conspires, wages war, expands, and retracts.”69 As observed in anti-Semitism, the argument is made that the religion is inhumane, requiring its adherents to treat believers of other faiths immorally and aggressively.70 This becomes the basis for a representation of “Muslimness” as an inescapable category. Because Islam moves on its own, Gardell writes that “Islam seems to be the source of an inborn essence of eerie ‘Muslimness.’”71 This aspect of Islamophobia is very often taken as a basis for a fundamental difference between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: some argue that anti-Semitism constructs the “eternal Jew,” who cannot escape his Jewishness when Jewish identity is represented as a race rather than a religious category. For that reason, Jews cannot convert to Christianity, as advocated by Christian anti-Judaism. Rather, they are, and will always be, Jews.72 This shift “in alterity from religion to race”73 marks an important aspect, as it does not point to a religion and a religious actor, but rather imagines the “eternal Jew.” Klug elaborates the definition of anti-Semitism as hostility towards Jews as Jews by saying “Jews are perceived as something other than what they are. Or perhaps more accurately, hostility towards Jews as *not Jews*.”74 He goes on to argue that in this process, “anti-Semitism is the process of turning Jews into ‘Jews.’”75 At the
same time, we should not forget that this notion of anti-Semitism also allowed for exceptions. Recall Adolf Hitler’s private physician, Eduard Bloch, who, according to Hitler, was not a “normal Jew,” and, if all Jews were like Bloch, there would never have been any problem. Hitler considered Bloch to be an *Edeljude*, a “noble Jew.” This image could exist alongside the killing of six million Jews because these images are not rational and ultimately depend on the group in power.

Considering the above case, it bears remembering that the figure of the Other is very fluid and may vary by context. In a seminar of the Austrian far-right party, Elisabeth Sabbaditsch-Wolff, a central figure in the global Islamophobic network, taught an introductory course on Islam. There, she gave an answer to a student asking how to assess a Muslim person who joins the far-right party. Her answer clearly draws on the ideas discussed above. According to Sabbaditsch-Wolff, this person can only lie because Muslims are taught by their religion to deceive others, to apply the principle of *taqiyya* (dissimulation). This was obligatory to all Muslims, she said, and the only reason any Muslim would want to join a far-right party is to save his or her own soul for the future. Based on these accounts, authors like Gardell argue that, although Muslims do not constitute a race, Islamophobia operates as racism. This leads us to what may be one of the most interesting aspects of the current discussion on the relationship between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: the question of race.

**RACE: A COMMON BLIND SPOT?**

In the introduction to the special issue of *European Societies* regarding “Anti-Semitism, Racism, and Islamophobia,” the editors claim that, due to the difficulty of establishing anti-Semitism studies as one of the varieties of racism to be researched, they decided “to avoid the risk of diluting the [anti-Semitism] by subsuming it to the [racism].” And, as Glynis Cousin and Robert Fine have shown, there were many historical reasons for the separation of anti-Semitism and racism studies, especially after World War II. In fact, the same issue seems to have been plagued by many authors who treated Islamophobia as a prejudice, resentment, or exclusionary ideology. The incessant quibbling over semantics poses an obstacle to an approach that studies Islamophobia along the same lines as racism. Besides, that is why some Islamophobia scholars consciously decline to use the term Islamophobia at all, preferring to call it “anti-Muslim racism.” Others, such as Hatem Bazian and Ramon Grosfuegel or Enes Bayrakli and me in our European Islamophobia Report, use Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism interchangeably and thus consider Islamophobia to be a racist phenomenon. Thus, the obstacles stemming from this confusion of the relationship of race and religion in the phenomenon of Islamophobia are manifold. In my view, it is not helpful to regard Islamophobia studies as a field of study separate from racism or post-colonial studies. That is why I defined Islamophobia as anti-Muslim racism in the *European Islamophobia Report* project, newly launched in 2015. Nevertheless, this undertaking goes hand in hand with several political and scholarly problems.

One political problem, especially, but not only, in Europe, is the proclamation of a post-racist world order. When UNESCO declared in its 1969 publication, *Four Statements on the Race Question*, that the “biological fact” of race had to be distinguished from the “social myth” of race, it proposed alternative categories. Due to the abuse of the notion of race, ethnicity and culture were introduced as social and cultural classifiers. According to Alana Lentin, this partly resulted in the separation of race from politics, the proclamation of a post-racial era, and the muffling of discussion of race. Some anti-Semitism scholars seem to
have taken this path, as the introduction to the aforementioned *European Societies* issue shows. Still, many do include anti-Semitism studies in a wider field of racism studies, and others have coined the notion of “cultural racism” to problematize this silencing and reveal ongoing racist discourses in a new guise.

Nasar Meer shows that, just as anti-Semitism studies is positioned far away from racism studies, the same can be said for Islamophobia studies: “It is striking to observe the virtual absence of an established literature on race and racism in the discussion of Islamophobia.” Meer acknowledges that race and religion overlapped prior to the formation of modernity. He also criticizes a blind spot in many theories of racism that neglect to identify religion “as the principle marker of difference.” Quoting Ash Amin, he points out that, even today, Muslims’ bodies are identified by “linking vicariously constructed phenotypes (including prayer caps, beards…) to terrorism, radical Islam, sexual slavery, drug trafficking and cultural backwardness.” Here, Meer discovers racialization as a core component in anti-Semitic, as well as in Islamophobic, sentiments, employing racialization, as developed by Robert Miles, in the sense of attributing “meaning to somatic characteristics.”

One productive way to discuss the relationship between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in conjunction with race and racism is Anya Topolski’s approach. Her essay, *How Jews and Muslims Became Races*, draws on W.E.B. Du Bois’s reference to the relationship between race and religion (which he rediscovered during his stay in Poland), and Frantz Fanon’s analysis of anti-Semitism as a non-color-based racism. Topolski argues that the rise of the new “science” of philology, at a time when the church and theology were losing authority, was what led people to be classified, not along religious lines (Christians, Jews, Mohammedans, and the rest), but along linguistic ones (Semitic, Aryan, and Turanian). This brand of philology, which gained favor around the 1840s, led to the merging of another category of differentiation between Semites and Orientals on one side, and Europeans on the other. Drawing on Anidjar, Topolski argues that this mixture led to a racialization of religion. Anti-Semitism, in its modern form, did not come about until the birth of the nation-state, she says, and she draws on Meer and Modood, arguing that Islamophobia, as cultural racism, has become the new internal Other for Europe after the immigration waves following World War II. She concludes that Europe has not learned the lessons of the Shoah in the face of two “religion”-based forms of racism. Meer also stresses that the first time the notion of *race* appeared in a dictionary (in a sixteenth-century dictionary by Sebastian de Covarrubias), it was synonymous with the words “blood” and “religion.” Racialized discourses also confused religion and race, as Robert Miles shows in the case of Pope Urban II’s speech to mobilize the crusades, but also in the case of Arabs, Saracens, and Turks, with whom Muslims were identified. Prior to the Reconquista, the Prophet Muhammad was also portrayed as a dark-skinned, satanic menace.

But even if we see the issue of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia through the lens of a post-racial world order, then a cultural racism, a “racism without race” that takes culture rather than biology or skin color as a basis for an “insurmountable difference,” as Étienne Balibar explains, exists. In that sense, for him, post-World War II anti-Semitism becomes a prototype of “neo-racism.” Along with these additional questions as to the nature, discourse, and relational dimensions of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, one of the most relevant aspects seems to be the question of politics. That is, to what purposes are anti-Semitism and Islamophobia applied. In my view, Islamophobia studies must spend more time interrogating the political aims behind these structures.
ANOTHER BLIND SPOT: AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POWER

In my reading, Islamophobia is used as an instrument of power, a *Herrschaftsinstrument*, in the desire to gain, keep, and extend *Herrschaft* (power). This is the case when wars are waged by the West and (partly) legitimized by arguing that it will free women from fundamentalists, as in Afghanistan, or when the War on Terror was evoked—a “holy crusade”—against “radical Islam,” as was the case in the aftermath of 9/11 and with the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This has also been the case in the War on Terror in general, where 9/11 has resulted in systematic racial profiling targeting Muslims as visible and suspect subjects, singling them out based on their appearance, their nationality, and their religious beliefs. Post-colonial conditions are present in many countries all over the world, be it in France, where the banlieus with big Muslim populations have become veritable militarized zones where young people are harassed and criminalized, or generally throughout Europe, as Liz Fekete has shown in regard to migration and security policies. Disciplining the Muslim subject has become a central agenda in the nation-state’s Islam policies, as various authors have shown is the case in Germany. One reason for this tendency may rest in the fact that Islamophobia has been informed by post-colonial scholarship on three levels, as Nasar Meer argues: first, that “historical colonial dynamics are reproduced in contemporary postcolonial environments,” second, in “the utility of Orientalist critique for the Islamophobia concept,” and third, “that the ‘making of Muslims’ is signaled by the emergence of the concept of Islamophobia.” Analyzing the relationship of power, representation, and knowledge as a central aim of postcolonial studies based on Said’s writings has had a lasting impact on scholars of Islamophobia, including Hatem Bazian. But still, an examination of Islamophobia studies reveals that many of the central writings of postcolonial studies are hardly reflected in the field at all.

Above all that, Islamophobia is never conceptualized as a *Herrschaftsinstrument*. Anti-Semitism studies tend to pay less attention to these proceedings, and tend to be occupied by discourse analysis, and the separating of conspiracy theories from power structures. Although some of the comparative works have analyzed anti-Semitism and Islamophobia as tools of identity politics that serve to reduce, essentialize, generalize, and fixate upon differences in order to separate the constructed acceptable, normal, and preferable from the unacceptable and abnormal to exclude and discriminate them, these elaborations have merely been on a theoretical level. On the side of the Jewish imagination, this may also be due to the fact that “race relations” have put their emphases on socially disadvantaged and discriminated-against minorities, while Jews were increasingly perceived as white, and started belonging to an upwardly mobile community in Europe and North America, and were, hence, perceived as privileged. This is not the case for the majority of Muslims in the West, who today are at the center of identity debates in the Global North. Thus, it is not surprising that much of the current research on Islamophobia exhibits a growing interest in studying how Islamophobia is used as a tool of power to surveil, control, and discipline the Muslim subject. This may also be a reason why, in many ways, it makes more sense to look to racism studies than anti-Semitism studies. When Hatem Bazian studies how the New Counter-Intelligence Program envisions Muslims as enemies of the state, he clearly draws more on racism studies than on anything else.
CONCLUSIONS

To conclude, studying Islamophobia together with, and/or in relation to, anti-Semitism has provided deeper insights into Islamophobia, including the nature of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, their “shared” histories and discursive analyses, and also central aspects of both phenomena, such as global conspiracy theories and the emergence of Islamophobia as an explanatory category in ideology-driven groups. But the debate is still very much politicized. This can be observed when various scholars begin their comparative inquiry by defending the very legitimacy of such an investigation.

On the other hand, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia studies seem to share some common blind spots, such as the nearly total exclusion of race in the debate. Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are also trivialized and reduced to stereotypes without considering how they relate to issues of power. In addition, one can assume much more potential from comparative analyses. To illustrate: the vast literature on Jewish anti-Semitism (self-hatred of Jews) has almost no representation in Islamophobia studies, although central figures in Islamophobic discourses, such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Necla Kelek, and Hamed Abd-el Samed, act as “native informants” of racist discourses. Some scholars have drawn upon post-colonial literature, but theories from anti-Semitism studies are all but absent. Another strong tradition in anti-Semitism studies that could well-serve Islamophobia studies would be the investigation of sexuality, gender, and the psychoanalytical approach. Hence, it would make sense for Islamophobia scholars to dig a bit deeper into the vast knowledge base contained in anti-Semitism studies, when examining issues facing Muslims. At the same time, considering Islamophobia in relation to racism studies, and actually conceptualizing it as racism, can bring many more insights regarding Islamophobia’s current use as a tool of power, relating to concepts like institutionalized racism, how intelligence services build on images of the enemy, and, particularly, the vast literature of postcolonial studies.

ENDNOTES


5 http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/178-Report-RT3-en.pdf This was not the only document by an international organization that invoked or tried to tackle Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in the same declaration or report. See also: “UN World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance” held in Durban, South Africa from 31 August to 8 September 2001, the “Warsaw Declaration of May 2005,” a meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization (OIC) in May 2007, and the “Durban II Declaration of the United Nations” in 2009.


The most comprehensive examination of a comparative analysis, Schiffer and Wagner’s work, *Antisemitismus und Islamophobie: Ein Vergleich*, is one of the few that has been recognized in English due to their English article: Sabine Schiffer & Constantin Wagner, “Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia - new enemies, old patterns.” *Race and Class*, Vol. 52(3), 2011, pp. 77–84. At the same time, authors such as the long-time head of the Center for anti-Semitism studies in Berlin, Wolfgang Benz, who was one of the pioneers of bringing these issues together, never was received in the global debate to the confinement of his works to the German language.


Ibid. p. 226.

Ibid. p. 215.

Ibid. p. 215.


26 Schiffer & Wagner. *Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia*, p. 83.


28 Ibid.


32 Ibid.

33 Ibid. p. 455.

34 Ibid. p. 458.


36 Schiffer and Wagner propose a distinction between the “analytical/conceptual” level and the “empirical” level, but fail to provide any definition what they mean by “analytical,” “conceptual,” and “empirical.”


38 Ibid. p. 105.

39 Ibid. p. 104.


42 Ibid. p. 455.


44 Fink, W. *Islamisch zwischen Reformation und Aufklärung*


Ibid.


Ibid. p. 179.


Ibid. p. 81.


When Rommelspachers speaks of the ’Dominazgesellschaft’, what she means is a group of people, which has power. See: Attia, Iman/Köbsell, Swantje/Prasad/ Nivedita. Dominanzkultur reloaded. Neue Texte zu gesellschaftlichen Machtverhältnissen, Bielefeld, 2015.

Ibid. p. 41.


Ibid.

69 Gardell, M. “Crusader Dreams: Oslo 22/7, Islamophobia, and the Quest for a Monocultural Europe” Terrorism and Political Violence, 2014, 26:1, p. 133.


71 Ibid.

72 Some scholars have argued that Muslims can voluntarily change their religious status. Other like Modood have pointed out that this ignores that “people do not have a choice over the conditions of discrimination into which they are born” (Cited in: Meer, Semantics, scales and solidarities, 511). One could add here that an Islamophobic discourse even affects people who are consciously distancing themselves from being Muslim because they might be used to support Islamophobic thought, as they have chosen not to be Muslim anymore. And even if they do not want this, Islamophobes will look at them as living proof of Islam being something evil or backward. Otherwise, why would somebody abandon something good by choice?


75 Ibid. 227


78 Gardell, M. “Crusader Dreams: Oslo 22/7, Islamophobia, and the Quest for a Monocultural Europe” Terrorism and Political Violence, 2014, 26:1, p. 133.


81 See f.i. the works in German of Iman Attia, Yasemin Shooman, and recently Fanny Uri Müller.

82 See f.i. the first inaugural issue of the Islamophobia Studies Journal and the texts of Hatem Bazian, Ramon Grosfoguel, and Mohammad H. Tamdgidi.


84 The European Islamophobia Report is a project, which produces yearly reports on Islamophobia in more than 20 European countries and is planned to be published for the first time in Spring, 2016. Reports can be downloaded here: www.islamophobiaeurope.com.


87 Benz. 2011.
88 Balibar, Etienne (1991a). ‘Is there a Neo-Racism?’ In: Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, (eds), Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (pp. 17–28). London: Verso. Still, analytically, we are facing a number of problems. First of all is there a huge amount of literature on race and racism and therefore a number of academic debates around different notions of race, racism, and racialization, which makes it sometimes difficult to say precisely which notion of race has been applied. Nevertheless, it would be ignorant not to discuss the othering of religion together with the othering of race, culture, etc. Racialization—a signifying process that constructs differentiated social collectives as races (Miles 1989, 79)—is of utmost importance in othering groups as different, sometimes superior, sometimes inferior, and most importantly as hostile.


90 Ibid.

91 Amin 2010, cited in: Ibid. 503.


94 Meer, Nasar Racialization and religion, p. 387.

95 Brown & Miles, Racism, p. 29.

96 Meer, Nasar. Racialization and religion, p. 387.


98 Ibid. p. 24.


104 Ibid. pp. 505-6.


To mention only a few: An upcoming special edition of the Islamophobia Studies Journal on Institutionalized Islamophobia is planned. James Renton and Gil Anidjar have organized a conference on ‘Islamophobia and Surveillance: Genealogies of a Global Order’ to be published in a special edition of *Ethnic and Racial Studies*.


Islamophobia & Anti-Semitism: Comparing the Social Psychological Underpinnings of Anti-Semitic and Anti-Muslim Beliefs in Contemporary Germany

Fatih Ünal
Humboldt University, Berlin

ISLAMOPHOBIA STUDIES JOURNAL
VOLUME 3, NO. 2, Spring 2016, PP. 35-55.

Published by:
Islamophobia Research and Documentation Project,
Center for Race and Gender, University of California, Berkeley.

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**ABSTRACT:** In response to critical stances voiced in regard to a comparative approach toward Islamophobia and anti-Semitism, the aim of this paper is to account for these critiques, and to statistically re-analyze the two phenomena in their structural and dispositional similarities and differences. First, an alternative perspective on Islamophobia is proposed, which differentiates between anti-Islam sentiment and anti-Muslim prejudices, and additionally includes anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs as an integral component. Second, anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic prejudices and conspiracy beliefs are then compared in their social psychological correlates. For this purpose, an online survey was conducted with young adults from Berlin (N=450). The results indicate similarities and differences in the underlying social psychological mechanisms of both phenomena. Both anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic prejudices are partially explained by a personal ideology of inequality, e.g., social dominance orientation, the belief-in-a-just-world ideology, and racism. However, regarding the conspiracy beliefs, conspiracy mentality (Bruder et al. 2013)—a psychological construct that measures a general propensity towards conspiratorial thinking—better predicted anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs than anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs.

**INTRODUCTION**

To start with, comparison does not mean equalization. Anti-Semitism is not Islamophobia—Islamophobia is not anti-Semitism. The current situation for Muslims in Germany pales by comparison to the persecution and mass murder experienced by Jews under National Socialism in Germany. Likewise, the relatively short history of Islamophobic attitudes and narratives is greatly overshadowed by the millennia-long history of anti-Semitism. That being said, comparing anti-Semitism with anti-Arab and/or anti-Muslim attitudes is not a new phenomenon. As early as 1988, Etienne Balibar pointed to anti-Semitism in explaining anti-Arab hostility. In the German context, the Bielefeld-based research group (Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence), has been comparing Islamophobia and anti-Semitism from a social psychological perspective since 2002 (Heitmeyer et al. 2002-2010) as two syndromes of what they define as Group-Focused Enmity (Zick et al. 2008). However, this comparative approach came to the attention of a broader audience shortly after a 2008 conference on the subject at the renowned Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung, in Berlin. The goal of the conference was to discuss similarities and differences between anti-Semitic and Islamophobic prejudices, narratives, and discourses (Benz 2008, 2011 Schiffer/Wagner 2010; Shooman 2012; Hafez 2013; Schneiders 2014), which in turn triggered heated debates in the academic and public discourses, questioning whether or not these two constructs are comparable to each other (Küntzl 2008; Schoeps 2010; Pfahl-Traughber 2012).
Two of the main arguments—opposing, or at least questioning a comparative approach toward Islamophobia and anti-Semitism—that have been voiced in the aftermath of the conference, can be labeled as: (1) the absence of Islam-/Muslim-related conspiracy theories (Küntzl 2008; Schoeps 2010); and, (2) the absence of an appropriate and comparable definition and measurement model of Islamophobia (Pfahl-Traughber 2012).

The goal of this paper is to address these critiques by offering a new approach toward defining and measuring Islamophobia, as well as analyzing it as a multidimensional phenomenon consisting of anti-Muslim prejudice, anti-Islam sentiment, and anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs. The proposed threefold structure of Islamophobia (anti-Muslim prejudice, anti-Islam sentiment, and anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs) will be tested by means of a factor analysis, in order to determine whether the structure is statistically valid.¹

As theoretical framework, the author re-proposes the concepts of Group-Focused Enmity (Zick et al. 2008), as well as conspiracy theories (Bruder et al. 2013), as a common structural ground for comparison. More specifically, the objective of this paper is to test the notion that anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic prejudices are both partially rooted in the personal ideology of inequality, e.g. social dominance orientation (Zick et al. 2008). Based on previous research results (Dalbert/Zick/Krause 2010; Oswald 2005), belief-in-a-just-world is expected to be significantly related to anti-Semitism, but not to Islamophobia. Moreover, regarding the comparison of anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs, differences in psychological correlates are to be expected, as both conspiracy beliefs are assumed to fall into different subcategories of conspiracy theories, e.g. System Conspiracy vs. Minority Conspiracy (Campion-Vincent 2005; Imhoff/Bruder 2014).

Before presenting the results of the empirical research, I will give a brief overview of previous research findings of comparative studies—both from a discourse analytical perspective, and an individual psychological perspective—and I will include critical notes regarding the conceptualization of Islamophobia in general. The following section will briefly introduce the concept of Group-Focused Enmity and the current state of research in this area. This section will be followed by social psychological research perspectives on anti-Semitic and Islamophobic conspiracy theories. The statistical results will be presented thereafter. Finally, a discussion of the results will conclude.

**Overview of Previous Comparative Research**

Supporters of a comparative approach point to several discursive similarities between the phenomena of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: First, analogous to anti-Semitic discourses and rhetoric of the 19th and 20th centuries, Muslims are portrayed as being incapable or unwilling to assimilate or integrate into German society (Brumlik 2012). Second, in keeping with historical anti-Semitic campaigns, a threat scenario is drawn for Germany’s future, based on an asymmetrical population growth scenario induced by an assumed higher fertility rate in Muslim families, e.g. a demographic threat (Schiffer/Wagner 2010). A similar notion of demographic threat has also been ascribed to Jews by Anti-Semites (ibid.). The idea of an asymmetrical population growth, due to higher fertility of Muslims, and hence an anticipated conflict, is frequently expounded in the public debate (Foroutan 2012), as well as in online forums (Shooman 2014), in the media (Bielefeldt 2010), and was prominently adopted and promulgated in the bestseller book “Deutschland schafft sieh ab,” by former politician Thilo Sarrazin (2010). In fact, a recent study reveals that the perception of the size of Muslim populations throughout European nations is overestimated.² Finally, the Koran and Sunna are being utilized to derive arguments for exclusionary discourses, reminiscent of
similar tactics of anti-Semites using the Torah and Talmud in the 19th century (Benz 2011). These are merely a few examples of discursive similarities that have been analyzed in previous research (for a general overview in the German context see: Botsch et al. 2012; Schneider 2014). In the next section, I will elaborate on further similarities, on a phenomenological and structural level, focusing on the individual psychological dimension.

**Defining and Operationalizing Islamophobia**

Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, several studies on Islamophobia in Germany indicate high rates of Islamophobic tendencies in the German society (Heitmeyer et al. 2002-2011; Hafez 2010; de Nève 2013; Zick/Klein 2014). Also reported are dozens of accounts of violent and hostile actions against Muslims and Islamic facilities (Piper 2011; Brauns 2012), as well as biased and generalized negative media coverage of Islam and Muslim-related topics in the media (Schiffer 2005; Bielefeldt 2010).

Nevertheless, systematic empirical studies addressing Islamophobia in Germany on a psychological individual level are scarcely found (de Nève 2013). For example, in most of the studies on the subject, Islamophobia is measured on a one-dimensional scale, which does not differentiate between prejudices against Muslims and sentiment against Islam, despite a vivid discussion on the theoretical and practical implications of such an approach (Conway 1997; Benz 2009; Shooman 2011, 2014; Richardson 2012; Pfahl-Traughber 2012). One line of theoretical discussion in this context is concerned with the question of: which is the actual focal point of Islamophobia, Islam as a religion/culture, or Muslims as adherents of Islam (self-attributed or ascribed)(Richardson 2012). On some accounts, the term Islamophobia is rejected completely to give way to a systematic differentiation between prejudice against Muslims and sentiment against Islam (Pfahl-Traughber 2012); hence, alternative terms are suggested (e.g. anti-Muslim racism; Shooman 2011). However, this lack of definition is reflected in the common usage of a variety of terms (de Nève 2013), e.g. the synonymous usage of Islamophobia as either anti-Muslim or anti-Islam racism, and/or anti-Islamism or anti-Muslimism.

Moreover, whereas the majority of studies focus on Islamophobia as prejudices against Muslims and/or Islam, a relatively new mode of derogative out-group beliefs—namely, Islamophobic conspiracy theories - has hardly been noticed yet, despite prominent examples in German media, the blogosphere, and public debate (Benz 2011; Shooman 2010; Hafez 2013; Shooman 2014). Islamophobic conspiracy theories constitute a relatively new phenomenon, thus, little empirical research is available at present. Analyses regarding public debate, the media, and respective online websites, however, indicate that, at the core of this relatively new narrative, lies the idea of a *secretly* ongoing “Islamisation of Europe” (Fekete 2011; Hafez 2013; Shooman 2014). Interestingly, a search for “anti-Islamic conspiracy theories” on the German Google service yielded results concerning “anti-Semitic conspiracy theories.” In fact, there are striking similarities between anti-Islamic and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories (Schiffer/Wagner 2010; Hafez 2013; Shooman 2014), which cannot simply be ignored. In close proximity to historical anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, which have been propagating the idea of a *secretly* ongoing “Judaisation of Germany” (Schiffer/Wagner 2010), there lies the idea of a *secretly* ongoing “Islamisation of Europe,” which is at the core of anti-Islamic conspiracy theories. This process is believed to be propelled by the belief in an extraordinary Muslim population growth that poses the aforementioned demographic threat (Bielefeldt 2010). Furthermore, according to some supporters of this narrative, and as propagated on popular websites, the “Islamisation
“process” is believed to be supported by certain leftist politicians, yet concealed from the masses by deliberate disinformation through the media (Fekete 2011; Shooman 2014). Inherent within this “process” is a supposedly well-orchestrated campaign with a hidden Muslim agenda that has the ultimate goal of enforcing Islamic laws and rules in Germany, and eventually dominating the entire Western World (ibid.). Moreover, according to Farid Hafez (2013), the idea of a secret Muslim infiltration and Islamisation of European countries (see also EURABIA in Fekete 2011) exhibits striking parallels to the Protocols of the elders of Zion, in which Jews were accused of secretly plotting for global domination. Similar to the dissemination of these anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, anti-Muslim conspiracy theories are being propagated by references to secret documents, allegedly authored by the Muslim Brotherhood, and mysteriously discovered by conspicuous networks of online activists (Hafez 2013; Shooman 2014). According to Benz (2011), these increasingly popular conspiracy theories operate with a strong emphasis on ethnic/civilizational in-group identity, to which Islam serves as the significant out-group.

To demonstrate the importance of taking seriously these kinds of conspiracy beliefs, the Breivik case is noted: when Anders Behring Breivik killed seventy-seven people during the 22 July 2011 massacre in Norway, he was partially motivated by the “belief in a Muslim conspiracy to take over Europe” (Fekete 2011). Notwithstanding, one of the critiques regarding a comparative approach toward Islamophobia and anti-Semitism was the absence of Islam/Muslim-related conspiracy theories (Küntzel 2008; Schoeps 2010). In a recent study, however, this author analyzed anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs as a negative intergroup outcome, and found empirical support for the phenomenon and its underlying social psychological mechanisms (2015, paper accepted for publication).

Moreover, in specific regard to a comparative perspective on Islamophobia and anti-Semitism, and in response to the aforementioned conference, the concept of Islamophobia has furthermore been criticized, to conflate prejudices against Muslims with resentment against Islam (fahl-Traughber 2012). On a theoretical level, certain prejudices can be defined as derogative attitudes toward individuals because the prejudice is directed at members of a specific social group, such as anti-Semitism, as well as racism, sexism, and homophobia (Zick et al. 2008). Therefore, a stringent, comparative, methodological approach would compare anti-Semitic prejudices with anti-Muslim prejudices, since both refer to individuals who are defined by their religious group membership (such a comparison to resentment toward a religion would not be a valid approach, as a religion is not an individual member of a group).

Adding additional support to use of a comparative approach, on a structural level, current research pertaining to anti-Semitism indicates a threefold structure for anti-Semitic beliefs, consisting of (a) traditional religious anti-Judaic beliefs, (b) secondary anti-Semitic beliefs, and (c) belief in Jewish conspiracies (Bilewicz et al. 2013). In turn, I argue that Islamophobia, as currently defined, is a multidimensional phenomenon, which seems to be operating with a comparable threefold structure as well: anti-Muslim prejudice, anti-Islam sentiment, and anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs. According to the critique of Pfahl-Traughber (2012), a comparison between anti-Muslim prejudice and anti-Semitic prejudice is sound, as long as the theoretical definition and methodological operationalization of the constructs follow the same rules.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Group-Focused Enmity and the Role of Personal Ideologies

In contrast to the majority of research on prejudices, the Group-Focused Enmity (GFE) approach conceptualizes several different types of prejudices, e.g. anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, sexism, racism etc., as comparable—yet not equal—constructs, which are understood to be syndromes of similar underlying social psychological mechanisms (Zick et al. 2008). Based on extensive research, analyses of GFE indicate that, first, different prejudices significantly relate to each other, and second, they relate to an overall GFE Index. In other words, many people exhibiting prejudiced views toward one social category tend to exhibit prejudices toward other social categories as well. Further, previous studies indicate that different prejudices, for example Islamophobia and anti-Semitism, are predicted by personal ideologies of inequality (Zick et al. 2008). For this study, two constructs have been operationalized, which assess (a) the social dominance orientation (a generalized ideology of inequality), and (b) the belief-in-a-just-world.

Social Dominance Orientation

The first construct is the so-called Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). Social dominance theory assumes that individuals differ in their endorsement of social hierarchies (Sidanius/Pratto 1999). The endorsement of social-hierarchical structures refers to the dominance of the in-group (political, ethnic, religious, and/or national) and the demand of subordination of outgroups. In times of crisis in which people perceive threats to their personal or in-group status, efforts to perpetuate or stabilize the in-group status are observable. Based on these observations, individuals with a high SDO tend to endorse and support non-egalitarian attitudes, ideologies, and policies. Social dominance theory proposes that societies develop ideologies of dominance, which tend to retain intergroup status differences in favor of the dominant group. In turn, individuals from dominant groups can try achieving a betterment of their personal and in-group status by adopting and advocating so-called dominance legitimizing myths, which provide moral and intellectual argumentations in this regard (Zick 1997). The SDO scale measures the inter-individual differences in the degree of endorsement of such dominance-oriented myths. The relationship between SDO (Sidanius/Pratto 1999) and different negative outgroup attitudes has been tested in several studies (Pratto/Sidanius/Stallworth/Malle 1994; Sidanius/Liu, 1991; Zick et al. 2008; Zick/Küpper/Hövermann 2011), as well as tested in regard to Islamophobic attitudes (Imhoff/Bruder 2014; Oswald 2005; Zick/Küpper 2006; 2007).

Belief in a Just World

The second construct operationalized in this study is referred to as belief-in-a-just-world (Dalbert/Zick/Krause 2010). It can be described as the worldview of “everybody-gets-what-they-deserve.” The construct is based on the works of Melvin J. Lerner (1980), who discovered from his research regarding how individuals perceive and process injustice, that human beings have a basic need to believe in a just world. The just world belief is transmitted by social institutions like families, schools, religious institutions, or by political ideologies, and serves different purposes. Depending on the extent of the just world belief, observed or experienced injustices can be cognitively processed in different ways. Individuals can use different schemata to rationalize the observed injustices. One way of dealing
with injustice is to be appalled by it; another would be by trying to restore justice (Montada/Schmitt/Dalbert 1986). Yet another reaction to observed injustice might be showing contempt toward the victims of injustice, such as, for example, making the victims responsible for their misery (“one gets what one deserves”) or, more generally, by adopting ideologies of inequality similar to the social dominance approach, which legitimizes existing socio-economic injustices (Dalbert et al. 2010). Interestingly, individuals who subscribe to the *just world belief* have a higher than average tendency to devaluate outgroups, to incriminate victims (Lerner/Miller 1978), and/or to adopt ideologies of inequality (Dalbert et al. 2010). The belief-in-a-just-world scale assesses the degree to which individuals differ in their perception of a just world. Belief-in-a-just-world has been found to significantly predict anti-Semitism and further prejudices (Dalbert et al. 2010), but was not found to be significantly related to Islamophobia (Dalbert et al. 2010; Oswald 2005). Therefore, I expect similar results for this study.

**Believing in Conspiracy Theories: A Conspiracy Mentality**

Despite their increasing popularity in popular culture, public debates, and politics (Goertzel 1994; Swami et al. 2011), conspiracy theories are still a subject widely neglected by scientific research (Anton 2011). Yet, since the events of 9/11, the popularity of conspiracy theories, as well as social psychological research on the subject, have gained momentum (Swami et al. 2011).

The general definition of a conspiracy theory is: an explanatory framework through which different historical or contemporary events and processes (real or fictive) are interpreted as the result of secretive actions conducted by multiple individuals or members of a social category (Anton 2011).

However, beside these common features shared by all conspiracy theories, there are differences in regard to the group to which the conspiracy plots are assigned. According to Véronique Campion-Vincent (2005), at least two sub-categories of conspiracy theories exist: System Conspiracy and Minority Conspiracy. Furthermore, according to Serge Moscovici (1987), minorities are prone to be identified as collective conspirators, because the minority, by its very existence, can be perceived as a threat and plot against the established order and way of life of the majority. Anti-Semitic conspiracy theories present during the Middle Ages provide a classic example of how conspiracy theories involve minorities. Nevertheless, the System-Conspiracy category, which is a relatively new phenomena (originated at the time of the French Revolution) according to Campion-Vincent (2005), is associated with powerful elite groups, such as international corporations and banks, secret services, governments, or lobbying groups — all of which secretly aim to gain more power and dominance both on a local or global scale.

Bruder and colleagues (2013) demonstrate that the general belief in conspiracy theories can be understood as a result of a prevailing tendency toward conspirational thinking, e.g. a *conspiracy mentality*. The *conspiracy mentality questionnaire*, which is employed in this study, assesses the individual differences in the general propensity toward conspirational thinking. However, in a similar vein as Campion-Vincent (2005) (see also Wagner-Egger/Bangerter 2007), Bruder and colleagues (2013) demonstrate that conspiracy mentality relates to high-power groups (e.g. politicians, capitalists, Americans, Jews) and is a better predictor of a belief in conspiracy theories involving such powerful groups (System-Conspiracy). In contrast, SDO is related to low-power groups (e.g. welfare recipients, Muslims) (Roma and Sinti) and is a better predictor of conspiracy theories involving low-
power groups (Minority-Conspiracy). Additionally, no relation between conspiracy mentality and SDO was found.

In the context of this study, it is important to note that Muslims are predominantly viewed as inferior, whereas Jews are seen as superior by anti-Semites (Schiffer/Wagner 2010). Likewise, and in accordance with previous research, I expect conspiracy mentality to be positively related to anti-Semitic prejudices and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, and SDO to be positively related to anti-Muslim prejudice and anti-Muslim conspiracy theories. Furthermore, I expect no significant relation between conspiracy mentality and SDO.

Hypotheses

Building upon these observations, I first propose testing whether the expected threefold structure is statistically valid. Furthermore, I am going to test the notion that anti-Semitic prejudices and anti-Muslim prejudices, which are both understood as syndromes of group-focused enmity, are rooted in personal dispositions, such as social dominance orientation, and that only anti-Semitic prejudices are related to belief-in-a-just-world. Finally, the comparison of anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs should yield different results with regard to conspiracy mentality. In the context of this study, it is important to note that Muslims are predominantly viewed as inferior, whereas anti-Semites see Jews as superior (Schiffer/Wagner 2010). In turn, in accordance with previous research, I expect conspiracy mentality to be positively related to anti-Semitic prejudices and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, and I expect social dominance orientation to be positively related to anti-Muslim prejudice and anti-Muslim conspiracy theories. Furthermore, I expect no significant relation between conspiracy mentality and social dominance orientation. The following hypotheses denominate the expected relations:

1. Islamophobia consists of three statistically distinct components: anti-Muslim prejudice, anti-Islam sentiment, and anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs.
2. The single GFE elements are significantly and positively inter-correlated.
3. All GFE elements are significantly and positively correlated to the GFE Index.
4. SDO is positively related to all GFE syndromes.
5. BJW is positively related to all GFE syndromes except to Islamophobic beliefs.
6. SDO and conspiracy mentality questionnaire (CMQ) are not related.
7. Conspiracy Mentality is positively related to anti-Semitic prejudice and anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs.
8. Conspiracy Mentality is not significantly related to anti-Muslim prejudice and anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs.

METHOD

Participants

The data acquisition for the empirical analyses was done via an online survey (Unipark). In order to reach a diverse sample, the survey was advertised through different channels, e.g. lists of email addresses for university attendees, school discussion boards, and social media channels. The survey advertisement and survey starting page indicated that participants should be between 18 and 36 years of age, should be currently living in Germany, and that participation was voluntary and anonymous. The data acquisition took place between June and August, 2014. After excluding all Muslim respondents and all
respondents with any missing values, a total of $N = 450$ participants without any missing values completed the survey. In the final sample, 264 (58.7%) of the participants were female, and 186 (41.3%) were male. The ages of the participants ranged from 18 to 36 years ($M = 25.27$, $SD = 0.71$).

**Measures**

The questionnaire included a demographic section consisting of age, gender, education, migration background, political orientation (ranging from 1 = “left-leaning” to 5 = “right-leaning”), and religion. SDO, BJW, and CMQ were measured as predictors. As dependent variables, Islamophobic and anti-Semitic prejudices and conspiracy beliefs were measured. Additionally, three syndromes of GFE (sexism, racism and homophobia) were assessed. According to Andreas Zick et al. (2008) Racism is defined as “a strong support of racially legitimized inequality between groups. Racism asserts the idea of superiority of one group over others on the basis of biological or natural differences.” In addition to these items, which measure biological racism, other items were included that measure cultural racism.

**Predictor Variables**

Using the shortened SDO scale (Pratto et al. 2013), SDO was measured by means of four items: (“In setting priorities, we must consider all groups” (reverse coded); “We should not push for group equality;” “Group equality should be our ideal” (reverse coded); and “Superior groups should dominate inferior groups.”) All items were measured on a five-point scale ranging from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree.” A higher score correlates to higher SDO. Cronbach’s $\alpha$ for the five item scale is .70.

BJW was assessed by means of three items: (“Basically, the world is a just place;” “I believe that, by and large, people get what they deserve;” and “I am confident that justice always prevails over injustice.”) which were adopted from a previous study (Dalbert et al. 2010) and measured on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 4 = “strongly agree.” A higher score correlates to higher BJW. Cronbach’s $\alpha$ for the scale is .81

Conspiracy Mentality was measured by utilizing the CMQ (Bruder et al. 2013) and by means of five items: (“I think that many very important things happen in the world, which the public is never informed about;” “I think that there are secret organizations that greatly influence political decisions;” “I think that events which superficially seem to lack a connection are often the result of secret activities;” “I think that politicians usually do not tell us the true motives for their decisions.”) Cronbach’s $\alpha$ for the scale is .80.

**Dependent Variables**

All prejudices were measured on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 4 = “strongly agree.” Conspiracy beliefs were measured on a five-point scale ranging from 1 = “definitely right” to 5 = “definitely wrong.”

Three item batteries were used to assess Islamophobia, including previously used, as well as newly constructed items.

Anti-Muslim prejudice was assessed by means of four items. Three items were adopted from previous research: (“The Islamist terrorist finds strong support among Muslims;” “Muslims are not trustworthy;” “Immigration to Germany should be forbidden for Muslims.”) (Leibold/Kühnel 2003). One item was newly constructed to measure negative attitudes against Muslims, based on a group-specific social and economic devaluation: (“Muslims are a social and economic burden for Germany.”). Cronbach’s $\alpha$ for the scale is .89.
Anti-Islam sentiment was measured by means of four items. One item, (“The Islamic religion is harmful for world peace.”) was taken from a previous study (Streib/Klein 2014). Three items were adopted from previous studies (Leibold/Kühnel 2003; Zick/Küpper/Hövermann 2011) and capture the devaluation of Islam as a religion: (“Islam is a sexist religion;” “The Islamic religion is anti-Semitic;” “Islam is a violence-glorifying religion.”) Cronbach’s α for the scale is .84.

Anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs were constructed in accordance with methodologies proposed by Miroslaw Kofta and Grzegorz Sedek (2005), and were measured by means of four items: (“Muslims secretly plot for an Islamisation of Germany;” “Actually, Muslims are striving to establish the Sharia in Germany;” “Islam is conspiring against the West;” and “Muslims are planning to Islamize the West step by step.”) Cronbach’s α for the scale is .86.

In order to test the proposed three-component structure of Islamophobia (Hypothesis 1), a total of 12 items were subjected to factor analysis. Table 1 shows the results of the principal component analysis with promax rotation. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .91, and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant ($\chi^2(66) = 4210.340$, $p < .05$). The three-factor solution explained 75.6% of variance in total. Using forced factor extraction of three factors and .50 as loading criterion, the items loaded on their respective factors.56

Two-item batteries were used to assess anti-Semitic beliefs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor loadings (Promax Rotation)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims are planning to Islamize the West step by step.</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actually, Muslims are striving to establish the Sharia in Germany.</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims secretly plot for a Islamization of Germany.</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam is conspiring against the West.</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Islamist terrorists find strong support among Muslims.</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration to Germany should be forbidden for Muslims.</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims are a social and economic burden for Germany.</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims are not trustworthy.</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam is a sexist religion.</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam is a violence-glorifying religion.</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam is an anti-Semitic religion.</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Islamic religion is harmful for world peace.</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Factor Loadings Based on a Principal Component Analysis with Promax Rotation for 12 Items (N = 450).
Anti-Semitic prejudice was assessed by two items from the GFE concept: (“Jews have too much influence in Germany;” and “As a result of their behavior, Jewish people are not entirely without blame for being persecuted.”) (Zick et al. 2008). Cronbach’s α for the scale is .77.

Anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs were adapted from the Belief in Jewish conspiracy Scale (Swami 2012) for the German context, and were assessed by five items: (“The Jewish-interest lobby is manipulating world politics through their strong influence on Wall Street;” “The US foreign policy is determined by the Israel lobby;” “Israel controls the media in Germany;” “The Holocaust is a myth fabricated to serve Israeli interests;” “Israel is secretly trying to establish global dominance with the USA.”). Due to the sensitive nature of anti-Semitic beliefs in Germany, Israel-related formulations were operationalized as the primary focus. Cronbach’s α for the scale is .83.

Regarding GFE syndromes, sexism, homophobia and racism were measured with the following items adopted from Zick et al. (2008; 2011):

- **Sexism** was measured by means of two items: (“Women should think harder on their roles as wives and mothers;” and, “When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to jobs than women.”). Cronbach’s α for the scale is .51.
- **Homophobia** was assessed by means of the following two items: (“It is a good thing to allow marriages between two men or two women;” and “There is nothing immoral about homosexuality.”) (reverse coded). Cronbach’s α for the scale is .44.
- **Racism** was measured by five items: (“Some cultures are clearly superior to others;” “We need to protect our own culture from the influence of other cultures;” “Some races are more gifted than others;” “There is a natural hierarchy between black and white people;” and “Preferably blacks and whites should not get married.”). Cronbach’s α for the scale is .81.

**RESULTS**

**Descriptive Results**

Table 2 shows the mean scores, standard deviations, and inter-correlations among all variables. Overall, the mean scores for the scales are below their respective neutral mean values, except for conspiracy mentality: $M = 3.82$ ($SD = .77$). Mean scores vary slightly, depending on gender. Male participants show overall higher mean scores than female participants except for anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs: $M_{male} = 2.06$ ($SD = 1.01$)/$M_{female} = 2.13$ ($SD = .79$), and conspiracy mentality: $M_{male} = 3.62$ ($SD = .87$)/$M_{female} = 3.96$ ($SD = .66$). In conclusion, the mean scores for the dependent variables indicate higher levels of anti-Muslim prejudice and anti-Islam sentiment than for anti-Semitic prejudice, but higher levels of anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs than for anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs. Overall, the results suggest relatively low levels of prejudice and conspiracy beliefs for this sample of well-educated, young adults.
Group-Focused Enmity: Inter-correlations

As shown in Table 2, all elements of group-focused enmity (GFE) are significantly inter-correlated at low- to strong-levels ($r = .24$ to $.56$) and, additionally, are significantly correlated with the GFE-Index at moderate- to strong-levels ($r = .51$ to $.86$). Therefore, the assumptions of the group-focused enmity concept that the single syndromes of GFE are significantly inter-correlated (Hypothesis 2), and also relate to an overall GFE-Index (Hypothesis 3), are substantiated in this study. Regarding the comparative subject of this study, the results indicate that anti-Semitic prejudices are significantly related to anti-Islam sentiment ($r = .37$, $p < .01$), and even more so to anti-Muslim prejudice ($r = .45$, $p < .01$).

Furthermore, a closer look at the inter-correlations indicates a particularly high correlation between racism and anti-Semitic prejudice: ($r = .56$, $p < .01$), anti-Islam sentiment ($r = .58$, $p < .01$), and anti-Muslim prejudice ($r = .60$, $p < .01$). These results suggest that many of the survey participants who show racist prejudice also exhibit generalized derogative attitudes toward Jews and/or Islam, and/or Muslims. Moderate correlations are also reported between racism and anti-Semitic prejudice ($r = .45$, $p < .01$), and anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs ($r = .70$, $p < .01$). Because of these strong inter-correlations, racism will be included in the regression analyses shown in the next section as a predictor of anti-Semitic prejudice and Islamophobic beliefs.

Personal Ideologies and GFO

Consistent with prior research, both SDO and BJW are significantly and positively correlated to all prejudices, with varying strength (Table 2). This indicates that the endorsement of personal ideologies of inequality is related to derogative attitudes toward various social categories, as proposed by the GFE approach (Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5). Regarding the comparative focus of this study, the results also indicate a significant and moderate relationship between anti-Muslim prejudice and SDO ($r = .36$, $p < .01$), and to
BJW \( (r = .39, p < .01) \). Moreover, a significant but weaker relation is found between anti-Semitic prejudice and SDO \( (r = .30, p < .01) \), and to BJW \( (r = .29, p < .01) \). Anti-Islam sentiment is found to be related to SDO \( (r = .39, p < .01) \) and BJW \( (r = .39, p < .01) \) to a similar degree, as is anti-Semitic prejudice. In conclusion, anti-Semitic prejudice, anti-Muslim prejudice, and anti-Islam sentiment are significantly related to personal ideologies of inequality, e.g., SDO, as proposed in Hypothesis 4. Also, consistent with Hypothesis 5, anti-Semitic prejudice is related to BJW; however, unexpectedly, anti-Muslim prejudices and anti-Islam sentiment are also found to be significantly related to BJW. The implications will be discussed in the last section.

**Conspiracy Beliefs and GFE**

Anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs are significantly related to anti-Semitic prejudice \( (r = .51, p < .01) \); i.e., many of the respondents adhering to Israel-related anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs also show anti-Semitic prejudices. The same relationship is found for anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs and anti-Islam sentiment \( (r = .65, p < .01) \), as well as for anti-Muslim prejudice \( (r = .67, p < .01) \). Furthermore, both conspiracy beliefs are significantly—yet in a weaker fashion than to their respective prejudices—related to all other elements of GFE, ranging from weak to strong relations \( (r = .13 \text{ to } .70) \). Anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs display a slightly stronger correlation to the overall GFE Index \( (r = .62, p < .01) \) than to anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs \( (r = .47, p < .01) \). In other words, respondents who show higher adherence to anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs exhibit a higher mean score on the overall GFE Index. Interestingly, a significant and moderate relationship can also be found between anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs \( (r = .44, p < .01) \), indicating that a certain percentage of individuals simultaneously exhibit adherence to both types of conspiracy beliefs.

**Conspiracy Mentality, Personal Ideologies, and Conspiracy Beliefs**

Regarding the comparison of conspiracy beliefs and their relationship to the proposed predictors, the following results are found. First, confirming Hypothesis 6, SDO shows no significant relation to conspiracy mentality (CM). This is in line with previous research findings (Imhoff/Bruder 2014). Furthermore, and also in consistence with prior research (ibid.), CM is significantly related to anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs \( (r = .46, p < .01) \). Unexpectedly, a significant, but much weaker relationship, is also found between CM and anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs \( (r = .19, p < .01) \). Moreover, SDO and BJW show stronger relationships to anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs \( (r = .44 \text{ and } .40 \text{ respectively}) \) than to anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs \( (r = .32 \text{ and } .22 \text{ respectively}) \). Additionally, CM displays significant, but weak, relation toward other prejudices, the strongest being toward anti-Semitism \( (r = .16, p < .01) \), but no relation is demonstrated to homophobia.

**Regression Analyses**

**Predicting Prejudices**

To determine in more detail the specific effects of the different predictors of Islamophobic and anti-Semitic prejudices and conspiracy beliefs, a series of multiple regression analyses was conducted. First, the predictors (SDO, BJW, CM, education, and political orientation) were entered into the hierarchical regression models. Then, in the second step, racism was added into the regression models.\(^8\)
Table 3 shows the results of the regression analyses with respect to the prejudices. In the first step of the analysis—without racism as predictor—the regression model accounts for 48% of the variance for anti-Muslim prejudice, 24% of the variance for anti-Islam sentiment, and 16% of the variance for anti-Semitic prejudice. Anti-Muslim, anti-Islam, and anti-Semitic prejudices are predicted by SDO ($\beta = .16, .27, .20$) and BJW ($\beta = .23, .25, .22$), respectively. Education has no effect on any of the variables. In contrast, political orientation to the “right” has a significant positive effect on both anti-Muslim prejudice ($\beta = .33$) and anti-Islam sentiment ($\beta = .15$), but not on anti-Semitic prejudice. CM shows a significant positive effect on anti-Semitic ($\beta = .17$) prejudice (Hypothesis 7), but, unexpectedly, also shows a positive effect on anti-Muslim prejudice ($\beta = .21$) (Hypothesis 8), but not on anti-Islam sentiment. When adding racism as predictor in the second step of the regression model, the amount of explained variance increases for all prejudices. Racism has the biggest effect on anti-Semitic prejudice ($\beta = .51$), followed by anti-Islam sentiment ($\beta = .44$) and anti-Muslim prejudice ($\beta = .42$). The full model explains 49% of the variance for anti-Muslim prejudice $F(6, 443) = 72.36, p < .001$ ($R^2_{adj} = .49$), 37% of the variance for anti-Islam sentiment $F(6, 443) = 44.34, p < .001$ ($R^2_{adj} = .37$), and 32% of the variance for anti-Semitic prejudice $F(6, 443) = 36.12, p < .001$ ($R^2_{adj} = .32$).

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* $p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
Predicting conspiracy beliefs

Following the same procedure as above, a two-step regression analysis was conducted with both (anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic) conspiracy beliefs (CB) as dependent variables.

As shown in Table 4, SDO, BJW, and CM are found to have a significant effect on anti-Muslim CB ($\beta = .28, .25, .16, .17$), as well as on anti-Semitic CB ($\beta = .21, .16, .45$), however, no significant effect is found for political orientation. Education has a significantly negative effect on anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs ($\beta = -.10$), but not on anti-Semitic CB. Adding racism in the second step raises the amount of explained variance significantly for anti-Semitic CB ($R^2_{adj.} = .05$), and for anti-Muslim CB ($R^2_{adj.} = .19$). In conclusion, SDO and BJW have a significant effect on both CBs, however, as expected, anti-Semitic CB is best explained by conspiracy mentality (Hypothesis 7), while, in contrast, anti-Muslim CB is best explained by SDO, BJW, and racism (Hypothesis 8). The full model accounts for 38% of explained variance for anti-Semitic CB $F(6, 443) = 46.67, p < .01$ ($R^2_{adj.} = .38$) and 52% of total explained variance for anti-Muslim CB $F(6, 443) = 81.98, p < .01$ ($R^2_{adj.} = .52$).

**DISCUSSION**

The main aim of this paper was threefold. First, to address the critical stances voiced with regard to employing a comparative approach towards Islamophobia and anti-Semitism (Pfahl-Thraughber 2012) and specifically, to address a critique of the term Islamophobia in general, including its definition and operationalization (Shooman 2011, 2014; Pfahl-Thraughber 2010; Richardson 2012), a three-layered structure of Islamophobia was proposed, consisting of anti-Muslim prejudice, anti-Islam sentiment, and anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs. Several items that reflect frequently reiterated stereotypes, prejudices, and conspiracy beliefs targeting Muslims and Islam in public debate in Germany since the 9/11 attacks (Foroutan 2012; de Nève 2013; Shoomann 2014) were assessed in an online survey. Through a confirmatory factor analysis, all three dimensions of Islamophobia were shown to constitute statistically distinct phenomena, thus confirming the assumption that Islamophobia is most appropriately understood as a multidimensional phenomenon. However, based on the results of this study, the question arises as to whether Islamophobia is the appropriate term to refer to prejudice and conspiracy beliefs attributed to Muslims, since Islamophobia by name suggests resentment against Islam as a religion and does not
account for prejudices against Muslims as individuals (Shooman 2011). In light of the presented results, I would argue for using three distinct categories to account for the specific characteristics and the specific underlying mechanisms of the phenomena in order to highlight that Islam-related derogative attitudes are not simply circumscribed as an anxiety towards a religion but are clearly directed towards individuals who are perceived and constructed as Muslims (self-attributed or ascribed). This procedure has the advantage of disentangling the commonly mingled categories and informing public debate and policy on potential intervention measures and techniques.

Second, addressing an additional critique concerned with the methodological and theoretical shortcomings of previous comparative studies (Pfahl-Thraughber 2012), only prejudices against Muslims were compared with anti-Semitic prejudices. Building upon the assumptions of research on group-focused enmity (Zick et al. 2008), it was assumed that both anti-Muslim prejudices and anti-Semitic prejudices should be partially explained by personal ideologies of inequality, such as social dominance orientation and the belief-in-a-just-world. The results can be interpreted as supporting a comparative approach, as they clearly indicate that both anti-Semitic prejudices and anti-Muslim prejudices are significantly predicted by social dominance orientation and the belief-in-a-just-world, though to varying degrees. These findings are in line with research showing that individuals who support social hierarchies in which the in-group is seen as privileged over the out-group and who endorse a “one-gets-what-one-deserves” philosophy exhibit more prejudices towards out-groups. Regarding political orientation, no significant relationship to anti-Semitic prejudice could be found. In contrast, anti-Muslim prejudice was significantly predicted by a political orientation towards the right ($\beta = .33$). Finally, the correlation analyses revealed significant and high correlations of racism with both prejudices. Thus, racism was included into the regression analyses. The results indicate that racism was a stronger predictor of anti-Semitic prejudice ($\beta = .51$) than of anti-Muslim prejudice ($\beta = .42$). This finding is interesting, as it indicates that racism, anti-Muslim prejudice, and anti-Semitic prejudice are closely intertwined. Moreover, both prejudices have been found to be significantly interrelated with each other ($r = .45$, $p < .01$). The significant relation between BJW and anti-Muslim prejudice and anti-Islam sentiment is surprising, given that previous studies (Oswald 2005; Dalbert et al. 2010) found no such relationship. However, Dalbert et al. (2010) used a one-dimensional measurement for Islamophobia, not differentiating between prejudice against Muslims and resentment against Islam, and Oswald (2005) assessed anti-Arab reactions by measuring prejudice, stereotypes, social distance, and discrimination against Arabs and Muslims, mixing ethnic and religious categorizations. Thus, the variation in the results may be due to different measurements. In conclusion, the results of this study can be interpreted as further empirical support for considering belief-in-a-just-world as a predictor of prejudice against religious minority out-groups.

Third, in a further step, anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs and anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs were analyzed in terms of their relationships to prejudices and further psychological correlates. First, both types of conspiracy beliefs were significantly related with all the types of prejudices, though most strongly to their respective group-specific prejudices. In other words, a significant amount of respondents adhering to anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs also exhibited anti-Semitic prejudices. The same relationship was found for anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs and anti-Muslim prejudices and anti-Islam sentiment. Interestingly, along the same lines as with the prejudices, a significant and moderate relationship could also be found between anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs and anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs ($r = .44$, $p$
< .01), indicating that a certain percentage of individuals exhibit adherence to both types of conspiracy beliefs simultaneously. Regarding the psychological and dispositional predictors, both types of conspiracy beliefs were significantly related to social dominance orientation, belief-in-a-just-world, political orientation towards the right, and racism. However, as expected, both phenomena differed in their relation to the psychological construct conspiracy mentality. In accord with previous research, anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs were most strongly predicted by a conspiracy mentality (Bruder et al. 2013). Whereas anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs were better predicted by the other psychological dispositions. Interestingly, racism also had a significant effect on anti-Muslim (β = .56) and anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs (β = .30). To conclude, the results indicate the importance of accounting for different types of conspiracy beliefs, as suggested by previous research (Campion-Vincent 2005; Imhoff/Bruder 2014). Both anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs and anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs are operating with narratives of a dangerous and deceptive outgroup, yet they differ in the amount of power ascribed towards the different groups: on the one hand, Jews/Israel as an omnipotent conspirational out-group, represented by Wall-Street financial power, media might, and great political influence over other nations’ actions; on the other hand, Muslims, as willing to conquer and dominate by means of demographic dominance and terror, yet being less powerful in comparison, albeit a dangerous and threatening out-group. Different means of achieving their goals of domination, while holding equally malicious and deceptive intentions, is the common structure of both.

On a final note, some limitations of this study should be clarified. First, it must be noted that due to the cross-sectional approach of this study, causal inferences are not possible. Furthermore, the survey took place between June and August 2014, at a time when ISIS was spreading its terror in Iraq and Syria. German media extensively covered the ongoing fighting in this region. Therefore, the results of this study have to be interpreted with this situational factor in mind, as it could have influenced the respondents’ responses. Moreover, the relatively small sample of this study consisted mainly of students, meaning that the results of this study are not representative for German society as a whole. Surveys with a more diverse sample, including different age groups and education levels, should be undertaken to further analyze the proposed assumptions.

In sum, the results indicate that similarities as well as differences in the underlying social psychological patterns of anti-Muslim prejudices, anti-Semitic prejudices, and conspiracy beliefs can be found. Understanding the underlying social and psychological mechanisms of anti-Muslim prejudice and conspiracy beliefs can provide useful insight and help in the development of countermeasures. In this regard, learning from the extensive research on anti-Semitic beliefs can prove fruitful in challenging dangerous narratives that threaten the current pluralistic democratic foundations of European nations (de Nève 2013). The author hopes that the results of these empirical analyses will enrich the theoretical discussions on the comparability of the two phenomena by analyzing their structural and correlative similarities and differences, giving an impetus towards redefining Islamophobia as well as highlighting the possibilities and limits of a comparative approach towards the subject. Future research could test the indicated similarities and differences between both phenomena, as well as the proposed three-fold structure of Islamophobia in other countries and with a more diverse sample then was done in this study.
ENDNOTES

1 For readers who are unfamiliar with statistical analyses, the following website offers easily understandable explanations: http://www.graphpad.com/guides/prism/6/statistics/index.htm?stat_the_essential_concepts_of_stat.htm

2 Public estimates show German respondents thought that Muslims would make up 19% of Germany’s population, however, the actual percentage being approximately only 6%. See: http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/01/daily-chart
2?fsrc=scn%2Ffb%2Fwl%2Fbl%2Fislamineurope

3 Much of the heated debate in the aftermath of the aforementioned conference was centered around the implicit question, whether the process of comparison itself signifies an a priori equalization of the phenomena. With regard to the concept of GFE, the different prejudices are not seen as equal, however, from a socio-functional perspective, they are seen as comparable phenomena (see Schneiders 2014).

4 The Group-focused Emnity (GFE) syndrome consist of 12 elements in total (see Zick et al. 2008). For this study, only three additional elements were employed. The choice of elements of GFE to investigate in this study was governed by empirical and methodological aspects and by the restricted length of the online survey rather than theoretical considerations. However, from a theoretical perspective, xenophobia was already analyzed as a predictor of Islamophobia in another study (Leibold & Kühnel, 2007), but not racism.

5 The three-factor solution by forced factor extraction with Maximum Likelihood estimation explained a total amount of 75.6% variance $\chi^2 (33) = 144.824, p < .01$. The two-factor solution with an Eigenvalue = 1 extraction method and Maximum Likelihood estimation, explained 67.9% of total variation $\chi^2 (43) = 458.219, p < .01$. This is approximately 7% percent less of total explained variation, and therefore the three-factor solution yielded better results. Moreover, the chi-square difference test was significant, indicating that the three-factor scale is a better fit to the data, $\chi^2_{d.f.} (10) = 313.4, p < .001$.

6 A CFA with all items was conducted to test the validity of the proposed three-fold structure. Acceptable discriminant validity is indicated by factor correlations < .80 (Brown 2006) and convergent validity by factor loading values > .60 (ibid.). The results show good discriminant validity (factor correlations ranging between .68 and .79) and acceptable convergent validity (standardized regression weights for the factor loadings ranging between .56 [one item only] and .96, p < .001) for the model. The $\chi^2$ of 111,113 indicates a lack of an absolute fit (p < .001), which is not uncommon for larger sample sizes. However, all the other fit measures indicate that the model has an acceptable model fit: $\chi^2 / df = 2.36; CFI = .98; SRMR = .032$, and RMSEA = .050 and 90% CI = .042-.068. The z-statistics obtained for all of the factor loadings were statistically significant (p < .001), and the standardized factor loadings were between .56 and .96.

7 The GFE-Index is calculated by combining the mean scores of the single elements and computing them into a single mean index-scale, representing an overall estimate of group-focused enmity.

8 Demographic factors (age, gender, and migration background) were controlled in all of the following regression analyses. No significant effect was found for any dependent variable, except for anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs, with respect to migration background. Having no migration background had a small but significant negative effect ($\beta = -.08, p < .05$) on anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs.

9 Anti-Islam sentiment was included in the regression analysis for comparison to anti-Muslim prejudices.
REFERENCES


Islamophobia and Anti-Semitism: Etiological Similarities and Differences among Dutch Youth

Jolanda van der Noll
FernUniversität Hagen (University of Hagen)

Henk Dekker
Leiden University, Delft University of Technology, and Erasmus University Rotterdam

ISLAMOPHOBIA STUDIES JOURNAL
VOLUME 3, NO. 2, Spring 2016, PP. 56-70.

Published by:
Islamophobia Research and Documentation Project,
Center for Race and Gender, University of California, Berkeley.

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Islamophobia and Anti-Semitism: 
Etiological Similarities and Differences among Dutch Youth

Jolanda van der Noll
FernUniversität Hagen (University of Hagen)

Henk Dekker
Leiden University, Delft University of Technology, and Erasmus University Rotterdam

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: Earlier drafts of this article have been presented at the conference panel “Muslim and anti-Muslim attitudes” of the Annual Meeting of the International Society for Political Psychology (ISPP), Rome, July 4th 2014, and the International Islamophobia Conference “Comparative Approaches to the Study of Islamophobia” in Salzburg, Austria, October 9-10, 2014. We would like to thank the participants of these conferences for their helpful comments and suggestions regarding the article.

ABSTRACT: This article contributes to the debate regarding to what extent Islamophobia is empirically a unique phenomenon, or that it is not fundamentally different from negative attitudes toward other out-groups. Thereto, we analyzed Dutch youths’ attitudes toward Islam and Muslims, and their attitudes toward Judaism and Jews ($N = 527$). The proposition that Islamophobia is an expression of a general negative out-group attitude, rather than a unique phenomenon, is not supported by the findings of our analyses. Islamophobia and anti-Semitism empirically form two constructs rather than one. The levels of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism are different, rather than about equal. Although Islamophobia and anti-Semitism correlate moderately strongly, a considerable portion of the respondents scoring high on Islamophobia have a neutral, or even positive, attitude toward Judaism and Jews. Specific Islam/Muslim cognitions and emotions—perceived threat in particular—contribute substantially to the explanation of Islamophobia, while cognitions and emotions targeted at Judaism and Jews contribute to the explanation of anti-Semitism. We therefore conclude that if we want to understand individual differences in Islamophobia, we need to consider cognitions and emotions targeted at Islam and Muslims specifically.

INTRODUCTION

Islamophobia is on the rise in Europe and the USA and is also clearly present in various countries in Latin America and Asia.1 The rise in Islamophobia has fueled the debate as to whether Islamophobia is empirically a unique phenomenon, or whether it is not fundamentally different from negative attitudes toward other out-groups. The objective of this study is to contribute to this debate. Our inspiration to carry out the current analyses stems from the various comments we received in response to our first publication2 regarding our assumption that Islamophobia is a unique phenomenon, as well as the growing discussion on the uniqueness of Islamophobia in various other studies.3 In this study we test the opposite of our original assumption, namely the proposition that Islamophobia is an expression of a general negative out-group attitude. We test this by analyzing and comparing Dutch youths’ attitudes toward Islam and Muslims, and their attitudes toward Judaism and
Jews, and by examining the impact of specific beliefs and emotions regarding Islam and Muslims and Judaism and Jews on these attitudes, as well as the impact of a general perceived threat.

**THEORY**

The proposition that Islamophobia is the result of a general negative out-group attitude, rather than the result of Islam-specific cognitions and emotions, is supported by studies that find strong associations between attitudes toward different national, ethnic, and cultural out-groups. Kerem Kalkan, Geoffrey Layman and Eric Uslaner, for example, show that negative feelings toward Muslims is “part of a larger syndrome” and is a general sense of affect for other cultural, racial and ethnic minority groups. Their path analysis of 2004 NES data shows that “cultural outgroup affect”—reflecting affect toward gays and lesbians, illegal immigrants, feminists, and people on welfare—had the largest direct impact on attitudes toward Muslims, and “racial/religious minority affect”—affect with respect to Jews, blacks, Asian-Americans, and Hispanics—had the second largest direct effect. They concluded that their research findings provide strong support for their “bands of others” thesis. However, a few methodological remarks can be made. To measure attitudes toward the various groups, the authors employed relative measures of affect—the difference between the respondent’s rating of the particular group and the average rating that he or she gave to all of the groups. This raises the question of whether the dependent and independent variables are completely independent. Furthermore, their independent variable “negative stereotypes” did not concern Muslims but, instead, non-Muslim African-, Asian-, and Hispanic-Americans. Finally, the explained variance in attitude toward Muslims was low.

More recently, Andreas Zick, Beate Küpper, and Andreas Hövermann published the results of their study on group-focused enmity, consisting of six different “prejudices” - Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, racism, sexism, and homophobia - in eight European countries. All correlations between these attitudes were moderate, including the correlations between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism ($r = .37$), Islamophobia and xenophobia ($r = .59$), and Islamophobia and racism ($r = .28$). Supporting the proposition is the fact that Islamophobia correlates with sexism and homophobia. Moreover, factor analysis of the six prejudices reveals that a one-factor model provides a good fit to the data, and that the scale including all six prejudices had a strong internal reliability. This scale, called “group focused enmity” (in the original German publication: “Gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit”) consists of “negative attitudes and prejudices against those groups that are designated as ‘different,’ ‘strange,’ or ‘abnormal’ and to which a subordinate social status is assigned.” Regression analyses shows that the main predictors of group-focused enmity are perceptions of threat by immigrants, rejection of diversity, social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, religiosity, friendship perception, anomie, trust in other people, direct contact with immigrants, income, and fraternal relative deprivation. At the core of the independent variables is, according to the researchers, “an ideology of inequality.”

In contrast to these studies, which support the argument that Islamophobia is merely an expression of a generalized negativity toward out-groups, there is other research showing that different out-groups evoke different levels of negative attitudes. Moreover, factors like personality and value orientations, which are commonly assumed to underlie the general negative out-group attitude—including authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, general religious intolerance, nationalism, conservatism and racism - generally contribute very little to the explanation of the attitudes toward specific out-groups.
In our view, a test of the proposition that Islamophobia is an expression of a general negative out-group attitude should start by comparing Islamophobia to an attitude toward adherents of another religion, such as anti-Semitism. Like Islamophobia, we assume that anti-Semitism is a unique phenomenon and not simply an expression of a general negative out-group attitude. We believe that out-group attitudes toward different groups differ because they are based on different cognitions and emotions, and different historical and sociological reasons. If the test has a positive result, which demonstrates empirical evidence for the proposition that both Islamophobia and anti-Semitism are grounded in a general negative out-group attitude, then it may be worth continuing the test by including attitudes toward cultural out-groups, such as the attitudes toward gays and lesbians. If the test including attitudes toward religious out-groups is not positive, then it may not make such theoretical and empirical sense to continue the test. If Islamophobia is indeed the expression of a general negative out-group attitude, we expect the data to meet the following criteria:

1. Islamophobia and anti-Semitism form empirically one construct, rather than two different constructs;
2. The levels of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism are about equal, rather than different;
3. Islamophobia and anti-Semitism correlate strongly;
4. Anti-Semitism explains a high proportion of the variance in Islamophobia, and Islamophobia explains a high proportion of the variance in anti-Semitism.
5. A general negative variable, such as perceived threat of foreigners, explains a high proportion of the variance in both Islamophobia and anti-Semitism.

In our study, we make use of survey data we collected among Dutch youth concerning Islamophobia and anti-Semitism. We consider Islamophobia and anti-Semitism to be negative attitudes toward Islam/Muslims and Judaism/Jews, respectively. The major characteristic of an attitude is its affective nature; “the amount of affect for or against some object.” Following Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein, we have opted for the one-dimensional interpretation of the attitude concept. In our view, cognitions (knowledge and perceptions, including clichés and stereotypes) and behavior are not dimensions of an attitude, but rather, are variables that may explain variance in an attitude (cognitions), and/or respectively be an effect of an attitude (behavior): more knowledge generally results in less stereotyping and reduction of negative out-group attitudes, while negative attitudes make negative behavior toward out-groups more likely.

In our definition and measurement of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism, we include both the religion and its adherents, although the term Islamophobia primarily refers to the religion, and anti-Semitism to the people. We see, however, an indissoluble union between the attitude toward the religion and the attitude toward those who are perceived as its adherents. People like or dislike Muslims because they identify them with a religion that they like or dislike, or vice versa. Islamophobia is, then, having a negative attitude toward Islam and Muslims; anti-Semitism is, in our view, having a negative attitude toward Judaism and Jews.

In order to uncover the relative importance of anti-Semitism as a predictor of Islamophobia, we included several other independent variables in our analyses. These variables were derived from the Integrated Threat Theory, which states that negative out-group attitudes are caused by group-specific threat perceptions, negative stereotypes, and anxiety. Threat perceptions include perceived “realistic” threats, which refer to perceived competition or conflicts of interest over scarce resources (e.g., economic welfare, security),
and perceived “symbolic” threats, which refer to a perceived conflict of values and norms (e.g., democracy). Several studies have confirmed that threat perceptions are, in fact, strong predictors of negative out-group attitudes,\textsuperscript{15} and, in particular, “anti-Muslim attitudes.”\textsuperscript{16} Negative stereotypes are negatively evaluated characteristics that an individual links to a group, for example, the stereotype that people of a certain group are aggressive. Anxiety refers to the fear of being treated negatively in interactions.\textsuperscript{17} Several studies have confirmed that negative emotions, such as anxiety, are indeed strong predictors of negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{18}

Following the Integrated Threat Theory, we included the following independents in our analyses: perceptions of threat posed by Islam/Muslims and Judaism/Jews, negative clichés about Islam and Judaism and negative stereotypes about Muslims and Jews, as well as anxiety related to Islam/Muslims and Judaism/Jews. From our focus group discussions\textsuperscript{19} we know that Dutch adolescents strongly associate Muslims with Turks and Moroccans; all conversations were about Turks or Moroccans, rather than about Muslims. This is not surprising because more than 90 percent of the people with a Turkish or Moroccan background declared themselves to be Muslim,\textsuperscript{20} and more than 60 percent of the Muslims in the Netherlands are of Turkish or Moroccan background, while the other 40 percent are dispersed over many small groups.\textsuperscript{21} To account for this association between Muslims and foreigners, we also included a measure of perceived threat by foreigners in general.

Background variables are age, gender, education level, social class, and religiosity. A fairly common finding is that older respondents have more negative attitudes toward ethnic out-groups than the younger ones,\textsuperscript{22} males have more negative out-group attitudes than females, and higher education leads to less negative attitudes toward ethnic out-groups in general,\textsuperscript{23} and toward Muslims.\textsuperscript{24} Lower socio-economic status usually translates to more negative attitudes toward out-groups. Research findings show a weak relationship between religiosity and negative out-group attitudes,\textsuperscript{25} but highly religious people and religious traditionalists have shown more negative views of Islam.\textsuperscript{26}

METHOD

To test the proposition that Islamophobia is the expression of a general negative out-group attitude, we used data from the Dutch Youth Attitudes toward Muslims and Islam survey, which we conducted in 2006.\textsuperscript{27} The survey was presented to respondents during regular school hours, as a study regarding attitudes of adolescents with respect to particular groups in the Dutch society. In total, 734 respondents from 11 secondary schools from various regions in the Netherlands participated in our study.

Completed questionnaires were not included in the analyses when we suspected that they had not been filled out seriously (57), when the respondents reported as not being of Dutch nationality (10), or when they indicated to be Muslim (64) or Jewish (3). Furthermore, we limited our sample to respondents between 14 and 16 years of age (583). Finally, questionnaires that contained missing values on the measures of Islamophobia or anti-Semitism were also deleted. This resulted in a sample of 572 adolescents. Girls (52 percent), and students in higher-level general education, were slightly over-represented in the sample.

Islamophobia was measured by seven questions that asked about the respondents’ general attitude toward Islam, Turks, and Moroccans, the amount of trust in Turks and Moroccans, and how respondents would feel about having neighbors with a Turkish or Moroccan background. Because of the strong association of Muslims with Turks and Moroccans, which was discovered from our focus group discussion,\textsuperscript{29} we asked the
respondents’ for their orientations concerning these specific ethnic groups, instead of for the broader category, “Muslims.” Principal component analysis in SPSS confirms that the seven questions tap into one underlying factor (factor loadings > .70, 67 percent explained variance, Cronbach’s alpha = .92), and the items were averaged into one scale with a higher score reflecting more negative attitudes toward Muslims and Islam.

To measure anti-Semitism we used similar questions: the general attitude toward Judaism and Jews, the amount of trust in Jews, and the respondent’s attitude to having a Jewish neighbor. Principal component analysis revealed, again, one underlying factor (factor loadings > .69, 60 percent explained variance, Cronbach’s alpha = .78), and the items were averaged into one scale with a higher score reflecting more negative attitudes toward Jews and Judaism.

Measurement of perceptions of threat was accomplished by statements reflecting economic threats (e.g., “Turks take the jobs of Dutch people”), safety concerns (e.g., “I feel unsafe when I meet a group of Turkish people on the street”), and value threats (e.g., “Islam and democracy are hard to combine”). We included one scale that particularly referred to perceived threat from Muslims and Islam (7 items, factor loadings > .50, 48 percent explained variance, Cronbach’s alpha = .82), and one scale that referred to perceived threat from Jews and Judaism specifically (5 items, factor loadings > .57, 43 percent explained variance, Cronbach’s alpha = .66). Perceived threat from foreigners in general was measured by statements reflecting economic threat, safety concerns, and value threat posed by foreigners in general (e.g., “Foreigners living in the Netherlands are a threat to Dutch society”; 8 items, factor loadings > .52, 50 percent explained variance, Cronbach’s alpha = .85).

Respondents were further asked whether they thought that a number of characteristics were applicable to the groups and religions, respectively. To avoid bias, an equal number of positive and negative characteristics were included in the questionnaire. In our analyses, and following the Integrated Threat Theory, we included only the three negative clichés of Islam and Judaism (violent, dominant, and unfriendly toward women) and the six negative stereotypes of Turks, Moroccans, and Jews (rude, selfish, aggressive, arrogant, clumsy, and dominant). Based on these, we constructed a scale of negative beliefs about Muslims and Islam (Cronbach’s alpha = .85) and a scale of negative beliefs about Jews and Judaism (Cronbach’s alpha = .76).

To assess inter-group anxiety, we asked the respondents whether they ever felt fear and/or uneasiness in relation to Islam, Turks and Moroccans (Cronbach’s alpha = .82), and in relation to Judaism or Jews (Cronbach’s alpha = .65).

Gender, age, and educational level were measured by the usual single items. Social class was subjectively measured by the estimated relative income of the parents (three categories: less income than most people; about the same income as most people; and more income than most people). Religiosity was measured by church attendance (5-point scale ranging from (0) never, to (1) at least once a week).

FINDINGS

To test whether Islamophobia and anti-Semitism form, empirically, one construct rather than two different constructs (criterion 1), we conducted an exploratory factor analysis (principal component analysis) on the individual items that aims to measure these attitudes. Results reveal two underlying factors, one with the Islamophobia items (factor loadings >.63, factor loadings on the second factor < .33) and the second factor including the anti-Semitism
items (factor loadings > .65, factor loadings on the first factor < .29). These results do not meet the first criterion that Islamophobia and anti-Semitism form one construct.

The second criterion postulates that the levels of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism should be about equally spread if these concepts reflect a general negative out-group attitude. The descriptive statistics show that respondents had more a negative than positive attitude toward Islam and Muslims ($\text{Mean} = 0.54, \text{SD} = 0.20$). More than one-third of the respondents (36 percent) had a negative attitude toward Muslims and Islam (a score of .60 or higher on the scale of attitude toward Islam and Muslims), and 12 percent had a very negative attitude (score above .80). Forty percent can be considered to have a neutral attitude (score between .40 and .60), while one-fourth (24 percent) had a positive attitude (score of .40 or lower). The level of anti-Semitism was significantly lower ($\text{Mean} = 0.40, \text{SD} = 0.17; t(571) = 17.94, p < .001; \text{Cohen’s } d = .75$). Nine percent of the respondents had a negative attitude toward Jews and Judaism (a score of .60 or higher), and less than two percent (1.7 percent) had a very negative attitude (score above .80). Almost forty percent (38 percent) can be considered to have a neutral attitude (score between .40 and .60), while more than half of the respondents (51 percent) had an explicit positive attitude toward Jews and Judaism (score of .40 or lower).

These results do not meet the second criterion that the levels of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism are about equal.

Correlation analyses further show that attitudes toward Muslims/Islam and Jews/Judaism are moderately correlated ($r = .50, p < .001$). This finding seems to support the proposition that people who have a negative attitude toward one outgroup are likely to have a negative attitude toward another outgroup as well. However, cross-tabulation of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism (Table 1) shows that, although respondents with a neutral or negative attitude toward Jews and Judaism typically have a similar attitude toward Muslims and Islam, the reverse does not apply. In fact, a substantial part of the respondents scoring high on Islamophobia have either a neutral or even positive attitude toward Jews and Judaism (39 percent and 36 percent respectively). These results do not meet the third criterion that Islamophobia and anti-Semitism are strongly correlated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Judaism/Jews</th>
<th>Islam/Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Attitudes toward Islam/Muslims and Judaism/Jews

The multivariate regression analysis of Islamophobia, including anti-Semitism and the background variables of gender, age, social class, educational level, and religiosity, shows that anti-Semitism has a strong effect on Islamophobia, $b = .56, SE = .05, p < .001$ (Table 2, model 1), together with gender, age and socio-economic status. This model explains, however, less than one-third (31 percent) of the variation found in the respondents’ attitudes toward Islam and Muslims. The multivariate regression analysis of anti-Semitism, including Islamophobia and the background variables of gender, age, social class, educational level, and religiosity, shows that Islamophobia also has a moderate effect on anti-Semitism, $b = .39, SE = .03, p < .001$, together with educational level, socio-economic status, and religiosity. This model, however, also explains less than one-third (30 percent) of the variation found in the respondents’ attitudes toward Jews and Judaism. Although anti-
Semitism explains a substantial and significant share of the variance in Islamophobia, and vice versa, the data does not support the criterion that anti-Semitism explains a high proportion of the variance in attitude toward Islam and Muslims, nor that Islamophobia explains a high proportion of the variance in attitudes toward Jews and Judaism. Instead, the results signal that important possible antecedents of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism are missing in the current model.

[See Table 2 at the end of the article]: In the next models we include the variables derived from the Integrated Threat Theory, which considerably improves the explained variance to 70 percent of the variation found in attitudes toward Muslims and Islam, and to 50 percent of the variation found in attitudes toward Jews and Judaism.

Results show that the impact of anti-Semitism on Islamophobia is robust, as it maintains its strong effect on Islamophobia, \( b = .54, SE = .04, p < .001 \). Anti-Semitism is, together with perceived threat specifically by Islam and Muslims, \( b = .41, SE = .05, p < .001 \), the strongest predictor of Islamophobia. Furthermore, perceived threat by foreigners in general has a unique and significant impact on the respondents’ level of Islamophobia, \( b = .19, SE = .05, p < .001 \). Thus, respondents with increased levels of perceived threat posed by Muslims and Islam, and by foreigners in general who hold more negative clichés about Islam and negative stereotypes about Muslims (i.e., Turks and Moroccans), and experienced anxiety in relation to Muslims (i.e., Turks and Moroccans) and Islam, are likely to have heightened levels of Islamophobia. This supports our previous conclusion that, although anti-Semitism may have a substantial impact on Islamophobia, other antecedents, most notably Islam-specific and Muslim-specific perceptions, additionally contribute substantially to the explanation of variance in the respondents’ level of Islamophobia.

Moreover, a surprising finding concerns the impact of perceived threat posed by Jews and Judaism. Respondents who perceive more threat from Jews and Judaism, and who hold negative clichés about Judaism and negative stereotypes about Jews, tend to be less Islamophobic. In other words, when we look at the unique impact of threat posed by Judaism and Jews, and thus filter out the impact of generalized perceived threat of foreigners, and of Muslims and Islam in particular, we find that more threat perceived from, and more negative beliefs held about, Jews and Judaism, are in fact associated with lower levels of Islamophobia.

Turning to anti-Semitism, we find that Islamophobia remains the strongest predictor of anti-Semitism, \( b = .60, SE = .04, p < .001 \). Furthermore, respondents with higher levels of perceived threat posed by Jews and Judaism, and anxiety in relation to Jews and Judaism, are likely to be more anti-Semitic, \( b = .42, SE = .04, p < .001 \) and \( b = .09, SE = .03, p = .001 \), respectively; specific negative beliefs about Jews and Judaism have no significant effect on the attitude. In contrast to the model explaining Islamophobia, we do not find a significant effect of perceived threat of foreigners in general on the attitudes toward Jews and Judaism, which does not support our fifth criterion. Again, we find a reversed unique impact of negative perceptions, beliefs, and emotions (anxiety) related specifically to Islam and Muslims: respondents who are more negative toward Islam and Muslims are less negative toward Judaism and Jews.

CONCLUSION

In this paper we test the proposition that Islamophobia is just an expression of a general negative out-group attitude rather than a unique phenomenon. Thereto, we analyzed Dutch youths’ attitudes toward Muslims and Islam, and their attitudes toward Jews and Judaism. We argue that Islamophobia can be considered as an expression of generalized
negative out-group attitudes when: 1) negative attitudes toward Muslims and Islam can empirically be combined into one construct with negative attitudes toward Jews and Judaism; 2) the levels of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism are about equal in our sample; 3) there is a strong correlation between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism; 4) anti-Semitism strongly contributes to the explanation of Islamophobia and vice versa; and (5) a general negative variable such as perceived threat by foreigners in general explains a high proportion of the variance in both Islamophobia and anti-Semitism. Based on these criteria, our analyses do not support the proposition that Islamophobia or anti-Semitism is merely the expression of a generalized negative attitude. First of all, we find that Islamophobia and anti-Semitism are empirically two different constructs. Second, we find that negative attitudes toward Muslims and Islam are far more widespread in our sample than negative attitudes toward Jews and Judaism. Third, Islamophobia and anti-Semitism are moderately strong correlated, but a considerable part of the respondents scoring high on Islamophobia have a neutral, or even positive, attitude toward Jews and Judaism. Fourth, anti-Semitism does contribute to the explanation of variance in Islamophobia—and vice versa—but only to a limited degree. The amount of explained variance substantially increases when we consider perceptions, beliefs, and emotions that specifically concern Muslims and Islam, or Jews and Judaism. Finally, including the perception of threat posed by foreigners in general, we find that this too has a unique impact on the level of Islamophobia, but not on anti-Semitism. This suggests that, although Muslims (i.e., Turks and Moroccans) are seen as foreigners, Jews are not necessarily regarded as such.

There is some overlap between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism—respondents who score high on the one construct are more likely to be high on the other construct as well. This effect appears to be robust when including emotions and cognitions targeted specifically at Muslims and Islam, or at Jews and Judaism. Furthermore, both Islamophobia and anti-Semitism seem to be fueled by perceptions of threat and anxiety coming from the respective group or religion. However, there are some remarkable differences, an example being that gender and age have an influence on Islamophobia only, and religiosity only affects anti-Semitism, or that self-identification with the higher social class has a positive impact on Islamophobia, but a negative impact on anti-Semitism. Most notable is that, when we control for the impact of generalized perceived threat of foreigners, and of Muslims and Islam in particular, we find that a higher perception of threat from, and more negative beliefs held about, Jews and Judaism, are in fact associated with lower levels of Islamophobia. It may indeed well be that, instead of being the expression of a generalized negative out-group attitude, attitudes toward Jews on the one hand and Muslims on the other have a contradicting influence on each other.

In conclusion, our analyses show that, if we want to understand individual differences in attitudes toward Islam and Muslims, we cannot rely on general out-group attitudes, but we need to take into account cognitions and emotions that are specific for Muslims and Islam. In a similar vein, to understand attitudes toward Jews and Judaism, we should look at cognitions and emotions targeted specifically at Jews and Judaism. Islamophobia is empirically a unique phenomenon.
### TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islamophobia</td>
<td>Anti-Semitism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Mean (SD)</td>
<td>Mean (SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (girl)</td>
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<td>.18 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (15+)</td>
<td>.62 (.49)</td>
<td>.03 (.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>.52 (.26)</td>
<td>.01 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low social class</td>
<td>.07 (.26)</td>
<td>.01 (.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>High social class</td>
<td>.28 (.45)</td>
<td>.03 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosty</td>
<td>.24 (.32)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-Semitism</td>
<td>.40 (.17)</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamophobia</td>
<td>.54 (.20)</td>
<td>.00 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived threat</td>
<td>.58 (.20)</td>
<td>.19 (.05)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslims/ Islam:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Perceived threat</td>
<td>.50 (.21)</td>
<td>.41 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative beliefs</td>
<td>.53 (.28)</td>
<td>.11 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-group anxiety</td>
<td>.54 (.36)</td>
<td>.05 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews/ Judaism:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived threat</td>
<td>.36 (.17)</td>
<td>.28 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative beliefs</td>
<td>.13 (.20)</td>
<td>.11 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-group anxiety</td>
<td>.14 (.24)</td>
<td>.02 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explained variance (R²)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.31***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All scales range from 0 to 1*
ENDNOTES


2 Dekker and Van der Noll, “Islamophobia and Its Explanation.”; Van der Noll and Dekker, “Islamophobia: In Search for an Explanation of Negative Attitudes toward Islam and Muslims, Testing Political Socialization Theory.”


4 e.g., Echebarria-Echabe and Guede, “A New Measure of Anti-Arab Prejudice: Reliability and Validity Evidence”; Zick, Pettigrew, and Wagner, “Ethnic Prejudice and Discrimination in Europe.”

5 “Bands of Others? Attitudes toward Muslims in Contemporary American Society.”

6 Ibid., 7.

7 Die Abwertung Der Anderen. Eine Europäische Zustandsbeschreibung Zu Intoleranz, Vorurteilen Und Diskriminierung.

8 Ibid., 14.

9 Cottrell and Neuberg, “Different Emotional Reactions to Different Groups.”


11 Fishbein and Ajzen, Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior, 11.

12 Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior.


16 Savelkoul et al., “Anti-Muslim Attitudes in The Netherlands.”

17 Stephan et al., “The Effects of Feeling Threatened on Attitudes toward Immigrants.”

Dekker and Van der Noll, “Islamophobia and Its Explanation.”


CBS, “Bijna Een Miljoen Islamieten in Nederland.”

Chandler and Tsai, “Social Factors Influencing Immigration Attitudes: An Analysis of Data from the General Social Survey.”

Hello et al., “Association between Educational Attainment and Ethnic Distance in Young Adults: Socialization by Schools or Parents?”


Dekker and Van der Noll, “Islamophobia and Its Explanation.”

The data set, including the questionnaire, is available for secondary analyses and replication at the Data Archiving and Networked Services from the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research [http://easy.dans.knaw.nl/dms under ID p1725].

Dekker and Van der Noll, “Islamophobia and Its Explanation.”

Earlier analyses including confirmatory factor analyses in Mplus6 also showed that a two-factor model of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism was a good fit to the data (χ² (31, N = 572) = 52.16, p = .01; CFI = .995; TLI = .992; RMSEA = .035, p = .945; SRMR = .030), and performed better than a one-factor model in which all items were forced to be part of one general construct (χ² (31, N = 572) = 162.32, p < .001; CFI = .971; TLI = .948; RMSEA = .086, p < .001; SRMR = .055).

We should note, however, that the perceptions of threat of foreigners in general and Muslims and Islam in particular are highly correlated (r = .80, p < .001). Nevertheless, the results of the multivariate regression do not suggest that there is a problem of multicollinearity between the included predictor variables (the variance inflation factors – VIF - are all below 3.7 and the tolerance statistics above .27) and they have both a separate and substantial impact on Islamophobia.
REFERENCES


Anti-Muslim Racism in Comparison: Potentials for Countering Islamophobia in the Classroom

Eva Kalny
Leibniz University Hannover, Germany

ISLAMOPHOBIA STUDIES JOURNAL
VOLUME 3, NO. 2, Spring 2016, PP. 71-84.

Published by:
Islamophobia Research and Documentation Project,
Center for Race and Gender, University of California, Berkeley.

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Anti-Muslim Racism in Comparison:
Potentials for Countering Islamophobia in the Classroom

Eva Kalny
Leibniz University Hannover, Germany

ABSTRACT: Anti-Muslim racism or Islamophobia is a worldwide problem, and it builds on a long historic tradition of prejudice often described as orientalism. But Said’s concept corresponds to a specific regional and historic context, namely that of British colonialism. Anti-Muslim racism and its specific expressions however differ according to regions and historic moments. European societies have had diverse historic experiences with societies influenced by Islam, and its mainstream members have developed specific stereotypes based on these experiences and their interpretation. Islamophobia is therefore not only an individual conviction but it is also embedded in social structures and transmitted through formal education, the media and legal restrictions, and it is informed by mechanisms of social exclusion in a specific cultural and historic context.

Hence while Islamophobes in Europe might agree on specific stereotypes directed against “Muslims”, they refer to different people and argue out of a diverse range of historic experience and tradition: the Ottoman empire, the French colonialism and the independence war in Algeria, British colonialism and the experience of South Asian expressions of Islam, just to mention a few.

The analysis of Islamophobia hast to take into consideration these differences among mainstream or dominant sectors of the population. Similarly, the work against Islamophobia can profit from analyzing mainstream cultures and their specific forms of exclusion and discrimination and focus on them instead of “Islam.”

Based on my teaching experience in Austria and Northern Germany, I will elaborate the very different underlying assumptions about “Muslims” in both regions. These different assumptions are based not only on a different historical relationship with Muslim societies but also on strategic decisions of knowledge transmission in both school systems. In Northern Germany, namely Hannover, Muslims and Islam are constructed as the unknown and strange, summarized frequently under the slogan “we don’t know the Muslims.” In contrast, in Vienna frequent reference is made to the two sieges by the Ottoman Empire, and Muslims are constructed as longstanding, well-known enemies.

Stereotypes of Muslims as portrait by the mass media and different geo-political circumstances build on such basic notions. In both cases, the basic constructions of Muslims are the product of a selective perception of historic events and not the automatic result of different historic experience. In both cases, periods of peaceful coexistence and even cooperation are eliminated from public memory.

INTRODUCTION

Anti-Muslim racism is a structural element of Western societies, and is commonly justified by stereotypes of an alleged Muslim religion or culture. Attempts to counter anti-Muslim discourses and related hostilities address the individual and his or her prejudices, and focus on breaking monolithic perceptions of Islam and Muslims. This approach is important
and necessary, but incomplete because it does not address the underlying societal structures that shape these very same prejudices. For this purpose, it is useful to build on the analysis of specific constructions of “Islam” in diverse Western societies, and to also take into account linguistic specificities. Orientalism, in general, has been described as a way of thinking based on a supposed fundamental difference between “the Orient” and “the Occident” (Said 1978, 2f). Edward Said refers to Germany in his book, but chooses not to elaborate on the case (Said 1978, 18), and, unfortunately, completely omits Austria. Comparing the patterns of the construction of Islam and Muslims in different cultural contexts that use the same language is specifically useful for deconstructing not only the “Muslim Other,” but also a supposed homogenous “Western Us.” This approach has additional value and positive side effects for teaching about and against anti-Muslim racism. As the following example shows, categories for othering are constructed in specific ways in different languages. Additionally, yet also within one language area, different constructions of the national and religious orientation can lead to significantly varying interpretations of Islam and Muslims.

The German language is spoken in Austria, Germany, and certain parts of Switzerland, and with about 100 million speakers, it is the most widespread first language in the European Union. Based on my teaching experience in the subject of human rights in Vienna, Austria, and Hannover, Germany, I will explore the specific similarities, as well as differences, in the construction of Muslims and Islam in both contexts, and reflect upon the practical implications of the teaching context. For the purpose of this article, I will use the term German in the sense of “German language,” and not as an adjective referring to Germany, unless indicated otherwise. As in German discussions about Islam and Muslims, the term “Kulturkreis” is used frequently. I first elaborate on this concept and its implications. Then, I proceed by illustrating the underlying differences between patterns of anti-Muslim racism in Hannover and in Vienna, as well as illustrating the usefulness of these differences for teaching against Islamophobia.

A SPECIFICITY OF THE GERMAN LANGUAGE: THE TERM “KULTURKREIS”

Within and outside of academia, since the end of the Cold War, the concept of “culture” has been used increasingly as a mono causal explanation of a variety of social phenomena and conflicts (Köstlin 2011, 180). In reunited Germany, this tendency has been aggravated by blaming individuals who raise issues of class and socio-economic inequality as perpetrating “Ostalgie,” a neologism that derives from the German word Nostalgie, and means “nostalgia for the East” (Ost), i.e., the regime of the former German Democratic Republic. Since the beginning of the new millennium, in the entire German-speaking region, this worldwide tendency is characterized by the increasing use of an already-nearly-forgotten term: the “Kulturkreis.” “Kulturkreis” literally means “cultural circle.” The underlying principle of the concept is that cultures are arranged in hermetically separated circles, and that they are organized around, and influenced by, their specific centers. Historically, the concept of Kulturkreis was coined by eighteenth-century historian Christoph Meiners, but, by the second half of the 20th century, the term had gone into oblivion. According to him, people at the centers of cultural circles generate “higher levels” of cultural development (later also described as Hochkultur [high culture]) than people living at larger distances from these centers. According to Meiners, cultures and Kulturkreise correspond to supposedly different biological origins of human beings (Gingrich & Steger 2011, 217). Christoph Meiners held the post of “Professor of World Wisdom” at the University of Göttingen, and
was one of the earliest developers of racist theories that considered psychological and moral characteristics as hereditary characteristics of race. Approximately one century later, the geographer Friedrich Ratzel further developed the concept, and in the 1920’s, the German historian Fritz Graebner tried to identify Kulturkreise by selecting key objects such as pottery or masks. During the first half of the 20th century, the concept of Kulturkreise was popular in German-speaking academia. Theories about the centers of these circles ranged from biological and racist assumptions, to the conviction that these centers represented the traces of divine creation. From 1910 to 1938, these theories were present in nearly all areas of humanities and social science in Central and Western Europe, as well as in politics and the media (Gingrich & Steger 2011, 217).

The most elaborate theoretical model of the concept was provided by Pater Wilhelm Schmidt in cooperation with Pater Wilhelm Koppers: the “Wiener Kulturkreislehre” (Viennese Theory of Cultural Circles) (Andriolo 1979, 135). Schmidt, originally from Dortmund, began teaching ethnology and linguistics in 1985 at St. Gabriel in Vienna. He conducted research in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and he founded the still-existing journal, Anthropos. In 1929, he founded the Institute of Völkerkunde at the University of Vienna. His goal was to prove the existence of God through ethnographic data. For this purpose, Schmidt elaborated on the idea of a primordial cultural circle, characterized by monotheism, monogamy, as well as patriarchy and private property. He assumed that short stature hunter-gatherers were closest to the Creation, and therefore, capable of remembering it (Gingrich & Steger 2011, 218).

All representatives of the diverse concepts of Kulturkreise rejected evolutionism expressively and sometimes aggressively. In the case of Pater Wilhelm Schmidt, this rejection was even qualified as phobia, and related to his deep rejection of Bolshevism. Schmidt defended racist, as well as anti-Semitic, positions (Andriolo 1979, 135f). One of the few theorists who did not relate the concept of Kulturkreis to ideologies of racial supremacy was the German ethnographer Leo Frobenius. His work focused on identifying interconnected Kulturkreise based on the diffusion of cultural elements of equal form, such as shields, jewelry, or music instruments (Kohl 2013, 391f). Frobenius opposed any relation between race and culture, and later completely discarded the concept of Kulturkreise. He was one of the few ethnologists who openly opposed anti-Semitism in the 1930’s.

Sigmund Freud also reflected on the popular concept of Kulturkreis, and although he did not question it fundamentally, he focused on its functionality for constructing the concepts of belonging and exclusion. According to him, the concept served to facilitate the expression of repressed aggression, and thereby, to unite a large group of people (Freud 1930, 82-85).

Adolf Hitler was inspired by the concept of Kulturkreis and, in Mein Kampf, referred to its theoretical foundation. Other fascist parties in central Europe were also influenced by this concept, and they parted from the assumption of delimited cultures, congruence between ethnicity and culture, as well as hierarchies between cultures. The concept implies the idea of “purity” of cultures, and corresponds to the racist ideology of the Nazi regime.

After 1945, the term Kulturkreis was generally eliminated in academic discourses, and in 1956 the ethnologist Joseph Haekel declared publicly that the concept of Kulturkreis had no scientific foundation (Haekel 1959, 867).
In spite of the term’s history and the lack of an empiric foundation for the notion of delimited, hermetically closed cultures with stable centers and a periphery passively receiving the ideas of this center (Gingrich & Steger 2011, 219f), the concept of Kulturkreis has become increasingly popular during the last one and one-half decades. People who use the term Kulturkreis are usually unaware of its historical weight, but both culture and Kulturkreis are commonly related to ethnicity or race and are used interchangeably. The translation of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations (Huntington 1993) is an interesting example of this: Clash of Civilizations became Kampf der Kulturen in German, i.e., Battle of Cultures, and within the book, Huntington’s “civilization” is also translated as Kulturkreis. In fact, Huntington’s use of the word “civilizations” corresponds to the German concept of Kulturkreis, but lacks the developing and testing of appropriate criteria for identifying Kulturreise. A hardback version of the German translation of Huntington’s book was published in 1997, however, after 9/11, the author attracted significantly more readers through a less expensive paperback version published in May 2002. His book was criticized by academics but praised in prestigious newspapers like Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. As of September 2015, the book remains at number three on the Amazon Bestsellers list for books on international politics, and at number fifty-six for books on society. While it is difficult to prove that the book itself boosted the use of the term Kulturkreis, it is remarkable that this wording was chosen for the translation, and that an obviously illogical term resonated extensively among readers (and non-readers).

The idea of a battle of cultures also resonates with another historical conflict: the term “Kulturkampf” was used in Germany in the 19th century for describing the conflicts between Protestants and Catholics (Köstlin 2011, 179). At that time, Protestant discourses described Catholicism, as well as Judaism, as incompatible with modernity, and they doubted the loyalty of Catholics and Jews to the newly emerging national state. Catholics and Catholicism were described as anti-modern, undemocratic, and steered by the Vatican. As today with Islam, Catholicism was perceived as a religion of the uneducated and dependent, and in a striking parallel, this was exemplified by the Catholic woman who was perceived as dependent and thoroughly influenced by the Pope (Behloul 2011, 9).

The idea of a, supposed, Muslim Kulturkreis that is inherently opposed to a Western Kulturkreis, is frequently evoked in the German-speaking media. While no center of the Muslim Kulturkreis is explicitly mentioned, media reports tend to consider Saudi Arabia, and groups like the Taliban, Al Quaida, or ISIS as representative of Islam and Muslims. This corresponds to the idea of a powerful center influencing a passive and moldable periphery, represented also by common Muslims in Europe. The persistency of this image is especially striking, as Muslims have consistently opposed any subjugation under one center, or the representation by one single religious authority. In the case of Austria, this was once more visible when, in 2014, Muslim organizations protested against the passing of a law that replaced the Islam Act of 1912. The new law bans all forms of religious teaching except for that provided by the Community of Islamic Creed in Austria (IGGIÖ, by its German name), which forces all Muslim NGOs to subjugate themselves to the IGGIÖ, and threatens all NGOs unwilling to do so with dissolution. In Germany as well as in Austria, Muslims are requested repeatedly to agree on, and subjugate themselves to, one single representative. In Germany, the institution of the Deutsche Islam Konferenz DIK (German Islam Conference) was created in 2006, with the intent of “resolving” conflicts between “Germans” and “Muslims” (Hernández Aguilar 2014). Among others, “religious instruction at Koran schools and official schools, the headscarf, education of Imams, the position of women and girls, and halal butchering” (...) “are problems that burden the coexistence with Muslims in our
country (Hernández Aguilar 2014, 269). The Deutsche Islam Conference ("DIK"), along with reports from prestigious newspapers such as FAZ and Die Welt regarding the DIK, maintains and reinforces the idea of creating two opposite groups of “us/Germans” and “them/Muslims.” In these discourses, the category of Muslims is further divided into “good,” i.e., Muslims adhering to a German Leitkultur (dominant culture) and “bad” Muslims (Shooman 2010). The efforts to find, and/or create, a representative for Muslims as a partner for engaging in dialogue, points, on the one hand, to a concept of religious organization evolved by the Catholic experience, and, on the other hand, refers to a deeply rooted desire to stick to the concept of one Muslim Kulturkreis, against all contrary evidence.

In my experience, teaching these historic roots of the term Kulturkreis proved to be very useful in initiating discussion and reflection regarding the underlying concepts that structure anti-Muslim prejudice, as well as cultural racism in general. The similarity between anti-Catholic and anti-Muslim resentments can lead to different reactions in regions noted for Protestantism or Catholicism, but in both cases this analysis can help to question monolithic perceptions of “us/Germans” versus “them/Muslims.”

**PATTERNS OF ANTI-MUSLIM RACISM I: HANNOVER**

In spite of the similarities between anti-Catholic and anti-Muslim resentments, underlying perceptions of Islam and Muslims differ significantly within the German-speaking area. This became obvious to me when I moved from Vienna, Austria to the town of Hannover, located in the province of Lower Saxony, Northern Germany, in 2009. I continued to teach human rights classes in social science, but soon noticed that anti-Muslim racism, among students and outside the university, was lingering and increasing steadily. Academic texts, which I had used with students in Vienna, deconstructing anti-Muslim stereotypes were now misunderstood, and racist attitudes were openly expressed in the presence of students categorized as Muslims. In selected cases, human rights norms were openly opposed if applied to Muslims; e.g., students deemed Article 29 1.c. of the Convention on the Rights of the Child to be inadequate if applied to Muslims. The article provides for education that promotes “the development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural identity, language, and values, for the national values of the country in which the child is living, the country from which he or she may originate, and for civilizations different from his or her own.” As a result, I opted for developing a course about (and against) anti-Muslim racism (Kalny 2014).

During these classes, I was repeatedly confronted by German Caucasian students insisting that “we don’t know the Muslims.” This statement was also evoked in the presence of students categorized as Muslims (Kalny 2014). In the university context as well as outside, I was repeatedly told that Muslims and Islam are “fremd.” The German term, “fremd,” has several meanings; it corresponds to the English terms “foreign and external,” as well as “alien and weird.” Additionally, in my classes, students categorized as Muslims opined that the reason behind the discrimination that they were subjected to was that they were so fremd in Germany.

Initially, I ascribed this assertion to the fact that non-Muslim students lacked contact with Muslims, although Islam and Muslims have had a long presence in Germany, Hannover has a significantly lower percentage of migrant populations than other parts of Western Germany. The population census of 2011 shows that the percentage of the population that is not of German nationality in Lower Saxony is only 5.5% (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2013: 30), while the national average is 8% (29). But “Germanness” is not
defined by nationality alone. Germany has introduced the concept of “Migrationshintergrund,” meaning “migration background” as a category for statistical differentiation. A person is considered to have Migrationshintergrund if he or she has a foreign nationality, if he or she is a nationalized foreigner, a person of German origin who immigrated into Germany after 1949, or a person born as a German in Germany with at least one parent being an immigrant or born as a foreigner in Germany. In the census of 2013 for Lower Saxon, 1,291,860 people were identified as having Migrationshintergrund, and 6,431,810 were identified as not having Migrationshintergrund. In the region of Hannover, the corresponding numbers are 263,640 vs. 831,120, i.e., 24% of the population meets the definition of migration background. This percentage is slightly higher than the national average of 20% (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration 2015, 9) but significantly lower than in other regions of Western Germany. Historically, migration to Hannover originates predominantly from Poland and Russia.

Categories in the census for the registration of religious denominations only include Catholic, Protestant and “others/none.” In Lower Saxon, 50.5% of the population identifies as Protestants, 18.1% as Catholics, and 31.4% as “others/none” (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2013: 2). In Hannover, 141,275 are designated as Catholics, 455,191 as Protestants, and the majority, 505,776, as having a “different” or “no religious denomination.” Thus, while on the one hand no reliable data are available about the Muslim population of Hannover (and Germany in general), on the other hand the category of Migrationshintergrund defines a high percentage of the population as somehow “different,” independently of their nationality or migration experience, and this “differentness” is also statistically ascribed to individuals with one German parent. Muslim religious affiliation is often equated to Migrationshintergrund. And, although Hannover is one of the centers of a significant Kurdish-Yezidi minority in Germany, its members are often considered to be Muslims. The insistency that Muslims are fremd in Germany also corresponds with, and is reflected in, public political debates: when former President Christian Wolff stated in 2011 that Islam formed part of Germany, former Home Secretary Hans-Peter Friedrich responded, “[t]hat Islam forms part of Germany is a fact which cannot be substantiated anywhere in history” (Hernández Aguilar 2014, 268).

Muslim and non-Muslim students exposed to these discourses were surprised to learn of the longstanding relationship of Hannover and Northern Germany, to different regions noted for Islam. For example, in spite of furious, anti-Muslim sermons delivered by Catholic and Protestant officials, peasants in the 15th and 16th century fled degrading and exploitive feudal conditions in what, today, constitutes Germany, and they found refuge in the Ottoman Empire where they enjoyed a less arbitrary tax system and the possibility of social ascension (Bauknecht 2011). In the 18th century, the Prussian army had Muslim regiments, and during World War I, the German Reich and the Ottoman Empire were allies. At this time, special treatment was given to Muslim prisoners of war from the French and British colonies. They were relocated to the Crescent Camp (Halbmondlager) in Wünsdorf, Berlin, where a mosque with minaret was erected, and the German Reich motivated the prisoners—with little success—to wage Jihad against the former colonizers by joining the army of the allied Ottoman Empire (Bauknecht 2010, 61). Muslim prisoners of war from the Russian army were relocated into a separate camp near Zossen. The government of the German Reich used the mosque and the camps in order to document, within and outside the country, the “special relationship of Germany with Islam and the Muslims” (Höpp 1996, 207f).
Similarly today, the variety of Muslim associations, journals, and academic publications in several German cities in the interwar period (Bauknecht 2010, 63-79), and their subsequent restriction during the Nazi regime, are not remembered publicly.

In 1961, a recruitment contract was signed between Western Germany and Turkey, which facilitated a cheap labor force for the German labor market. Maintaining the construct of Muslims as complete strangers is, in fact, a complex process: Western Germany resolved its lack of manpower by the recruitment of people who took unpopular and hard physical labor jobs, which simultaneously enabled social ascent for men of the majority population. This was also necessary for maintaining a conservative concept of the family, where husbands had the legal power to dissolve work contracts for their wives, and to forbid them from accepting employment. Eastern Germany opted to resolve its lack of manpower mainly by actively including women in the labor market. On the one hand, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent reunification of Germany, it was celebrated that, after half a century of different prevailing legal norms and socialization, “it is again growing together what belongs together,” to cite the words of Willy Brandt; on the other hand, people who had historically been part of the social structure in the Western part of Germany for decades were increasingly declared to be “strange” or “foreign.” And while the newly emerging Germany dismantled Eastern Germany’s more progressive standards with regard to women’s rights, it projected a specific discrimination toward women onto people socialized in Western Germany but categorized as Muslims. The creation of the new Germany and its new national consciousness is at least partly based on the creation of new “strangers,” and the elimination of the remembrance of the long history of interaction and cohabitation.

The structural exclusion of these longstanding relationships became significantly obvious when, in 2014, the city of Hannover commemorated the 700th anniversary of the beginning of the personal union of the royal crowns of the United Kingdom and Hanover, which lasted from 1714 to 1837. While the city, on the one hand, celebrated proudly that during these times “the Royals came from Hannover,” on the other hand, it did not reflect on its subsequent involvement in the colonial expansion of the British Empire in South and Southeast Asia. In fact, Hannover’s involvement with this part of the Muslim world was initiated by historical and colonial encounters at the same time that Johann Wolfgang Goethe was composing the West-Östlicher Divan [West-Eastern Divan]. In this extensive collection of sketches and poems, Goethe commented respectfully and extensively on Persian literature and art, and he intended to apply his findings to his own works.

The notions of foreignness and strangeness continue to be perpetuated in German schoolbooks. Contrasting juxtapositions of “us vs. them,” “fremd vs. our own,” or “modern vs. premodern” were used in textbooks in the 1980s and 1990s in order to differentiate and discriminate between migrants and the majority population, and this stereotypical representation has not changed significantly in the new millennium. Strangeness is specifically described as Anatolian, Turkish, and Islamic. Authors of schoolbooks who request tolerance simultaneously perpetuate images of inherently different migrants (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration 2015, 13) and perpetuate the idea of Kulturkreise. One educational plan, for example, states that “greater knowledge about other Kulturkreise, other religions, manners, and customs can help pupils to classify their own values, norms, and patterns of behavior, compare them, and eventually relativize them (p. 19). Migration is mainly described as problematic, and integration as desirable. One schoolbook proposes the following options in order to determine whether a person is well integrated: reaching a high educational level, speaking German fluently, having mainly German friends, living like Germans, dressing like Germans, having children that
speak only German, celebrating German feasts, being appreciated by Germans, being invited by German neighbors for coffee, or thinking like Germans. While these options are presented as being open for discussion, they suggest a homogenous Germaneness, and reconfirm processes of categorization and othering (27). Some schoolbooks represent the practice of Islam, and Turkish families, as specifically problematic and engendering conflict, referring specifically to the use of the headscarf, building of mosques, and Muslim festive days (28). Germans are typically understood as having no Migrationshintergrund, and are pictured as white and blond (31). “Foreigner,” “stranger,” “migrant,” and “person with Migrationshintergrund” are often used as synonyms (67). In his analysis of 210 schoolbooks used in Lower Saxon, Tammo Grabbert comes to a similar conclusion: immigrants are predominantly represented as members of homogenous groups characterized by cultural stereotypes, reinforcing the oppositional description as “foreigners” versus Germans (Grabbert 2010, 15). Turkish immigrants represent failed integration (15 & 16). Similarly, in a comparative study, the Georg-Eckert-Institute came to the conclusion that German schoolbooks are characterized by problematizing migration, the headscarf, and conflicts about the building of mosques when discussing Islam and Muslims (Georg-Eckert-Institut für Internationale Schulbuchforschung 2011, 7). In one case, a photo of women with a headscarf was labeled “fremd in Germany.” The use of the headscarf is repeatedly related to being a foreigner, fremd, and Muslim. Islam is related to conflicts and lack of integration, and frequently represented by Turkish families (17).

**PATTERNS OF ANTI-MUSLIM RACISM II: VIENNA**

The underlying beliefs about Muslims, as well as the general conditions under which they live, differ significantly between Hannover and Vienna. Vienna is a growing city and is expected to reach two million inhabitants by 2030. In 2014, out of 1,797,337 inhabitants, 460,163, i.e., 25%, were not of Austrian nationality, and 661,142, i.e., nearly 37%, are considered to have Migrationshintergrund (Magistrat der Stadt Wien 2015, 8). Austria’s definition of Migrationshintergrund is narrower than the German definition: a person has Migrationshintergrund when both parents are born outside of Austria. Historically, migrants to Vienna came predominantly from the former member states of Austria-Hungary, and later from former Yugoslavia. Currently, half of the foreigners in Austria are members of EU states, and Germans constitute the largest group of migrants. The largest migrant groups from outside the EU are Serbs, Turks, and Bosnians. On the 1st of January 2015, in Vienna: 84,307 people of Serbian, 67,097 of Turkish, 46,826 of German, and 44,586 of Bosnian nationality resided in Austria.

Contrary to the situation in Hannover, in Vienna Muslims are not considered to be foreigners. In the minds of the general public, Muslims are typically categorized as either Bosnians or Turks. In this conception, on the one hand, Bosnians are perceived as “good,” and as “Austrian Muslims,” with long historic ties due to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. In reality, the Habsburg administration governed Bosnia for only 30 years, from 1878 until 1918. On the other hand, Turks are synonymous with bad Muslims (Gingrich 1998, 106f), an image that is invoked by frequent references to the two Ottoman sieges of Vienna. These historic incidents—two weeks in 1529 and two months in 1683—are deeply imprinted in the Viennese landscape, as well as in surrounding towns and villages. Several toponyms refer to the sieges, an example being the Turkish Trench Park (Türkenschanzpark), a popular park of 150,000m² in Vienna’s 18th district, where historic and new monuments refer to the Second Ottoman Siege of Vienna. In 2003, a new memorial was unveiled in the park, in the presence
of the Ukrainian ambassador (Wöller 2013, 256f), honoring the 320th anniversary of the support of Austria by the Ukrainian Cossack army during the battle of Sept. 12th, 1683. In the 17th district of Vienna, an edifice constructed in the 1920s in conjunction with the city’s program for affordable housing received the name Türkenritthof (Yard of the Horse-Riding Turk) in commemoration of the eviction of Kara Mustafa Pasha, grand vizier and commander-in-chief during the Second Siege of Vienna. In the central 9th district, the Türkenstraße (Turks’ street) received its name in 1862, in order to commemorate both Sieges of Vienna. Similarly, during the 19th century, a sword-swinging Turk substituted the image of a Saracen with bow and arrow at the Heidenschussgasse (Pagan’s Shooting Street) in the central district of Vienna. Several streets in the city carry the names of personalities involved in battling the Ottoman troops, such as Lieutenant Rimpler (Rimplergasse), Vienna’s mayor, Liebenberg (Liebenberg-statue in front of the university), Sobieski (Sobieskigasse and Sobieskiplatz), and Count Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg. In the 10th district of Vienna, the barracks erected in the early 20th century were renamed in 1967, from Franz-Ferdinand-Kaserne, which originally honored the Imperator Franz Ferdinand, to Starhemberg-Kaserne, now honoring the defender of Vienna during the second siege by the Ottoman Empire. At present, the 10th district of Vienna is known for its large Turkish migrant community.

According to local reports, the Pummerin, also known as the bell of Saint Stephen’s Cathedral, was made from the bronze of cannons left behind by the Ottoman troops during the second Battle of Vienna, in 1683.

Near Vienna, the small mountain of Kahlenberg, and its chapel, are specific places of remembrance of the liberation from the Ottoman occupation. During his sojourn in Austria in 1983, Pope John Paul II made a visit to the chapel, uncovered a commemorative plaque in honor of the Polish King Jan Sobieski, and stressed in his speech the importance of Holy Mary in the victory of the united Christians against the Ottoman troops.

These, and many other references to the Sieges of Vienna by the Ottoman Empire, and their political use, have been analyzed extensively (Feichtinger & Heiss 2013, Heiss & Feichtinger 2013). Most of these “historic” monuments appeared in the city during the 19th century, during the time of growing nationalism. Viennese legends regarding these historic events are part of school curricula, which includes visitations to these and many other historic sites of Vienna by school classes.

At the national level, the legend associated with the origin of the Austrian national flag illustrates the hostile relationship between Austria and Muslims: during the 3rd Crusade, and, more precisely, the occupation of Akkon (today Israel) from 1189 to 1191, Babenberg Duke, Leopold V, killed so many Muslims that his white clothes were completely saturated with their blood. When he took off the belt that carried his sword, this was the only part of his clothes left white. The soldiers accompanying him exclaimed excitedly that this combination of colors—red, white, red - would be the design of the new banner that they would follow (Shakir, et al. 2012: 201f). This legend has been promoted by paintings since the beginning of the 16th century, and is still embedded in popular lore.8

Anti-Muslim—and especially anti-Turkish—resentment in Vienna is based on the notion of a long-lasting bellicose relationship between two empires. In this perception, Turks and/or Muslims are not unknown aliens, but longstanding and well-known enemies. As dead Muslims, they are even integrated into the Austrian flag, the Austrian national symbol. This remembrance is initiated and perpetuated by the renaming of monuments and streets, and by commemorative acts.
In Austrian schoolbooks, Islam is represented as a religion subjugating believers under rigid rules, and as patriarchal. They frequently suggest that all aspects of every day behavior of Muslims are influenced by religion (Georg-Eckert-Institut für Internationale Schulbuchforschung 2011, 9). Austrian schoolbooks tend to relate current incidents involving terror with historic events, like the expansion of Islam during the Middle Age, or the construction of mosques with minarets during the Siege of Vienna (10). In his overview of the most important historic events related to Vienna, the Magistrat der Stadt Wien included both sieges, and World War II, but not the city’s incorporation into the German Reich (2015,5).

As a result of this popular “knowledge” regarding the two sieges, populist political parties in Vienna gain votes by warning of a third Turkish Siege of the city. Official rhetoric excludes the fact that the Ottoman Empire had no bellicose relationship with the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the 19th century and, on the contrary, both multi-ethnic empires became strategic allies against nationalist movements, e.g., the pan-Slavic movement, and the strengthening of Russia (Hafez 2014, 67f).

**SHIFTING THE FRONTIERS OF WHAT IS FREMD**

Academic texts discussing the longstanding relationship between today’s Germany and regions associated with Islam (e.g., Bauknecht 2010 or Berman 2007) can be used to refute the conceptual pattern of Islam and Muslims as being completely fremd. Analysis of this relationship reveals differences within Germany: students in Hannover, who are mainly Protestant or atheist, were irritated by references originating in those parts of Germany where Catholicism predominates, which frequently invoked the “Blessed Virgin Mary” as the protector against the Turks (Spohn 2010). Subsequent discussions reveal differences within the country, and prejudices and stereotypes toward other provinces, especially Bavaria, which is mostly Catholic. Although foreigners tend to take Bavarian local customs as representative of Germany, this view is not shared by many Germans from other provinces. Differences in perspective regarding relationships between Germany and Islam/Muslims are visibly apparent between regions associated with Protestantism and those associated with Catholicism.

These differences offer excellent learning opportunities for clarifying anti-Muslim racism as a structural element of society, as exhibited by the relevant religious, social and political contexts. In Northern Germany, emphasizing the underlying pattern of anti-Muslim racism in Vienna proved to be very useful for this purpose: German stereotypes toward Austria characterize the Southern neighbor as gemütlich (pleasant), cute, and an attractive place to visit for holidays. Germans are knowledgeable about the Austrian flag, but tend to underestimate the differences between the two countries. Under such circumstances, the emphasis on the military history of Vienna contradicts, on the one hand, patterns of anti-Muslim racism in Hannover, and on the other hand, belies stereotypes about Austria. As a result, the 19th century’s narratives regarding Vienna’s national symbols, and the bloody legend about the origin of the Austrian flag, can unite Muslims and non-Muslims in Hannover in their bewilderment. This shift in the perception of what is considered fremd increases the awareness that cultural boundaries are flexible and situational.
THE OUTLOOK

Imparting knowledge about different patterns that underlie anti-Muslim racism has significant potential for rupturing monolithic perceptions of an alleged Western “us,” or, in German colloquial language, a Western Kulturkreis. Muslims and non-Muslims socialized in a specific regional context most probably share these patterns and can recognize them as a cultural similarity. This has two implications: first, it makes visible the fact that members of Muslim minorities with migration experience are people who comprise a variety of (national and) cultural identities—including the one of the dominant national society, i.e., they are “Halfies” in the sense of Abu Lughod (Abu-Lughod 1991, 139f). Second, such an approach automatically raises the question, “When do we call behavior ‘cultural,’ and when do we not?” (Volpp 2000, 89). This leads to discussions about culture that rupture concepts such as Kulturkreis, which is based on ideas of ethnicity or race.

For this purpose, more detailed investigation of the specific regional patterns underlying anti-Muslim racism is required. In the case of Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, open questions include whether prevailing patterns correspond to the religious denomination of the majority in a given region, and whether they are differently adapted when Catholic or Protestant contexts shift towards atheism. In the case of Germany, specificities of the former German Democratic Republic are desired. In the case of Switzerland, patterns of anti-Muslim racism might be framed differently according to language frontiers.

ENDNOTES

1 Huntington arbitrarily mixes religion, nationality and geographical region as criteria for distinguishing between “Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization” (Huntington 1993, 25).


3 In spite of immigration, the German population has been shrinking steadily since 2001 (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2013: 9)

4 See endnote 3

5 http://www.willy-brandt.org/fileadmin/brandt/Downloads/Beitrag_Rother_Letzte_waechst_zusammen.pdf. Migrants from the former German Democratic Republic are not considered to have Migrationshintergrund.

6 http://www.royals-aus-hannover.de/ausstellungen/

7 http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/menschen_und_gesellschaft/bevoelkerung/bevoelkerungsstruktur/bevoelkerung_nach_statsangehoerigkeit_geburtsland/index.html

8 In 2011, www.kidsnet.at, an internet portal for primary school, still offered teaching materials for imparting this legend though they have been removed since then.
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Examining Islamophobia and Racism in the Netherlands: Practices and Beliefs of Academics, Politicians, and the Police Regarding these Concepts and their Social Aspects

Ineke van der Valk
University of Amsterdam
Examining Islamophobia and Racism in the Netherlands:
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Regarding these Concepts and their Social Aspects

Ineke van der Valk
University of Amsterdam

ABSTRACT: Central focus of this special ‘comparative approaches to studying Islamophobia’ are the differences in comparative work on Islamophobia in different parts of the world, notably between the Anglo-Saxon world, the USA and German speaking countries. As far as science in general is concerned one can say that the Dutch academic world is rather ‘in between’ and more or less open to different international traditions. Goldberg (2014), expert in research on racism, speaks of a ‘peculiar mix’. Dutch academia definitively has a character of its own, in particular with regard to (the study of) racism.

In the last decade discrimination of immigrants in the Netherlands became more and more framed in terms of the Islamic religion and culture, in particular since the rise and prospering of the nativist populist party PVV that recently entered into alliance with several classical right wing extremist parties on the European level. Islam became increasingly represented as a totalitarian political ideology, comparable to fascism and communism and its followers target of verbal abuse and insults and even sometimes violence. In
discriminatory discourse references to religious and ethnic grounds are often intertwined. In the Netherlands Islamophobia however is an underreported, under researched and even contested social phenomenon and concept. Dominant public and policy discourses use discrimination - a concept that refers to practices instead of ideologies - to refer to unequal treatment and social exclusion of ethnic minorities and its underlying attitudes and prejudices. In this paper I explore how academics analyze the phenomenon. Do they use the concept Islamophobia? Do they link it with other forms of discrimination such as anti-Semitism or racism? The same question may be raised for political actors such as the Dutch government and political parties in parliamentary debates. In addition I analyze and discuss police practices of categorization and registration of cases of discrimination. What does the fact that racism and related topics are under researched and downplayed mean for these practices? Does it have implications and if so how to assess them?

This analysis of the state of the art in study on Islamophobia and racism in the Netherlands highlights that Islamophobia as a concept to denote a specific form of racism is slowly but undeniably gaining ground while more sophisticated theorization is lacking. This is also reflected in politics.

That this under theorization and lack of recognition is not only detrimental for science but also has undesirable practical implications is illustrated with the empirical case study on police practices.

**INTRODUCTION**

The central focus of this special issue of the Islamophobia Studies Journal is the regional differences in comparative work on Islamophobia, notably between the Anglo-Saxon world, the USA, and the German speaking countries. As far as the social sciences in general are concerned, one can say that the Dutch academic world is rather “in between,” and more or less open to different international perspectives regarding the subject. Dutch academia definitely also has a character of its own, in particular with regard to (the study of) racism.

In the last two decades, discrimination toward immigrants in the Netherlands has increasingly become framed in terms of the Islamic religion and culture. Since the rise and prospering of the nativist populist party, PVV (founded in 2005), which entered into an alliance with several classical right wing extremist parties before the European elections of 2014, Islam has become increasingly represented as a totalitarian political ideology. Islam is compared to fascism and communism, and its followers have become targets of verbal abuse and insults, and even occasional violence. Islamophobia, however, is an underreported, under-researched, and even contested, social phenomenon, as well as a controversial concept. In the Netherlands, both the public and policymakers typically use the term “discrimination” in their discourses to refer to unequal treatment and social exclusion of ethnic minorities and underlying attitudes and prejudices. The basis for this is that the concept of discrimination refers to practices instead of ideologies, and practices may be punishable, but ideologies are not. In the following sections, the analysis of this phenomenon by academics is explored. Do they use the concept Islamophobia? Do they link it with other forms of discrimination such as anti-Semitism or racism? Similar questions may be raised regarding politicians, the Dutch government, and political parties. In addition, police practices regarding categorization and registration of cases of discrimination are discussed. What meaning should we derive from the fact that Islamophobia, racism in general, and related topics are under-researched, downplayed, and contested? Does this have implications, and if so, how should we assess them?
In order to explore how Dutch academics analyse Islamophobia, I discuss in particular contributions in two books on racism in the Netherlands that were published in 2014: *Dutch Racism*, by Philomena Essed and Isabel Hoving (eds.), and *Blackness in Europe*, by Dienke Hondius. The book, *Dutch Racism*, is an edited volume with articles from an interdisciplinary group of contributors who write about a variety of topics such as colonial histories, contemporary novels, government policies, public debates, interaction in the workplace, anti-Semitism, and anti-racist action. It is noted on the cover as “the first comprehensive study of its kind […],” and continues as follows: “Contrary to common sense beliefs it appears that the old-fashioned biological notions of ‘race’ never disappeared. At the same time the Netherlands echoes, if not leads, a wider European trend, where offensive statements about Muslims are an everyday phenomenon.” However, in spite of this statement, and although Muslim discrimination is occasionally referred to in other contributions as well, only two of twenty articles addresses Islamophobia, namely those by Marc De Leeuw and Sonja van Wichelen and Miriyam Arouagh. Arouagh discusses the developments in the public debate after 9/11 and the murder of van Gogh, covering the period from 2002-2008. She gives an interesting “personal account of observations, concerns and dilemmas about resisting and experiencing Islamophobia,” including those she experienced in the social anti-racist movements in which she participated at the time. De Leeuw and van Wichelen point to “the obsessive instrumentalization of religion” in the Dutch culturalist approach to immigration issues by which “Muslims are essentialized,” citing civic integration programs as an example. “In this approach,” they argue, “the nation’s own violent past in colonialism and slavery and national exclusionary practices of the exclusion of a.o. women and gay people remain unchallenged.” However, none of these chapters discusses the phenomenon of Islamophobia on a more theoretical level, nor makes comparisons to racism or anti-Semitism.

In this well-documented study titled *Blackness in Western Europe, Racial Patterns of Paternalism and Exclusion*, historian Dienke Hondius describes and analyses the historical influence of race and racism in interracial interaction, including slavery and colonialism, and contemporary forms of racism and its denial. She identifies the following forms of racial attitudes, e.g., paternalism, infantilization, exoticism, bestialization, exclusion and distancing, and exceptionalism. She argues that, in particular, exclusion and paternalism have historically been characteristics of these interracial relations and were most influential.

Although the author argues that in the Netherlands after 9/11 “anti-Muslim sentiments soon began to compete with and overgrow forms of anti-black racism,” she does not analyse the phenomenon of Islamophobia in more detail, relating it uniquely to the effects of Islamist terrorism. She states, “One effect of the terrorist attacks in New York, Casablanca, Bali, Madrid and London was the strengthening of anti-Muslim sentiment, and of fear and anger against Muslims and people who are perceived as terrorists.” Although her study is extremely valuable in many respects, a more theoretical approach, as well as definitions of the central items of her analysis (race and racism), are lacking. Although she does attempt to compare racism to anti-Semitism in various sections of her book, these relations are insufficiently explored because of the lack of theory. Although she makes an interesting
comparison of the anti-Semitism of the Nazis to their anti-black attitude, she argues without any further explanation that historical slavery of black people must not be compared to the Holocaust. It should, rather, be compared to forced labour systems in Nazi Germany, she maintains. This is an interesting argument, although one that needs further elaboration. Dienke Hondius (2014) identifies a seesaw effect, as coined by Albert Memmi, in relation to anti-black and Muslim discrimination in the Netherlands. “It appears that, as Muslims have been pushed down, other groups discriminated against as well, such as black people, have gone up the social hierarchy, to some extent.” Thus, although both studies raise the issue of Islamophobia, their discussion of this social problem and concept is very limited.

In general, as far as I am aware, even today, few scholars in the Netherlands specialize in the study of Islamophobia, although the landscape is rapidly changing as a result of increasing political and media attention. The Netherlands Scientific Organisation (NWO) is in charge of Dutch academic research funding. Procedures for selection of academic research proposals are not always fair, and result in what professor Willem Trommel, of VU-University, has called “research without risks.” There is a strong tendency to favor “normal science.” NWO sponsored a project by Jansen (University of Amsterdam) and Thijl Sunier (Free University, Amsterdam), that studied the relationship between discrimination and criticism of religion. This was formulated in the project proposal as “the relationship between the contemporary criticism of Jewish and Muslim social practices and the position of these minorities as historical and contemporary objects of culturalization, orientalization and racialization.” Racialisation refers to a process by which meaning is attributed to specific biological characteristics of humans in order to divide them into different categories of human beings. This process precedes practices of discrimination and exclusion on racial grounds. Because formulating in terms of racism would almost certainly mean receiving no funding, that may explain why this was not done. In recent years, particularly at the University of Amsterdam, various scholars in the field of sociology of religion, and specialists in Islamic studies, have started to integrate a focus on Islamophobia into their academic work, such as Martijn de Koning on his blog, religionresearch.org, Annelies Moors, who specializes in gender issues, and Sipco Vellinga in a recent project on anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Several scholars working with the PVV populist party equally study and discuss the discriminatory dimensions of the discourse of the PVV regarding Muslims and Islam, e.g., Jan Jaap de Ruiter (University of Tilburg), Sybe Schaap (Delft University), and Koen Vossen (University of Nijmegen).

Denial

The relative lack of research interest in Islamophobia as a form of racism in the academic world is not surprising given that, not only Islamophobia, but racism in general, is predominantly denied not only in politics and civil society but even in academia. Academics studying these issues are often marginalized, and their work is often ridiculed by columnists and Internet bloggers. In short, this type of research is not without (social) risks. Australian Ellie Vasta, Associate Professor in Sociology, describes her experiences with the hostile attitudes of Dutch (male) academics when she analysed the conditions of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands as predominantly influenced by institutional discrimination and a culture of racism: “It became clear to me that many Dutch academics do not believe that institutional racism exists in the Netherlands—or indeed that racism exists at all.” (Vasta 2014). It is, thus, not accidental that the majority of Dutch authors of the volume Dutch Racism are based abroad or self-employed. Few, if any, biographies of contributors to the volume mention
racism as a main research interest, hiding this interest behind more-general headings such as diversity, emancipation, and migration. The general denial of racism in Dutch society is the leading focus of the volume *Dutch Racism*, and rightly so. This general denial implies, for example, that few scholars in the Netherlands specialize in racism studies. In addition to the other authors of the books that are discussed in this article, Amade Mcharek of the University of Amsterdam, needs to be mentioned, whose research interests are in race, genetics, and forensics. She is also the convener of the seminar series *Ir/relevance of race in Science and Society*. In these seminars the relevance and irrelevance of race is discussed as an object and concept of research in order to explore ways to talk about race without naturalizing differences. The series, as it explains, goes beyond a standard definition of race—one that is allegedly relevant everywhere—and situates race in specific practices of research. In addition, the series gives room to the various different versions of race that can be found in the European context, and explores when and how populations, religions, and cultures become naturalized and racialized.

Outstanding academics who have specialized in the study of racism and related mechanisms of exclusion in the 1980s and 90s, such as academics affiliated with the former Centre for Race and Ethnic Studies of the University of Amsterdam, either later joined universities abroad to safeguard their commitment to this field of study, or integrated it into a more general focus on mechanisms of exclusion, such as those based on gender and ethnicity, or continued a marginalized existence. Consequently, few scholars in the Netherlands, as far as I am aware, relate historical forms of racism to an explanation of anti-Muslim attitudes and ideology on a more theoretical level.15

Until World War II, Islam was mostly remembered as being a danger to Christianity and society. This memory was based on the Crusades, and the military confrontations with the Turks in the seventeenth century. At the same time, Islam also culturally symbolized a distant exotic world, i.e., the Orient, “an oasis of unfulfilled desires” based on essentially positive stereotypes. The representation of Islam functioned as a tool to articulate the worldviews of Westerners. In the social domain, the image of Islam was inextricably linked to colonial politics in the Dutch East Indies. As trade and profit originally were the main focus, the objective was to avoid social unrest based on faith. This is why Christians were formally forbidden to convert Muslims, although, in practice, they did so in regions where Islam was considered to be weakly represented. From the nineteenth century onward, social divisions in the colonies were color based, with white Europeans at the top of the hierarchy and dark colored native people at the bottom. Academic interest in Islam not only served to preserve the classical heritage and to enable the study of Islamic arts, but it also became a focus of attention for policies of population management in the colonial context. Dutch politics had dual objectives: oppression of Islamic forces as a political power on the one hand, but allowing space for Islam as a religion on the other.

With regard to the contemporary relationship between racism and anti-Muslim attitudes in the specificity of conditions of the Dutch society where racism is met with indifference, ignored, and denied, the US scholar and critical race theorist David Theo Goldberg argues as follows:

[… the projection of an international reputation for liberal tolerance are maintainable in the face of unjust social conditions only through a series of less visible conceptual and social repressions and restrictions. […] the consensus is predicated on an implicit understanding that the principal profile of racist expression is anti-Semitism. This in turn partly accounts for the increasingly extreme expression
of Islamophobia identified with European societies [...] Islamophobia has come to constitute a key means to the maintenance of a peculiarly European identity as ‘Caucasian’ (white) and Christian.\textsuperscript{20}

While racism and Islamophobia are under-researched despite remarkable research efforts of individual scholars,\textsuperscript{21} it is anti-Semitism that is a more institutionalized focus of much scholarly attention, particularly for academics working in a specialised institute, the Netherlands Institute for War-Holocaust and Genocide Studies (NIOD).\textsuperscript{22}

In summary, unlike anti-Semitism, both racism in general and Islamophobia are under-researched as contested social phenomena. Consequently, few academics specialize in Islamophobia, and only a few more in racism as a main research topic. Although Islamophobia is increasingly referred to in their publications, a more elaborate account of this phenomenon and a theoretical approach are still lacking.

\textit{POLITICS}

\textit{Political Parties}

For about a decade, Islamophobia has been at the center of politics in the Netherlands. Geert Wilders, PVV party leader, again and again, wherever possible, and with all legal means available, campaigns against Islam/Muslims in local and national politics by means of hateful rhetoric in speeches, on websites, in parliamentary questions and motions, and on stickers and leaflets that are widely distributed. How do other political actors relate to this Islamophobic discourse and/or the resistance against it? The conservative Christian party, SGP, - the party that opposes women fulfilling active political functions - rejects Islam too, because it considers this religion to be against the will and command of God, but does not use this stance as an argument for discriminatory policies. Neither does the right-wing Christen Unie (Union of Christians). “Islam as religion must not be combated with political means,” argues a political leader of the Union of Christians in an article in which he explains the differences in opinion on Islam between the PVV and the Union of Christians. He continues: “But the political differences are even more principled. The Union of Christians does not want a distinction between first class and second-class citizens with more or fewer rights [...]. The constitutional state first of all creates freedom for all beliefs within the limits of the law. Not only for those who please us but also for those that hurt our souls.”\textsuperscript{23}

Various other parliamentary parties show a contradictory picture. On the one hand, their positions may be characterized by silence, underestimating, downplaying the importance of discrimination against Muslims, and distrust of Muslim organizations and leaders; on the other hand, they officially and verbally support anti-discrimination measures, but are often badly informed about the real spread and prevalence of Muslim discrimination, due to a general underreporting. A social and political struggle for the recognition of Islamophobia, both in terms of the phenomenon and its definition, is ongoing. Significant in this context is the fact that, during a parliamentary debate requested by the PVV on the 16\textsuperscript{th} of January, 2014 regarding hatred against Jews, Muslim youngsters were exclusively pointed at as perpetrators. This is contrary to the evidence, as a number of studies have shown. In a study on anti-Semitism among secondary school students, for example, it was shown that, in two thirds of recent cases of anti-Semitism, perpetrators among students had a Dutch ethnic background.\textsuperscript{24} Incorrect figures were used in the parliamentary debate, while none of the political parties that participated in the discussion mentioned the role of young Muslims as
victims of discrimination. Contrary to the evidence, and in spite of the fact that stereotypical images of Jews are part of Dutch culture, this particular form of racism is prevalent in the dominant anti-Muslim political and public opinion climate, predominantly situated in the Muslim community.

At the same time, democratic political parties gradually, but increasingly, take a stance against (the racism of) the PVV, against racism in general, and Islamophobia in particular, and take steps to initiate policies. An example is the proposal of the two liberal political parties, D'66 and VVD, submitted at the level of the local council in Amsterdam, to introduce Muslim discrimination as a separate category of discrimination in police registration forms. After more than three decades, and due to different societal developments, examples being the rise of Islamophobia and the heated public debates on the Black Pete figure in the traditional children’s festival of Sinterklaas, racism is definitively back on the Dutch political and media agenda.

**Government**

The present government, formed by the liberal party VVD (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) and the social democratic party PvdA (Labour Party) after the collapse in 2012 of the government supported by Wilders’ PVV party, has ostensibly decided to tackle discrimination issues by speech. From winter 2013 onward, the government repeatedly and publicly recognized the existence and rise of racism in the Netherlands in general, and discrimination in the labor market in particular. After the release of a report on labor discrimination, the authorities announced policies aimed at reducing discrimination, for example, by refusing to cooperate with businesses that allow discriminatory policies and practices. The report highlighted the fact that people from Moroccan or Turkish origin have three to four times more discriminatory experiences when looking for a job than people from Dutch origin. Antilleans, Eastern Europeans, and Surinamese have such experiences two to three times as often, compared to native Dutch. Measures to counter discrimination in education have also been launched. In spring 2014, the government made a declaration against Islamophobic incidents and discrimination in reaction to discriminatory experiences of some Muslim women that were reported in the press. Minister Asscher called discrimination “a many-headed which should be combated with full force whenever it resurfaces.” Subsequently, various expert meetings on Islamophobia were organized by the Ministry of Social Affairs in close collaboration with civil society stakeholders. In the minutes of their first meeting, the term ”Islamophobia” was used, but the ministry referred to potentially harmful effects when using this terminology: “Minister Asscher recognizes the problems that underlie the concept of Islamophobia but considers the use of this term hazardous and potentially counterproductive.” It was not explained what this risk was. The outcome of the meeting was illustrated by the statement that “the Minister is willing to support initiatives that challenge and counter this phenomenon.” Most importantly, the government, after initial hesitation, has officially protested against discriminatory statements by Wilders regarding Moroccan citizens, which were expressed during the last election campaigns in the spring of 2014. Changing attitudes of the government in relation to discrimination issues are also reflected in foreign politics. In reaction to a terrorist attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels on 27th of May, 2014, the then minister of Foreign Affairs, Frans Timmermans, made a clear statement on xenophobia in Parliament while referring to European right-extremist parties: “Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, racism and discrimination threaten the European project,” he said. “One of the demons haunting Europe is that in
times of crisis people are looking for a scapegoat. In the past these were Jews and gypsies, and nowadays, also Muslims” (my translation). By the end of 2014, when bloggers published a call to set a mosque on fire, as was done in Sweden, the government decided to investigate this case and prosecute the people who had expressed these threats. It is clear that the reason for these more-positive political developments is, to a certain extent, the fact that the mainstream parties, the liberal VVD in particular, have rid themselves of restrictive collaboration with the PVV, following the collapse of the last government in 2012. In addition, the Netherlands has been in the forefront of attention of international organizations, such as the ECRI body of the Council of Europe, which produced a critical report on the situation related to racism and anti-racism in the Netherlands. The Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent of the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations also visited the Netherlands, in order to report on discrimination. This international spotlight has obviously been a stimulus for taking a stance against racism, discrimination and Islamophobia, and for development of policies to counter these social problems. Nevertheless, representatives of Muslim umbrella organizations repeatedly complain that their discussions with authorities regarding Islamophobia too quickly reach an inappropriate character of negotiation. In return for more adequate policies on Islamophobia, authorities want the Muslim community to speak out against Islamic terrorism, and to oppose and combat radicalization among their young followers. So, by the time of this writing, the country is in the middle of changing political opinions, attitudes, and relationships regarding Wilders/PVV, and Islamophobic and racist discourse in general. Islamophobia is increasingly on the political agenda, and the concept has gradually become more accepted. Governmental “management by speech,” however, needs to be followed up by unconditional policies and their implementation. A first step was the announcement in spring 2015, of the revision of the Action Program against Discrimination, in order to incorporate more concrete policies.

POLICE DATA, CATEGORIZATION, REGISTRATION AND ANALYSIS

Commissioned by the National Expertise Centre Diversity (LECD-police) an annual report is published with data on discrimination that are systematically registered by the 26 regional police services and the national police service, KLPD. This POLDIS report gives an overview of discrimination data on grounds that are subject to criminal law, i.e., race, religion, philosophy of life, gender, sexual orientation, and handicap. In the remainder of this article, I critically discuss changes that have been made to the registration and categorisation system used by the police, and thus, also changes in the POLDIS report. These changes pertain to the following categories: “anti-Semitism,” “origin,” “religion/philosophy of life,” and “graffiti and right-extremist texts.”

Anti-Semitism

In 2010, following advice from the research department of the Anne Frank House, discrimination on the basis of anti-Semitism was added to the aforementioned, legally recognized, discrimination grounds in order to obtain a better insight into this form of discrimination, given its social relevance, and in order to integrate the fact that anti-Semitism not only refers to religion but also to origin. In 2012, however, this policy was changed again. In the registration form used, the term Anti-Semitism is no longer used. It is divided into “Jewish as race” and “Jewish as religion.” In the synthesizing report, which is based on
the registration forms of the police, both are again combined and synthesized as anti-Semitism. Police officers who report a complaint on these forms are, thus, not able to categorize such a complaint as anti-Semitic.

**Origin**

In the new form introduced in 2012, the former category of “origin” has been renamed “race.” Moreover, “race” has been divided into the following new subcategories: “autochthonous,” “Western allochthonous,” “non-Western allochthonous,” “Roma/Sinti,” “Jewish,” and “others/unknown.” The earlier coding form that was used until 2012 contained the following grounds for discrimination concerning origin: “autochthonous,” “Western allochthonous,” “Turkish,” “Surinamese,” “Moroccan,” “Antillean,” “white skin colour,” “dark/black skin colour,” “Roma/Sinti,” and “unspecified.” The new system represents a remarkable change that is not without implications. Since World War II, given the traumatic experiences associated with the extermination of different population groups by the Nazis, Jews in particular, it has become at least unusual, if done at all, to talk of groups of people in terms of “races.” However, related to international convention, the term continued to be used in legislation and jurisdiction (Dutch penal law and Equal Treatment Law) as an overarching heading of categories of descent. For the first time since World War II, and in a new format, these recent changes at the executive level imply that “race” is back again in the official police registration system. Note that the subcategory of “skin colour,” although it is considered one of the most important features of racism in the eyes of the Dutch, is absent in the new subdivision. Moreover, new “races” are constructed: “autochthonous” and “allochthonous” - subdivided into Western and non-Western - next to the “races” that were used in history (“Roma/Sinti” and “Jews”), but about whom we have not spoken in racial terms since 1945. Regardless of nationality and regional origin, Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, and Antillean members of these groups are grouped together into the category “non-Western allochthonous.” Differences in prevalence of discrimination among these different groups, which are often remarkable and thus socially relevant to highlight, are no longer visible. One may wonder where the black Dutch Surinamese, if they are discriminated against, will be registered. Will they be of “autochthonous race” (as a Dutch national), or of “non-Western allochthonous race” (as a person originating from a former colony)? One may also wonder if the Jewish community will be happy to be categorized again as a “race.” Obviously, all theoretical, scholarly, and societal discussions on ethnicity, race, anti-Semitism and related topics are neglected in the construction of these categorisations. Also neglected is the academic and societal debate on the controversial concepts of “allochthonous” versus “autochthonous” that were once constructed in the Netherlands to facilitate policies to counter the disadvantaged position of ethnic minorities, which are more and more often criticised for their discriminatory implications. Nevertheless, the policies based on this distinction are outdated and no longer practiced. No specific motivation is given in the POLDIS 2012 report for this change of lexical items of registration, although the following may serve to explain the rationale. The report signals that this change, as far as discrimination of Jews is concerned, is responsible for higher complaint scores for “anti-Semitism” because, previously, in the former coding system, “anti-Semitism” was partially registered in the “race” category, and partially in the category of “religion” and/or “philosophy of life,” and also partially under the “anti-Semitism” code, depending on the individual insights of the police officer who was in charge of the reported incident. More clarity for the category of discrimination against Jews is undoubtedly im-
important, but, due to the changes in categorization of discrimination regarding other groups, a decline in accuracy and effectiveness of complaint registration for these groups, and thus with further insight into discrimination issues, may, unfortunately, be expected. While more detailed, disaggregated, and specific data are needed, the tendency is toward aggregation.

Religion/Philosophy of Life

During all of 2011, and for all regions, the police registered 2,802 incidents for all grounds categories combined, which was 10 percent more than in 2010. Most cases involved the discrimination ground of “race” (931). Two hundred ninety-four incidents were counted for “anti-Semitism,” which was a sharp increase in comparison to the previous two years. The number of complaints on the ground of “religion” was relatively small in the incident registration for 2011. For this category the report does not give precise numbers, but, when asked for detailed information, the researchers gave a number of 18.

For a long-term overview, the following table shows the data over the last five years:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Origin/ethnicity (per 2012 race)</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>1161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Semitism</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion/(until 2011 including philosophy of life)</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy of life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: Grounds of discrimination 2008-2012
The changes in registration categories since 2011 are referred to in the lines between parentheses.

The high scores for “religion/philosophy of life,” which is the category where Muslim discrimination is registered, are remarkable. The “non-religious philosophy of life” scores were negligible. Discrimination against Christians is the basis for approximately 10 complaints per year. I thus assume that the large majority of these complaints are related to the Muslim religion, and also partly to the Jewish religion (as far as this was not registered as “anti-Semitism”). In 2011, the grounds of “religion” and “philosophy of life” were separated. “Religion” scored remarkably low, and “philosophy of life” remarkably high (440 complaints). Discrimination relevant to the Islamic religion was obviously registered as “philosophy of life.”
When asked about the motives for this division of the categories, and the registration of discrimination complaints related to the Islamic religion as “philosophy of life,” the researchers said that the distinction between “religion” and “philosophy of life” is “somewhat vague,” as far as Islam is concerned. The report itself does not give any motivation for this policy. This is not without problems, since it may be viewed as a move in the direction of tendencies to not consider Islam as a religion, but, instead, as a culture, or, in the view of the PVV, as ideology. Discrimination toward Muslims would then no longer be a protected category. Whether it was done intentionally or not, it is important to counter these forms of culturalization of religion. Moreover, in my opinion, these changes do not add to further insight into discrimination, and certainly do not add insight into Islamophobia, all of which get more and more hidden behind categories of registration that are not very clear and too frequently changed. This is especially true if the report gives no explanation for these changes.

Focused or Unfocused?

The POLDIS reports for 2011 and 2012 reveal some other changes. For the first time, in 2011, a distinction was made between “incidents with a discriminatory character” and incidents with a mere “discriminatory expression.” In the latter category, the expression does not target the object or victim directly based on characteristics of his/her identity. Among these expressions are, for example, a swastika on a car, or insulting someone who is not Jewish by calling him or her a Jew. This distinction is not explained in the report, and does not seem very clear. I am concerned that there will be a lot of borderline cases that will question this distinction. Moreover, the autonomous function of a linguistic expression or symbol is thus downplayed. This is also the case for incidents where someone may feel insulted even if the insult does not pertain to his or her identity characteristics. On the other hand, this distinction may contribute to further insights, but should be verbalized in a more consistent and distinctive manner, explained fully, and properly analysed. The report for 2012 does not contain this distinction, and uses a clearer terminology to differentiate between two kinds of incidents: “intentional” versus “unfocused.”
Graffiti and Right Extremist Texts

Another change that was made in the 2012 report is the elimination of the registration of the former categories “discriminatory graffiti” and “right-wing-extremist texts.” In 2011, there were 476 registered for “right-wing extremist texts” and 446 for “discriminatory graffiti,” far from negligible numbers. This change, too, remains unexplained in the POLDIS report. However, when asked, the researchers said that the motivation for this change is that such utterances are more and more normal, and have indeed become part of daily life. Moreover, the question is whether these expressions are not registered anymore, or, whether they are registered under a different category. From a discussion in the report about the quantitative data, it may be derived that swastikas on benches in public spaces continue to be registered, namely as “unfocused anti-Semitism” (versus “intentional anti-Semitism” for swastikas on synagogues), whereas, they probably were formerly registered as “right-wing-extremist expressions.” This raises questions. The swastika is a symbol of Nazism/national-socialism, and nowadays in particular, is used by neo-Nazis and right-extremist groups. It has thus become a symbol of expressing anti-Semitism. It seems inadequate, however, to reduce it to its anti-Semitic dimension only, in particular, where distinctions are made between “focused” and unfocused” expressions. In other words, why are Nazi symbols exclusively associated with racism towards one group, (i.e., anti-Semitism, as Jews were indeed excessively victimized by Nazism) and not to another? What about a swastika on a mosque? It is not unusual to find swastikas on Islamic objects, such as on the mosque in Almere in the summer of 2014, and on Turkish shops in the winter of 2014 in Amersfoort? It is clear, however, that these swastikas were intended to express a conviction that Islam is a fascist ideology, and not to express anti-Semitism. They are, nevertheless, in many cases, registered as anti-Semitism. Related questions are: If graffiti with a White Power symbol is in analogy categorized in the police registration system as discrimination on the ground of “non-Western allochtonous race” and MoskNee (NoMosque) on a wall as “unfocused” discrimination based on the Islamic religion? If not, the changes are selectively implemented, and the indicated increase in anti-Semitic incidents is possibly partially related to changes in the registration system used by the police. The Anti-discrimination Office in the region of Rotterdam, RADAR, recently made a comparable observation. It reported that, of ninety incidents in 2011-2013 in the region of Rotterdam registered by the police as anti-Semitic, sixty did not target people from a Jewish background. Ten, indeed, could be characterized as anti-Semitic, while fifteen were related to football, and twenty were not clear enough to determine their character. Among the incidents, many examples of swastika graffiti were placed on arbitrary objects such as walls and cars. They did “not convincingly focus” on Jews as a group.43 Unless a clear relationship to discrimination against Jews can be established, such as in the case of swastikas on a synagogue, the usual categorization as right-wing extremist expressions of graffiti (such as swastikas) would be more appropriate. However, if changes are implemented, then they should be done consistently.

IN CONCLUSION

This exploratory analysis of the state of the art regarding the study of Islamophobia and racism in the Netherlands highlights that Islamophobia, as a concept and field of study, is slowly, but undeniably, gaining ground, while more sophisticated theorization is lacking. Two recently published studies were examined in more detail. Although both raise the issue
of Islamophobia, their discussion of this social problem and concept is very limited. Unlike anti-Semitism, racism, in general, is also an under-researched field of study, despite efforts of individual scholars. This situation of neglect and underestimation also holds true for politics. The concept of Islamophobia, and the problem of Muslim discrimination, are increasingly gaining space on the political agenda. A case study on police practices illustrated that the under-theorization and lack of recognition and know-how of problems related to racism and discrimination toward Muslims is not only detrimental for science, but also has undesirable practical implications. As a result of changes in the categorization terminology of discrimination incidents affecting various vulnerable groups, a general decline in accuracy and effectiveness in understanding the true nature of such incidents may be expected. Different forms of discrimination, such as anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, are seemingly not addressed equally. While more detailed, disaggregated, and specific data for different vulnerable groups are needed, the actual tendency is toward aggregation.

ENDNOTES

1 The field of the study and politics/policies related to Islamophobia and racism is rapidly changing. This article discusses the situation until spring 2015.

2 For discussion on alternative concepts that have been suggested by international and Dutch scholars see Ineke van der Valk Dutch Islamophobia, LIT Verlag, 2015.


6 Culturalism is conceptualized as a form of racism.


8 De Volkskrant, 6 September 2014.

9 The overview of scholars is not exhaustive.

10 Ibid.


13 This also holds for others such as Halleh Ghorashi (VU University Amsterdam) and Gloria Wekker (University of Utrecht).

14 See e.g. Amade Mçharek, “DNA onderzoek en racialisering, van individuele verdachte tot verdachte populatie,” in Marija Davidovic & Ashley Terlouw Onderzoek naar processen van in- en uitsluiting, Amsterdam, AUP 2014.

15 See Van der Valk 2012.


17 Ibid. p.580.


21 Other examples are Ph-D studies such as Rob Witte, “Al eeuwenlang een gastvrij volk,” racistisch geweld en overheidsreacties 1950-2009, Amsterdam Aksant, 2010.


25 Examples and details are elaborated in Ineke van der Valk, Dutch Islamophobia, LIT Verlag, 2015.

26 Initiatievoorstel Zicht op Moslimdiscriminatie, Gemeente Amsterdam; The proposal was done in reaction to the outcomes of my monitoring report shortly before.


29 See for findings in English http://www.researchgate.net/publication/265412943_Perceived_discrimination_in_the_Netherlands

30 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2014/03/01/asscher-wil-contract-met-bedrijven-opzeggen-bij-discriminatie

31 Ministerie van SZW, Ronde Tafel bijeenkomst islamofobie en discriminatie van moslims, 9 april 2014, p. 2


34 http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/nieuws/2015/02/12/kabinet-herijkt-actieprogramma-anti-discriminatie.html

35 An abbreviation of police and discrimination.

36 I thank the researchers of the Verwey Jonker Institute for their reactions to critical comments about the POLDIS reports.


39 See for a critical discussion on these concepts Ineke van der Valk, Difference, deviance, threat, mainstream and right-extremist political discourse on ethnic issues in the Netherlands and France (1990-1997), Amsterdam: Aksant, 2002.


41 Ibid, p.10.

42 Bas Tierolf & Niels Hermens, Poldis rapportage 2011, p. 6.

43 RADAR Trendrapportage discriminatie 2011-2013, 2014:17
Islamophobia & Europhobia: Subaltern Discourse & Its Limits

Peter O’Brien
Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas

ISLAMOPHOBIA STUDIES JOURNAL

Published by:
Islamophobia Research and Documentation Project,
Center for Race and Gender, University of California, Berkeley.

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**Islamophobia & Europhobia: Subaltern Discourse & Its Limits**

**Peter O'Brien**

*Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas*

**ABSTRACT:** This essay examines resistance to Islamophobia in the form of Europhobia produced by Islamists in Europe. By “Europhobia” I mean essentializing and distorting depictions of Europe (and the West) as thoroughly decadent, corrupt, and sadistic. In a process that I dub “inverted othering” Islamists emulate the discursive strategies of Islamophobes but invert their negative stereotypes of Muslims to portray (non-Muslim) Europeans as a menacing threat to the umma, or Arabic community. I spotlight three forms of “inverted othering” through systematic comparison of both Islamophobic and Europhobic discourse in Europe (including in cyberspace): Islamists invert the claim that Islam is incompatible with democracy by contending that European democracy is a hypocritical sham when it comes to equal rights for Muslims; Islamists invert the claim that Islam is misogynistic by arguing that Europe sexualizes and thereby represses women; Islamists invert the claim that Islam is inherently expansionist by insisting that Europe continues to harbor (neo)imperialist aims and attitudes toward the Islamic World.

**INTRODUCTION**

The discipline of Islamophobia Studies is profoundly informed by social constructivism. It would make little sense to study Islamophobic discourse without presupposing constructivism’s central tenet that social reality is constructed. Indeed, studies abound that deftly analyze the multifaceted power of Islamophobic discourse to produce the stigmatized, essentialized, and mediatized Muslim Other who is made to appear to threaten European well-being in myriad ways (O’Brien 2015; Hafez 2014; Fredette 2014; Cesari 2013; Morgan and Poynting 2012; Bowen 2012; Lean 2012; Schneider 2010). However, social constructivism, regardless of its many manifestations, is susceptible to the charge of over-determination, that is, of exaggerating the power of the discourse to define its subjects. The subjugated are presumed to be powerless in resisting and countering the dominant discourse: “the agency of the postcolonial is… obliterated in order to inscribe him and her as marginal” (Spivak 1990; also Bhabha 1994; Guha 1982-89; Hall 1980). Stuart Hall (1988) insists, however, that “the ideological sign is always multi-accenual… it can be discursively rearticulated to construct new meanings, connect with different social practices, and position social subjects differently.” Homi Bhabha (1994) points to the “subversive strategy of subaltern agency that negotiates its own authority through a process of iterative ‘unpicking’ and incommensurable, insurgent relinking.” Edward Said (1994) found such critique of this neglect of the “subaltern” so incisive that he was moved to pen a sequel volume to *Orientalism* that explored resistance. Islamophobia Studies (much of it inspired by Said) needs to follow his example and investigate subalternity in greater depth.

This essay examines resistance to Islamophobia in the form of Europhobia produced by Islamists in Europe. By “Europhobia” I mean essentializing and distorting depictions of Europe (and the West) as thoroughly decadent, corrupt, and sadistic. In a process that I dub “inverted othering” Islamists emulate the discursive strategies of Islamophobes but invert
their negative stereotypes of Muslims to portray (non-Muslim) Europeans as a menacing threat to the umma, or Arabic community. It can also be useful to think of this resistance as reverse moral panic, whereby “moral panic” represents the process by which opportunistic political agents manage to stigmatize a targeted group in such a way that the group’s purported moral deviance becomes convincingly portrayed as an existential threat to the community as a whole (Cohen 1980; also see Morgan and Poynting 2012; Bahners 2011). Moral panics tend to take place largely in the realm of symbolic politics, having little or no basis in fact.

I spotlight three forms of “inverted othering” through systematic comparison of both Islamophobic and Europhobic discourse in Europe (including in cyberspace): Islamists invert the claim that Islam is incompatible with democracy by contending that European democracy is a hypocritical sham when it comes to equal rights for Muslims; Islamists invert the claim that Islam is misogynistic by arguing that Europe sexualizes and thereby represses women; Islamists invert the claim that Islam is inherently expansionist by insisting that Europe continues to harbor (neo)imperialist aims and attitudes toward the Islamic World. “Inverted othering” generates and disseminates a powerful subaltern discourse that moves many Muslims in Europe to resist their subjugation in myriad ways.

For all its power and influence in moving Muslims to resistance, however, Europhobic discourse remains limited by Islamophobia nonetheless. Following Spivak (1988), I contend that Europhobic “inverted othering” remains, to an important extent, informed by, or confined within, the binary logic of Islamophobia. “Inverted othering” opens only very specific and limited iterations of resistance, while obscuring other arguably more useful challenges to Islamophobic stereotypes that emanate from what Bhabha (1994) has called the hybrid “third space of enunciation.”

**METHODOLOGY**

I focus on the three themes because they are the most salient. The claim that Islam, and by extension, Muslims, are anti-democratic, is commonly heard on both the political Right and Left. Moreover, its broad distribution has influenced the proliferation across Europe of mandatory integration tests, civics courses, and loyalty oaths targeted specifically at European Muslims (Goodman 2014; Groot, Kuipers and Weber 2009). The veil controversy has been in the headlines regularly since 1989 when three pupils of Moroccan heritage who refused to unveil were expelled by administrators of Gabriel Havez Secondary School. Burqa, niqab or hijab bans have been enacted in countries such as France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and Turkey (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2014; Rosenberger and Sauer 2012; O’Brien 2009). The salience of Islamic expansionism manifests itself in the enormous amount of both rhetoric and policymaking addressing alleged Islamist terrorism despite the fact that it regularly amounts to under three percent of failed, foiled, or completed terrorist attacks in Europe (Europol 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008).

By “Islamophobes,” I mean public opinion leaders (politicians, activists, journalists, scholars) who are keen to make and distribute critical assessments of Islam. However, to qualify as “Islamophobic” in this essay, their allegations need to be reductionist and essentializing. They have to claim implicitly or explicitly that whatever negative trait they criticize (for example, tyranny, or misogyny) is inherent to Islam, and can therefore, justifiably be suspected of most or all devout Muslims. Furthermore, in this article, Islamophobes, for the most part, are not degree-holding specialists on Islam and would appear to be
uninterested in learning from the abundant literature now available that plainly refutes reductionist allegations regarding Islam and Muslims (see O’Brien 2015; Schneider 2010).

I focus on Europhobic pronouncements from Islamists because I am interested in their resistance to the dominant discourse. I employ the admittedly imperfect term “Islamism” loosely and broadly to envelop the beliefs of all those who strive toward a society in which Islamic precepts and laws—typically understood as those enunciated in the Qur’an and Sunna—predominate. Among those I label “Islamists,” the general idea tends to prevail that God revealed, through the Prophet Muhammad (and by some accounts certain subsequent Hadiths as well), sufficient guidelines for leading a morally upstanding life as an individual and as a community in all times and places. They view and practice “Islam as a way of life” (a common slogan among Islamists) rather than a private spiritual confession (Maréchal 2008). Because of limited space, I gloss over the significant differences in strategy for achieving the Islamist goal—differences ranging from pietist personal conversion stressed by such groups as Tabligh Jamaat (Association for the Propagation of Islam), Jamaat Nur, the Sûleymani, and the Gülen Movement, to non-violent political action practiced by the Muslim Brotherhood and its European affiliate the Union of Islamic Organizations in Europe (UOIE), the Islamische Gemeinde Milli Görüş (IGMG), the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) or the Jamaat-i Islami, to jihadist militant organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, Supporters of Shariah, Islamic Cultural Institute of Milan, Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiya, and Groupe Islamique Armé. The connections among Islamist organizations are typically informal and often strained. Yet, they all tend to see themselves working in the service of the international umma, or Arabic community (Paragert 2008). As a leader of the United Kingdom Islamic Mission (UKIM) remarked, “We belong to the international Islamic movement, neither to Jama’at, nor to Ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood] nor to the [Islamist] Refah party in Turkey—but all of them are our friends” (quoted in Vidino 2006). But let the reader be forewarned that Islamist (not to mention Islamic) doctrine and practice are highly complex and evolving phenomena, full treatment of which would demand a separate volume (Mandaville 2014; Leiken 2012; Göle 2011; Roy 2005).

TYRANNY

One of the commonest Islamophobic tropes maintains that Islam (and by extension devout Muslims) is undemocratic. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, for example, avers that anyone who takes Muhammad as their moral guide to action is bound to reject democracy. She has called the Prophet a “perverted tyrant whose teachings cannot be reconciled with democracy.” Listed by Time (18 April 2005) as one of the “100 most influential persons in the world,” Hirsi Ali has been but one of a chorus of prominent opinion leaders, including Afshin Elian, Chadortt Djavann, André Glucksman, Emmanuell Todd, Oriana Fallaci, Necla Kelek, Alice Schwarzer, Helmut Schmidt, Ralph Giordano, Melanie Phillips, Roy Jenkins, and Niall Ferguson, who insist that Islam is incompatible with democracy. Hirsi Ali’s erstwhile political partner in the Dutch parliament, Geert Wilders, went so far as to liken the Qur’an to Mein Kampf. Prominent French intellectual Bernhard Henri Lévy uses the catachresis “fascislamist,” while Le Figaro columnist Yvan Rioufol prefers “nazislamist” (both quoted in Rigoni 2007). British columnist Christopher Hitchins spoke of “fascism with an Islamic face” (Slate 22 October 2007), and the best-selling Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci of “the new Nazi-Fascism” (quoted in New Yorker 5 June 2006).
The incompatibility indictment, versions of which frequently appear on any number of Islamophobic websites such as Islam Watch, Politically Incorrect, Die Grüne Pest, Nürnberg 2.0, Racisme anti-blanc, Reposte Laique, Stop the Islamization of Europe, Nuke all Mosques, Islam versus Europe, Pro-Reconquista-Europa, The Brussels Journal, Jihad Watch, or Gates of Vienna, typically asserts something like the following: Both the Qur’an and the Prophet command followers to submit to the will of God. After all, “Islam” is derived from the Arabic root s-l-m, which connotes “submission,” as the 2004 film Submission written by Hirsi Ali and directed by Theo Van Gogh emphasizes. In her best-selling The Rage and the Pride, Fallaci says Islam “has never wanted to know about freedom and democracy and progress.” The creed’s insistence on submission is said to foster a “slave mentality” (Kelek 2005) among Muslims that makes them dubious, if not inimical, toward individual liberty, the moral cornerstone of democracy. German sociologist of Turkish background and winner of Bavaria’s prestigious Geschwister-Scholl prize for courage in the name of liberty, Necla Kelek (2005), asks doubtingly: “Is a culture capable of democracy that denies to the individual the right of self-determination?” Similarly, Giordano “doubts whether anyone who considers holy this charter of a herdmen’s culture can abide by the [German] constitution” (quoted in Bahners 2011).

Islamist Europhobes invert this argument by asserting that the European “democracies” are themselves anti-democratic, at least when it comes to Muslims. For example, Abou Jahjah, leader of the Antwerp-based Arab-European League, complains: “We’re Belgian citizens but they treat us like foreigners. The whole system is rigged to exclude us from jobs, houses and everything” (The Telegraph 29 November 2002). Similarly, Al-Islam, the journal of the Munich Islamic Center, charges: “In a society where the majority of the population—and nearly all politicians—are critical of or reject Islam, one cannot expect Muslims to enjoy real freedom” (quoted in Meining 2012: 228). IGMG “reminds that the majority of Muslims in Europe are excluded from direct democratic participation” and presents itself as “supporting the socially disadvantaged and oppressed” (www.igmg.de/gemeinschaft/wir-ueber-uns). Abdul Wahid, Chairman of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, claims, “the government’s long-term objective is to manufacture a compliant, subdued, secular Muslim community in Britain” (quoted in Akbarzadeh and Roose 2011).

Despite pretensions of liberty, equality, and tolerance in Western democracies, the truth, according to Islamists, is that Muslims and the values dear to them are under relentless attack. Kalim Siddiqui, who founded the Muslim Parliament UK in 1989, charged that “post-Christian secular society,” including “the British Government,” seeks “to destroy our values” (quoted in Kepel 1997). Jahjah talks of “Flemish cultural terrorism” against the Islamic community of Belgium (The Telegraph 29 November 2002). Similarly, before being deported from Germany to Turkey in 2004, Metin Kaplan, the self-proclaimed Caliph of Cologne, complained that “the enemies of Islam assume they can attack our religion, beliefs, and worship and we Muslims keep silent like sheep” (quoted in Yükleyn 2012). In response to France’s 2004 ban on veiling in public schools, Abdullah Ben Masour, General Secretary of the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF), criticized the French state for portraying “a twelve-year-old child… like an enemy… just because she wants to do her own thing” (quoted in Koopmans et. al., 2005). This complaint of the relentless and systematic oppression of European Muslims has, for at least two decades, represented a major theme in the lyrics of hugely popular Islamist hip-hop and rap artists such as IAM (Imperial Asiatic Men), Islamic Force, Lala Man, 3ème CEil, Fun-Da-Mental, Mecca2Medina, Pearls of Islam, or Yazid. The latter sings:
I’m the Arab, stopping oppression is my mission.  
The country of secularism doesn’t tolerate Islam  
Unemployment ravages, they talk of immigration  
And when the banlieue burns, they talk of integration.  
(Quoted in Jenkins 2007; also see Aidi 2014)

Western governments and media are also said to engage in mendacious humbug regarding Muslims, despite lip service paid to the democratic value of truthfulness. The rapidly proliferating jihadist websites typically style themselves as alternative sources of news and information to the “lies or misconceptions that are present in Kuffar (infidel) sources such as the BBC or CNN,” to quote almuhajiroun.com (quoted in Wiktorowicz 2005). The most outlandish recrimination claims that Western governments themselves commit the terrorist attacks spuriously attributed to Muslims. The commonest accusation in this regard is that the 9/11 attacks were either orchestrated or faked by the Central Intelligence Agency (or in some accounts by or with the Israeli Mossad). In his 2002 book, Naad bon la France (Damn France), Farid Abdelkrim, president of Jeunes Musulmans de France, denounced France as a neocolonial power that conspired with the West to commit the 9/11 atrocities and pin them on Osama Bin Laden (also see Leiken 2012; Schiffrauer 2010; Wiktorowicz 2005; Werbner 2004). Similar allegations have been made about, for example, Britain’s MI5 (Secret Intelligence Service) and the London Tube bombings of 2005 (Leiken 2012; Jenkins 2007). IGMG alleged that Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses was actually published by the CIA (Laurence 2012). It testifies to the power of persuasion that the jihadist websites and other publications possess, for which a Pew (2006) survey found that 56 percent of polled British, 46 percent of polled French and 44 percent of polled German Muslims refuse to believe that Arabs were involved in the 9/11 attacks. Likewise, half of the 500 British Muslims surveyed for Channel Four News (4 June 2007) believe that the government trumped up charges against the convicted Tube bombers; a quarter maintain that the government itself masterminded the attacks.

**MISOGYNY**

One of the Islam-bashers’ favorite accusations against Islam and Muslims is that they are misogynistic. Predictably, Muhammad is said to bear much of the blame. Particularly virulent scorn is poured on his consummated marriage to nine-year-old Aisha. On the Internet one can frequently come across such slurs as “Muhammad the Pedophile” (wikiislam.net), “rapist” (western-civilization.com), and “child-fucker” (Kinderficker) (pi-news.net). Select verses are typically plucked from the Qur’an and quoted out of context to demonstrate Islam’s supposed disdain for women:

The Quran in Sura 4:11 says: “The share of a male shall be twice that of a female”…
The Quran in Sura 4:34 says: “If you fear highhandedness from your wives, remind them [of the teaching of God], then ignore them when you go to bed, then hit them…” (infidelsarecool.com)
Rather than acknowledge that consummated marriages with girls at puberty have been a common practice in many cultures, including Christian ones, or that misogynistic lines abound in the Bible (for instance, Genesis, 3: 16), opportunist Islamophobes proffer the essentialist argument that the Prophet’s words and deeds have fostered an Islamic doctrine and culture that make all pious Muslims prone to oppress women. French feminist Elisabeth Altschull (1995) does concede that “all religions have their oppressive aspects toward women,” but immediately adds that “none [but Islam] has gone so far, is as systematic, or is as explicit about the inferior status of women willed and created by god.” Kelek (2007), the author of the 2005 bestseller Die fremde Braut (The Foreign Bride), alleges that “political Islam wants… to establish an Apartheid of the sexes in free European societies,” whereby “women in public don’t have the right to be human” (quoted in Cesari 2013). In her book The Caged Virgin, Hirsi Ali (2006) excoriates Islam for endorsing “a stifling morality that makes Muslim men the owners of women.” The most pessimistic of these caricatures depict Muslim women so firmly oppressed by, and socialized to, gender inequality that even they cannot be relied on to fight for emancipation, unless, that is, they abandon Islam altogether. Thus, Hirsi Ali (2006) avers:

Because they have internalized their subordination, they no longer experience it as an oppression by an external force but as a strong internal shield… They are like prisoners suffering from Stockholm syndrome, in which hostages fall in love with the hostage takers and establish a deep intimate contact with them.

It speaks to the widespread influence of this trope that the Stasi Commission (tasked with recommending whether to ban veiling in French public schools in 2004) refused to hear public testimony from veiled women on grounds that their views could not possibly be autonomous. Likewise, the legislator who introduced Italy’s bill, the Moroccan-born member of Premier Silvio Berlusconi’s PDL, Souad Sbai, justified the measure on grounds that “we have to help women get out of this segregation… to get out of this submission. I want to speak for those who don't have a voice, who don't have the strength to yell and say, 'I am not doing well’” (Huffington Post 2 August 2011).

Many opponents of veiling seem keen to test the limits of credulity. In the public letter that arguably elevated the headscarf debate from low to high politics in 1989, five prominent French intellectuals, including Alain Finkielkraut, Elisabeth Badinter, Régis Debray, Elisabeth de Fontenay, and Catherine Kintzler, likened the town where the controversy began, Creil, to Munich in 1938 (the “Munich of the republican school”) and implored French educators not to repeat the fateful error of appeasement committed by Neville Chamberlain with Hitler (Le Nouvel Observateur 2 November 1989). Thus were three teenage girls (and no more than an estimated 2000 veiled pupils in the whole of France) equated with the bellicose chancellor of a mighty nation-state poised to invade and occupy France. The analogy to the Nazis is common. For instance, Chahadortt Djavann (2004), an Iranian novelist domiciled in Paris, has compared the veil to the yellow star forced upon Jews under the Nazi regime; so too has prominent German feminist Alice Schwarzer (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 4 July 2006). Likewise, President Sarkozy’s eventual Minister for Urban Renewal, Fadela Amara, described the hijab as “an instrument of oppression that is imposed by the green [meaning Islamist] fascists” (quoted in Jenkins 2007).

“Systematic exaggeration” (Bahners 2011) has extended beyond veiling to other issues affecting female Muslims. So-called “honor killings” of Muslim women who have allegedly disgraced their family by consorting with non-Muslims, for example, Fadime
Sahindal (Sweden 2002), Ghazal Khan (Denmark 2003), Schijman Kuashi (Netherlands 2005), Hatan Sürücü (Germany 2005) and Banaz Mahmod Babakir Agha (Britain 2007), have received much sensationalized media coverage and political commentary (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2013; Fredette 2014). In the case of Sürücü, experts on gender and Islam published an open letter criticizing Islam critics Serap Çileli, Seyran Ates and Necla Kelek for deliberately exaggerating and exploiting the case in an effort to advance their personal Islamophobic agendas (Terkessidis and Karakaşoğlu 2006). The film La Squale (2000) and the book Dans l’enfer des tournantes (translated into English as To Hell and Back) by Samira Bellil (2002) focused French national attention on the arresting problem of gang-rape among Muslims in the banlieues, when, in fact, the despicable act transpires in non-Muslim circles as well (Muchielli 2005). Burned Alive, the 2005 best-selling French memoir of a woman who survived being doused with gasoline and set ablaze by her brother, appears to have been largely fabricated with the assistance of writer and promoter Marie-Thérèse Cuny, who “assisted” at least two other women in similar fashion (Abu-Lughod 2013). So-called “forced marriages” have also become media flashpoints through popular books such as Brick Lane (Ali 2004), Die Fremde Braut (Kelek 2005) and The Caged Virgin (Hirsi Ali 2006), which depict real or fictional accounts of young women dragooned into marrying men whom they despise. In reality, however, the overwhelming majority of arranged marriages result from negotiations freely entered into by the bride and groom with their parents (Roy 2007).

Islamists invert the image of subjugated female Muslims by spotlighting the purportedly rampant objectification and sexualization of women in Europe. Thus the Union for Islamic Development and Culture in Bulgaria laments that “women can be seen in the streets dressed in clothes that barely cover their underwear (and this is taken as normal)… [trying] to appear as sexually attractive as possible… and disappointed if no one turns their head to look at them” (quoted in Ghodsee 2012). Al-Muhajiroun claims that in British secular schools “children are taught to conform to a code of dress that shows their nakedness…. Children grow up idolizing pop-stars and footballers rather than appreciating the Messengers from their creator and worshipping God alone” (quoted in Wiktorowicz 2005). The preoccupation with women and girls as sex objects is typically made to mushroom into myriad additional problems that are said to plague Western women’s lives. In her study of the Swedish journal Salaam, for instance, Jonas Otterbeck (2000: 259) found that:

Swedish (or Western) women is a recurrent theme. The Swedish woman… is described as a victim of several powers. She is exploited by commercialism, especially by the fashion industry. She is overworked and underpaid, has a full-time job and all the housework. She never has time for her children who will end up on the streets, which will lead them to self-destruction, drugs, crimes, and a high suicide rate. Her marriage will eventually break down and lead to divorce due to [sic] unrealistic hopes built on the first moments of love and passion in the relationship.

Just as the image of subjugated female Muslims self-serveingly implies that European women are liberated, the portrayal of the latter as sinfully unchaste and wantonly over-sexed is coded to suggest superior virtue among pious Muslims. Veiling, for example, is exalted as a necessary safeguard against perilous Westernization. Fereshta Ludin, the woman at the center of Germany’s headscarf controversy, insisted that her veil ensured “protection against Western decadence” (quoted in Oestreich 2004). Muslims are warned that removing the veil in public represents the first capricious step down a treacherous path ineluctably leading to
mundane profanity and eternal damnation. Thus, German Salafist Ibrahim Abou-Nagie warns that unveiled women will land in hell (www.diewahrereligion.de). One Internet meme that has found wide distribution depicts a veiled woman ascending a staircase to heaven, the unveiled, secularly clad woman descending a staircase into hell. Unveiling is further said to invite harassment from lascivious Western men, which will either lead to rape or, worse, consorting and fornicating with them which, in turn, will alienate the wayward women from their true family and community. Typically, verses from the Qur’an will be cited to emphasize divine injunction: "O Prophet! Tell thy wives and daughters, and the believing women, that they should cast their outer garments over their persons (when outside): that they should be known (as such) and not molested" (Qur’an 33:59). Such purported Qur’anic approbation is reinforced by an abundance of popular, alarmist film and fiction widely distributed among Muslim immigrants that dramatize stories of unsuspecting Muslim daughters and wives lured from chastity and piety into depravity and ruin by mischievous European playboys (Gerlach 2006).

EMPIRE

Islamophobes warn that Islam is inherently expansionist. Muhammad is said to have cast the mold by establishing an army of holy warriors in Medina that went on to wage jihad against the infidels controlling Mecca. On the website islamwatch.org, for instance, Hirsi Ali alleged:

Muhammad built the House of Islam using military tactics that included mass killing, torture, targeted assassination, lying and the indiscriminate destruction of productive goods… a close look at the propaganda produced by the terrorists [of today] reveals constant quotation of Muhammad’s deeds and edicts to justify their actions and to call on other Muslims to support their cause. (Hirsi Ali 2006)

Of course, such expansionist militancy was attributed to the prophet not only in the controversial cartoon published by Jyllands-Postens in 2005, but also in the notorious Regensburg speech of 2006, in which Pope Benedict XVI (2006), quoting an erstwhile Byzantine emperor, referred to Muhammad’s “command to spread by sword the faith he preached.” Many maintain that the Muslims have their covetous eyes set on Europe. Such charges often point to verses in the Qur’an that purportedly command believers to exercise violence. Favorites (often taken out of context) state: “When you encounter the unbelievers strike off their heads” (47:4); or “Slay them wherever ye find them and drive them out of the places whence they drove you out” (2:191-93). It should come as no great surprise, then, claims Niall Ferguson that “a youthful Muslim society to the south and east of the Mediterranean is poised to colonize—the term is not too strong—a senescent Europe” (quoted in Saunders 2012). “Wake up, people,” thundered Fallaci following 9/11, “what is under way here is a reverse crusade… They will feel authorized to kill you and your children because you drink wine or beer, because you don’t wear a long beard or chador, because you go the theatre and cinemas, because you listen to music and sing songs” (quoted in Kaya 2012). Søren Krarup warns of “the slow extermination of the Danish people” (quoted in Hedetoft 2003), while Melanie Phillips (2007) contends that “the job of subjugating the West is half done” and is being carried out by a “lethal and many-headed hydra” of Al-Qaeda affiliates in Europe. Alice Schwarzer (2002), whose 2002 bestseller was titled The Holy Warriors and the Misguided Tolerance, drew the predictable comparison to the Nazis: “The
parallels to 1933 are emerging...The holy warriors have already made Italy their logistical basis, England their propaganda center and Germany their European hub.” Elsewhere, she warned that the Islamists “have already won an unsettling amount of terrain and unfortunately can no longer be stopped with democratic measures alone” (quoted in Bahners 2011: 246). Sorbonne history professor Guy Millière (2004) went so far as to claim that the Muslim question “will determine whether France survives or perishes” in the twenty-first century. There would appear to be no limit to the number of politicians (including: Enoch Powell, Jean-Marie Le Pen, Jörg Haider, Pim Fortuyn, Geert Wilders, Filip Dewinter, Siv Jensen, and Nigel Farage) who catapult themselves to political popularity by haranguing against the “Islamization” of Europe. The same holds for the ambition of large numbers of authors who make bestseller lists with books purporting to expose the designs of radical Muslim cells to transform Europe into “Eurabia” (Y’oer 2005; also Marchand 2013; Ulfkotte 2013; Broder 2006; Besson 2005). Likewise, Islamophobic websites abound that deploy captivating graphs and images depicting the impending Islamization of Europe. One YouTube video with more than 1 million hits features a reconfigured map of “Europe 2015” on which France has been renamed “The Islamic Republic of New Algeria,” The United Kingdom “North Pakistan,” Germany “New Turkey,” and so on (youtube.com/watch?v=wLDc7Eha4; accessed 12 July 2012). A Pro-Reconquista-Europa headline from 22 July 2014 read: “Madrid to Fall [to jihadists] in 2020” (forum.pro-reconquista-europa.com/viewtopic.php?f=93&t=2267); the headline at Islam versus Europe from 16 June 2014 was: “Black flag of Jihad Will Fly over London.” Given the nigh ubiquity of anti-Islam hyperbole, it should come as no surprise that more than two-thirds of those polled in France, Britain, the US, and Germany “are worried about Islamic extremists in their country” (Pew 2012).

Eurohostile Islamists retort that it is Europe (the West) that is imperialist. Echoing a theme common in postcolonial studies (Fanon 1965; Said 1978; Nandy 1988), Islamists contend that, since the Crusades, Europe and the West have harbored and realized (neo) imperialist designs on the Orient. Regularly invoking conspiracy theory, self-appointed “cyber-imams” point the finger at the USA, Israel, and their allies in Europe as today’s “Crusaders and Zionists” (quoted in Scientific Council, 2006; also Kepel 2004; Wiktorowicz 2005; and Leiken 2012). Although Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain condemned the Boston Marathon bombing of 2013, it urged visitors to its website to consider the larger context:

Just in the past decade, in a highly charged post 9-11 world, the USA and its allies have committed numerous heinous crimes against Muslims. Whether one looks at the Guantanamo Bay, the deaths of Iraqis on false pretences [sic], the systematic destruction of Afghanistan since 2002, the drone attacks in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, the attack and intervention in Mali, overt support for Israel’s crimes in Palestine, tacit support for India’s crimes in Kashmir, silence and complicity over Russian thuggery in the North Caucasus, the backing of vicious dictators in the Muslim world or the tacit support for Bashar Al-Assad in Syria until recently, one will see genuine causes for grief, anger and emotion… (www.hizb.org.uk/current-affairs/boston-bombings).

ISIS has successfully recruited thousands of European Muslims to join its ranks with contentions such as: “Oh Americans, and oh Europeans, the Islamic State did not initiate a war against you as your governments and media try to make you believe. It is you who
started the transgression against us, and thus you deserve blame and you will pay a great price” (CNN 22 September 2014). Islamist social media tend to portray Western foreign policy as nothing short of a thinly veiled crusade bent on destroying Islam. Typically, physical injuries to innocent women and children allegedly inflicted by Western government action are highlighted and depicted, not as unintended and regretted, but rather as deliberate and wanton (Leiken 2012; Pargeter 2008; Wiktorowicz 2005; Kepel 2004). By contrast, jihadists are one-dimensionally lionized as heroic defenders of Islam, miraculously overcoming tremendous odds to triumph over the Western persecutors (Awan 2007; Sageman 2008). The numbers of supporters of the jihadist movements are also typically inflated several fold (Wiktorowicz 2005).

Whether true or false, such fulminations can and do influence European Muslims. For example, Mohammed Bouyeri, murderer of Theo van Gogh and member of the so-called “Hofstad Network” of alleged terrorists, claimed:

There are dark Satanic forces that have sown their seed of evil everywhere in the world. This seed has been sown in the Islamic world in the times of colonialism… Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire… the enemies of Islam have been active in gradually carrying out their plans aiming at the total destruction of Islam. (Quoted in Peters 2011)

Omar Bakri, who headed the British group Al-Muhajiroun, said in 2004 that aggressive Western foreign policy had earned Western nations “a 9/11 day after day after day” (quoted in Aidi 2014). London Tube bomber Shehzad Tanweer justified his actions thusly: “Your government continues to oppress our women and children, our brothers and sisters in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya” (youtube.com/watch?v=FG6a26uX1eA). Likewise, Michael Adebolajo, who cut down British soldier Lee Rigby with a machete in 2013, claimed: “Muslims are dying daily by British soldiers… We swear by Allah… we will never stop fighting you until you leave us alone” (youtube.com/watch?v=WxtraHkyw5w). The Madrid bombers are said to have been significantly influenced by the Internet text Iraqi Jihad: Hopes and Dangers, which recommended strategic rail bombings in Spain to prompt its withdrawal from the US-led occupation of Iraq (Awan 2007). The Moroccan-German Chouka brothers, who grew up in Bonn but now reside in the borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan, regularly send internet videos from the camp of the International Mujahadeen Uzbekistan exhorting Germans, in German, to commit acts of terrorism against trains, shopping centers, restaurants, and discotheques in Germany. In one video from 2011 entitled Evil Fatherland (Böses Vaterland), Mounir promises that “there must and will be, God willing, a series of attacks against the German people” in retaliation for the injustices its government has perpetrated against Muslims in Afghanistan. In subsequent videos, such as Yes, We Are Terrorists, the brothers praise Arid Uka and Mohammad Merah (“the knight of Toulouse”) as exemplary Muslims whose murderous deeds merit emulation (Spiegel Online 23 May 2012). For his part, Merah claimed to be motivated by French involvement in Afghanistan, the burqa ban, and Israel’s persecution of Palestinians: “The Jews kill our brothers and sisters in Palestine” (Telegraph 10 April 2012). Amedy Coulibaly, who killed four hostages in Paris in 2015, complained of the wrongful persecution of ISIS: “They need to stop bombing ISIS” (CNN 11 January 2015).
CONCLUSION

In her widely read article “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Spivak (1988) casts doubt on identifying and hearing an authentic subaltern voice completely free of the influence of the dominant Eurocentric discourse. Europhobia is counter-hegemonic to be sure, but it remains informed by Islamophobia. “Inverted othering” locks Islamist discourse into the binary logic of Islamophobia that juxtaposes Islam and Europe as utterly different (or, “other”) and irrevocably at odds. Europhobia portrays Europe (the West) as wholly evil, as well as incapable of reform. The binary logic plainly manifests itself in the notion of “Westoxification,” originally coined by the Iranian intellectual Jalal al-e Ahmad, but widely circulated by and among European Islamists. Any and all contact with Europeans is discouraged, lest the pious Muslim become infected with their evil thoughts and deeds.

Binary logic impedes the emergence of hybrid voices from Bhabha’s (1994) “Third Space.” Thankfully, such voices do exist. They can be heard, for example, from what some scholars label “post-Islamists” (Mandaville 2014; Schiffauer 2010; Roy 1998). I adopt the admittedly less-than-perfect label to refer to a new generation of Muslim intellectuals and activists in search of a “fusion of religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty [that] transcend[s] Islamism by building a pious society with a civil nonreligious state” (Bayat 2013). Although their critique of many aspects of modern Western societies is unmistakably informed by the thought of earlier Islamists such as Qutb or Maududi, post-Islamists eschew the wholesale rejection of Western society associated with both the Islamist pioneers as well as their contemporary orthodox adherents. “I don’t deny my Muslim roots,” claims Tariq Ramadan, “but I don’t vilify Europe either” (Time 11 December 2000). Though the grandson of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan al Banna, Ramadan (2010) chides European Muslims for falling prey to “simplistic versions of ‘us versus them’” that teaches “you are more Muslim when you are against the West.” Ramadan’s celebrity notwithstanding, post-Islamist voices, like the ecumenically oriented voices of some non-Muslim Europeans who resist a wholesale rejection of Islam and even Islamism (Schiffauer 2010; Roy 2005), continue to go largely unheard, drowned out by the din of nigh ubiquitous Islamophobic and Europhobic demagoguery.

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Fanny Müller-Uri
University of Vienna, Austria

Benjamin Opratko
Humboldt Universität zu Berlin

ISLAMOPHOBIA STUDIES JOURNAL
VOLUME 3, NO. 2, Spring 2016, PP. 117-129.

Published by:
Islamophobia Research and Documentation Project,
Center for Race and Gender, University of California, Berkeley.

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Islamophobia as Anti-Muslim Racism:  
Racism without “Races,” Racism without Racists

Fanny Müller-Uri  
University of Vienna, Austria

Benjamin Opratko  
Humboldt Universität zu Berlin

When, in November and December 2014, the newly formed PEGIDA movement (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident) began to mobilize tens of thousands in various cities against the alleged threat of Europe’s “Islamization,” public reactions in Germany were markedly ambivalent. Even though overt anti-Muslim banners and slogans were present at the marches, and right-wing and neo-Nazi groups had joined the demonstrations, PEGIDA spokespersons were keen to frame their protest as a movement of “concerned citizens” and publicly distanced themselves from racism and fascism. Some media experts and pundits, such as political scientist Werner Patzelt, echoed this self-description, arguing that "PEGIDA is the people, not a mob of neo-Nazis." (Der Standard 2014) In a similar way, some politicians from Angela Merkel’s governing CDU party called for a “dialogue” with PEGIDA, praising the movement for bringing important topics “back on the political agenda.” (Wolf 2015) Accusations of racism were rebutted by claiming that PEGIDA mobilized citizens from the “middle of society.” They were not just fringe political groups and right wing extremists—thus, they could not be racist.

This partial success of the discursive strategy employed by PEGIDA’s organizers has to be understood in the context of the peculiar history and contemporary usage of “racism” as a concept in the German language. As Mecheril and Melter note, the term was a “virtual taboo” in Germany up to the 1990s, and almost exclusively linked to National Socialist ideologies and policies of extermination. (Mecheril/Melter 2009, 13; cf. Messerschmidt 2009) This has changed somewhat in the past decades, with researchers and activists drawing on critical theories of racism, mostly developed outside of Germany, to address racism against migrants and refugees (and their descendants) at home. However, in the larger public as well as in the political sphere, narrowing the concept of racism is still very much prevalent, as the example of the reactions to PEGIDA attests. Significantly, this narrow definition involves the displacement of racism in two separate, yet interlinked ways: racism is referred to as a problem of the past, or a phenomenon existing only on the extremist margins of society.

In Anglophone critical discussions of racism against Muslims, or Islamophobia, these restrictions are less prevalent. Yet there we find other, equally problematic conceptualizations of racism which prevent a fuller understanding of anti-Muslim mass movements such as PEGIDA. On the one hand, an understanding of racism as primarily an instrument of divide and rule systematically underestimates the way in which a broader anti-Muslim consensus has emerged which allows racist mass movements and political projects to operate. On the other hand, Islamophobia is often presented as the latest incarnation of a “cultural racism”—a claim that can be problematic when it is not sensitive to the specific historic circumstances under which contemporary Islamophobia thrives.
In this contribution, we argue for a theoretical understanding of Islamophobia as anti-Muslim racism that is attentive to contemporary transformations and articulations of racism. To do this, we discuss some of the most recent contributions to the emerging field of Islamophobia Studies, focusing on the explicit or implicit theories of racism present in the different studies. We lament a lack of engagement in the Islamophobia Studies literature with earlier critical theories of racism. In a second part, the theoretical consequences we draw from the challenge of Islamophobia to a critical understanding of racism are translated into an alternative conceptual framework of anti-Muslim racism. Specifically, we discuss how thinking through anti-Muslim racism forces us to reconsider a number of basic assumptions about racism more generally. We conclude with some thoughts on how these theoretical considerations are relevant for a more adequate understanding of movements such as PEGIDA, and contemporary anti-racist strategies more generally.

**ISLAMOPHOBIA: STILL CHALLENGING US ALL**

The term Islamophobia, while still highly contested politically, can today be considered as an established term in what Garner and Selod (2015, 10) recently called the “long first wave of Islamophobia studies.” Indeed, we witness not just a quantitative increase in academic publications using “Islamophobia” but, as Brian Klug remarks, the term also increasingly “functions as an organizing principle for scholarship and research” (Klug 2012, 666). The impressive proliferation of articles in academic journals, papers and reports, edited volumes and books contributing to this emerging field in the past few years certainly attest to his observation. Scholarly engagement with the phenomenon has developed in a number of different disciplines, producing a large variety of working definitions, hypotheses and results, relying on different theoretical, epistemological and methodological frameworks. Periodicals exclusively devoted to the study of Islamophobia have been established in recent years, such as the German language “Jahrbuch für Islamophobieforschung” covering research on Islamophobia in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, as well as the present “Islamophobia Studies Journal.” However, it might be necessary to ask in what sense the term Islamophobia really operates as an “organizing principle.” Almost 20 years after the publication of the Runnymede report “Islamophobia: A Challenge For Us All,” which included the first systematic definition of the term, nothing resembling a consensus on its meaning has emerged. (The Runnymede Trust 1997; cf. Allen 2010 for a thorough critique of the Runnymede model) Today, there seem to exist almost as many concepts and definitions of Islamophobia in the field as there are scholars using it. It is therefore relevant to ask how the term Islamophobia operates in this emerging field of Islamophobia Studies, and what its relation to the concept of racism is. We claim that in a number of influential contributions, a lack of engagement with existing critical theories of racism prevents a more accurate understanding of the phenomenon.

One example for this is the resurrection of instrumentalist conceptions of racism in Islamophobia Studies. Two recent books by Nathan Lean and Deepa Kumar can help illustrate this problem. Their books—Lean’s “Islamophobia Industry” and Kumar’s “Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire”—are among the most widely discussed recent contributions to the field. They aim at a broader audience including the non-academic public, are written with a strong political claim, and put adopt a strong anti-racist perspective. However, both Lean and Kumar treat Islamophobia mainly as a consciously deployed instrument, forged by political elites. Both understand Islamophobia as the most recent construction of the West’s main enemy, and the right-wing Islamophobes in the US
as “new McCarthyites” constructing a “green scare.” (Kumar 2012, 175ff.) Kumar claims that Islamophobia was “consciously constructed and deployed by the ruling elite at particular moments,” (Kumar 2012, 3) while Lean traces Islamophobic ‘fear merchants’ that successfully brainwash large segments of the wider populations through their manufacturing of an irrational ‘fear of Islam,’ instrumentalizing lawmakers and governing bodies in the process. How is Islamophobia defined, or used, in these works? In Lean’s book, there is no explicit definition. The few theoretical and conceptual references are borrowed from the psychological paradigm of racism as prejudice and stereotype that goes back to the 1950s positivism of Gordon Allport. (Lean 2012, 82f.) But, at the same time, Lean clearly states that he sees Islamophobia as a phenomenon intersecting with, but distinct from racism or what he calls xenophobia.

Kumar introduces the concept of Islamophobia early in her book as any form of “fear (and hatred) generated against the ‘Muslim threat.’” (Kumar 2012, 3) In contrast to Lean, she explicitly refers to Islamophobia as a form of “cultural racism against Muslims”—but she never elaborates what this means for her theoretically and conceptually. Thus, while Kumar, other than Lean, does acknowledge that Islamophobia is a form of racism, they both share a thoroughly agential, intentionalist and instrumentalist perspective on the phenomenon. This means treating Islamophobia as something that relatively powerful agents do in order to achieve a certain goal that is in accordance with their political-economic interest. This conception is reminiscent of earlier Marxist conceptions of racism as a tool, used by the ruling elites to divide the subaltern classes. Indeed, Kumar uses the expression “tool of the elite” herself to describe how she understands Islamophobia (Kumar 2012, 7).

It was exactly this instrumentalist view that was criticized and overcome by contributors to the development of a critical theory of racism in the 1980s in Britain and France. With varying emphases and in different ways, authors such as Robert Miles (1989), Stuart Hall (1980, 1986), Etienne Balibar (1990) or Collette Guillaumin (1995) agreed that it was necessary to go beyond functionalist and instrumentalist conceptions of racism. They sought to integrate the phenomenon of racism—or rather, different kinds of historically specific racisms—into a broader theory of ideology and hegemony, drawing on the works of Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser. Their aim was to integrate the structural and discursive aspects of racism in their concepts, i.e. the ways in which racist stereotypes, images, metaphors—the whole complex of racism as an ideology in a fuller sense—is socially reproduced and institutionalized as part of a social formation’s superstructure; how this in turn is linked with practices of exclusion; and how racism, understood not as a tool but as a social relationship, produces racialized identities. Stuart Hall and his colleagues at the CCCS (Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies) argued theoretically, and traced empirically (Hall et al. 1978), that racism functions as a system of ideological interpellations creating, as they put it, racialized “modalities in which class is lived” (Hall 1980, 55). These discussions, however, are absent from many recent contributions to Islamophobia Studies, especially in the context of the United States, which permits the resurgence of a reductionist instrumentalism. This is not to say that elite actors never consciously deploy Islamophobia. In fact, it is the great merit of Lean’s and Kumar’s work to have shown in great detail that this is indeed the case, especially in the US. However, we should be careful not to restrict our view and focus exclusively on this dimension of overt, strategic anti-Muslim propaganda and politics. Precisely because racism is not a “tool” in the hand of the powerful, but a complex social relation, an ideological field and an archive of knowledge informing everyday practices and popular common sense, powerful social agents can, often successfully (as in the discourse surrounding the “War on terror”), mobilize racist stereotypes, metaphors, tropes and affects strategically to bolster their respective political projects.
Often in recent publications, Islamophobia is to treat it as a variant of a “cultural racism.” This theoretical approach is present in a number of publications both in English and German language. (Attia 2009; Cakir 2014; Dagistanli/Grewal 2014; Eickhof 2010; Fekete 2009; Shooman 2011) Here, scholars draw on the debates of the 1980s and early 1990s that tried to get to grips with the emerging new forms of racism in Europe directed against the “foreigner,” and which were not organized around discourses of “race” as a biological entity, and did not rely on phenotypical markers such as skin pigmentation. This “new racism” (Barker 1981) emerged in a historically specific context of new patterns of migration in the post-colonial conjuncture in the late 1970s and 1980s (Balibar 1991, 21; Hall 2000, 12), and was organized around a certain idea of “culture.” It rested, as Balibar summarized its logic, on the idea of an “insurmountability of cultural differences;” it was “a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but ‘only’ the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions.” (Balibar 1991, 22) Today, a quarter century later, we could describe these articulations of a “racism without races” (Balibar 1991, 21) as an “old new racism.” But while contemporary does share a number of similarities with it However, to simply treat Islamophobia as the latest incarnation of cultural racism misses out on some extremely important aspects, as we will show below. First, the “old new racism” was analyzed primarily as an element of modernizing strategies of the political right—from Thatcherite conservatism to new right-wing populism in Europe. However, today, the recourse to values of enlightenment, the cooption of parts of feminist and queer movements, and the ways in which it is partly framed as a progressive “critique of religion,” makes anti-Muslim racism irreducible to a strategy of right-wing modernization.

A second, related problem is that framing Islamophobia as “cultural racism” often implies a historical periodization. It locates the emergence of this form of racism in a particular temporal sequence, where an earlier, “properly biological” racism, which was socially discredited after the Holocaust and decolonization, was replaced by a racism that uses culture as a substitute for the old racial categories of biologism. In a sense, as Pnina Werbner has argued, this can lend itself to the interpretation that there really is “only one racism, which disguises itself opportunistically beneath a variety of publicly acceptable codes and discourses.” (Werbner 2013, 453) However, our claim is not only that we have to insist on the existence of a plurality of racisms, but also that contemporary anti-Muslim racism goes beyond this periodization and challenges the historical sequence of “first biological—then cultural.” Anti-Muslim racism is characterized by the re-articulation and politicization of a huge archive of metaphors, stereotypes and images constituted by the long history of Orientalism, providing an ideological framework in which contemporary subjects are able to make sense of their present(s). The ideological “work” of anti-Muslim racism is the translation of this deep archive, to paraphrase Stuart Hall, into modalities in which class, and gender, are experienced and lived.

**RACISM WITHOUT “RACES” REVISITED**

To speak of Islamophobia as anti-Muslim racism has, therefore, far reaching consequences for our understanding of racism(s) in the broader sense. It refers to the *longue durée* of racisms that have operated historically, and still do today, with and without, before and after the concept of “races,” as Wulf D. Hund (2012) argues. This brings us back to the question that raised but not answered by Chris Allen: If Islamophobia is racism, “what type of racism might it be?” (Allen 2010, 153). We need to work on clarifying our concepts: only
if we have an appropriate picture of what we understand as racism can we meaningfully develop the concept of anti-Muslim racism, and translate it into politics and practical conclusions.

Of course, “race” is not a scientific category. This is why critical research on racism posits that racism does not refer to “race” as a natural fact that is then connected to negative values, but rather grasps “race” as a discursive effect and social construct (cf. Guillaumin 1995). It follows that racism is more than just “profound differences between different groups of people […] that are made out to be absolute […] and are abused for agitation,” as Immanuel Geiss puts it in his classic definition of racism (Geiss 1988, 20); instead, the construction of “profound differences” itself must be identified as an effect of racist discourse: “‘Race’ is the object of racist discourse, outside of which it bears no meaning; it is an ideological construct and not an empirical category within society, and as such it names a series of imaginary characteristics to do with genetic inheritance, via which de facto positions of social domination and inferiority are perpetuated and legitimised in reference to the genealogy of differences within species.” (Cohen 1990: 97) Frantz Fanon has already poignantly pointed this out back in 1952: “It’s the racist who creates the inferior” (cit. in Terkessidis 2004, 96). If racist difference is thus imaginary and constructed, this doesn’t make it any less real in the sense of a principle of social structure that has very material effects, inscribed into social practices of discrimination as well as woven into action-orienting understandings of self and world by means of “cultural knowledge.” In fact there is nothing fictitious about “race,” as Colette Guillaumin drily remarks: “Race does not exist. But it does kill people” (1995, 107).

This is the core argument of critical theories of racism. Racism is seen neither as an individually held prejudice, nor as a tool or instrument used by powerful social actors, but as a social structure regulating social relationships in specific ways. As ideological discourse, racism uses symbolic markers to construct differences between social groups (Hall 1980). Therefore, specific characteristics are attributed to these groups, which are mostly expressed in intellectual, emotional, sexualized etc. dispositions. Drawing on Frantz Fanon’s work, Robert Miles called this process “racialization,” while the preferred concept in feminist and postcolonial terms is othering. Put in general terms, this signifies that the racist construction of difference, the specific markers of difference and the racist categories, signifiers and attributions are always contextually and historically variable and amalgamate social, cultural and so called natural elements. This concept of “othering” is not the same as a social constructivist understanding of the category of “race.” While it agrees with such views that “race” is a social construct, it makes racism, not “race,” its operative concept. The term “race,” in its modern sense, cannot be understood separately from racism. As John Solomos put it, “race’ is a product and effect of racism and not its premise” (Solomos 2002, 160). But, crucially, racism can and should be understood as being independent from the concept of race. This points to an understanding of racism that goes beyond the conventional argument of the “culturalized” racism, which allegedly only emerged in the second half of the 20th century. In fact, it is not the case that racism as a “biological” discourse was transformed into a culturalist disguise; it is exactly the other way round. While racist discourse claims to be able to deduct cultural characteristics from natural traits, the legitimation process of this argument in fact points exactly in the exact opposite direction. Every racism is, at its core, cultural. In some of its historical and contemporary variants, it claims to be able to make visible the asserted cultural differences in bodily/natural/biological features. But it is not biological difference that is culturalized, but on the contrary, constructed cultural difference is embodied, i.e. inscribed in the bodies—the nature—of
social actors. It follows that there is always a cultural core in every form of racism: Historically, the construction of racist difference has always been about the essentialization of socio-cultural differences that allegedly express themselves in biological characteristics, but—and this is equally crucial—only tendentially and always precariously. Racism operates even where the alleged cultural differences cannot be linked to bodily markers. This can be illustrated through many historical and contemporary examples where strategies of artificial visibilization were necessary to signify racist difference. The use of the “yellow badge” in Anti-Semitism is perhaps the most prominent example. So, racism hinges neither on the notion of “race” itself nor on the process of constructing “races” (racialization), but deploys various different strategies of legitimization, in which “race” is but one of many options. This means that Robert Miles’ demand to “break this conceptual link between racism and the discourse of race” has to be defended and thought through: Racism can operate without “race.” It does so in many contemporary modalities of racism; and it has done so historically, even before the concept of “race” has emerged in its modern form in the late 18th century (Hund 2006, 2007).

Following from this, we may ask what different articulations of racism have in common if we grasp racism as a social relation. One answer revolves around the way it operates in the process of stabilizing class-based societies, without falling back into a functionalist perspective that claims to be able to explain racism exclusively through its functions. A general notion of racism can be derived from its effects in the process of societalization in class societies, i.e. the processes of inclusion and exclusion, or what the German sociologist Wulf D. Hund has called “negative societalization” (Hund 2006, 2010). This has two sides: on the one hand the imaginary (binary) delimitation between us and them through which existing social divisions are resolved into a common, cross-class “Us.” On the other hand, this refers to the practices of exclusion and inclusion on a material level, including the fragmentation of classes, institutional racism, as well as repression and violence. These abstract considerations have to be put to analytical use in view of historical specificities of capitalist social formations, their specific modalities and forms of articulation: capitalist exploitation, the modern nation state, new migration movements, border regimes, biopolitical policies—in short the structural features of capitalist modernity and, more concretely, the context of the current capitalist crisis.

**RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS**

These admittedly very general remarks are important because of the analytical and theoretical shortcomings and insufficiencies in debates about anti-Muslim racism. But they are also important because of existing political hesitations and uncertainties of anti-racist movements in general when it comes to anti-Muslim racism. Even existing critical research on racism is unsure about the extent to which anti-Muslim racism should be called racism. For example, Ali Rattansi, in his introductory text on “Racism,” writes: “Given that Muslims globally have all shades of skin color, ethnicity, and nationality, it is difficult to argue in any straightforward way that even if Islamophobia exists, it is a form of racism.” (Rattansi 2007, 109) Robert Miles and Malcom Brown put it in similarly confusing and unclear terms:
When Muslims become a racialised group, an amalgam of nationality (‘Arab’ or ‘Pakistani’, for example), religion (Islam) and politics (extremism, fundamentalism, terrorism) is frequently produced in Orientalist, Islamophobic and racist discourses. (…) However, like other religious Others, the alleged distinctiveness of the Muslim is not usually regarded as biological or somatic, so Islamophobia is not to be regarded as an instance of racism. However, it does interact with racism, and (…) there was an anachronistic quasi-racialisation of the Muslim (as ‘Saracen’, ‘Turk’ or ‘Moor’) in the Middle Ages (Miles/Brown 2003, 164).

The impasses of a conception of racism that is exclusively based on the historically specific colonial and color-related racisms are obstructing our view here. This is why we will again repeat the conclusions drawn in the theoretical considerations about racism as developed above, relating them to the concrete example of anti-Muslim racism: Anti-Muslim racism works by essentializing cultural difference, constructing Islam as a static, homogenous and characteristically different culture. Muslims and people marked as Muslims are de-individualized, reduced to their alleged belonging to Islam, with other social characteristics made invisible. This constructed cultural difference is embodied in different ways, constructing an appearance marked as “Muslim:” a piece of clothing or headscarf, or indeed a name or an accent can trigger an arsenal of images and associations to be projected onto the individuals or groups (Shooman 2010: 104). This is why those affected by anti-Muslim racism are constantly asked to position themselves with regards to all kinds of events seen to relate to “Islam.” Because this is “their culture:” “Every single Muslim is made responsible for the suras in which s/he doesn’t believe, for orthodox dogmatists s/he doesn’t know, for violent terrorists s/he rejects or for brutal regimes in the countries he himself fled from.” (Emcke 2010) The demand to permanently declare one’s affirmation of democracy and human rights and to have to distance oneself from fundamentalism takes on a conspiracy-like dimension, particularly when this affirmation is mistrusted with reference to the supposedly Islamic doctrine of taqiyya, which is said to permit Muslims to lie to non-Muslims.

Furthermore, anti-Muslim racism is linked to debates on migration, integration and European identity in which culturalist strategies of demarcation and calculations of the economic utility of persons are entangled, and in which racist discourses and discriminatory practices are often articulated in the language of emancipation and enlightenment. Crucially, this is not only a done by the far right. In these discourses, Muslims often stand as a cypher for “unwanted migration” and “refusal of integration,” articulated by social actors who consider themselves as liberal, progressive and anti-racist. For this reason, we do not only speak of anti-Muslim racism as “racism without ‘races’” but also about as “racism without racists.” This highlights the fact that social actors who reproduce discourses of anti-Muslim racism usually consider themselves as anti-racists, and often left of center politically. This also relates to the defense strategies of racists themselves, who of course broadly reject the accusation of racism, often by stating that Islam is not a “race.” But racism cannot be reduced to the construction of “races.” As we have pointed out, the core of racist ideologies rests in the naturalization of social inequality, organized around imaginaries of cultural difference. In this sense we can identify PEGIDA’s critique of Islam as a racist discursive strategy, wherein an essentialist conception of culture serves to lock down the racist delimitation between us and them.
This process of *othering*, of the construction of Islam and Muslims as *the other*, contributes mirror-like to the self-understanding of Christian or secular Western culture, whereby the latter is portrayed as enlightened, democratic and emancipated. It is in this way that anti-Muslim racism aims both at a delimitation towards an outside and effects of integration towards the inside of a social formation. “Religion” features as a dimension of an essentialized culture in this context: “The often selective and literal reading of the holy book of Muslims, the Qur’an, leads to wholesale conclusions about the social behavior of this religious community, claiming their actions are primarily and unambiguously determined by their religion” (Shooman 2010, 108). Quotes from the Qur’an is thus mobilized as an “explanation” for the features and dispositions of “the Muslims”—independently of the actual roles that religiousness plays for each individual and what Muslim identity may mean individually, subjectively and contextually in each case, and independently of whether those concerned even consider themselves Muslims.

Anti-Muslim racism isn’t at all about personal religiosity. In this way the claim that there’s no question of racism because religion is still a (reversible) personal decision and not an essentialist attribution, is untrue. Nasar Meer opposes this discursive strategy, which differentiates between racist essentialization and freely chosen religiosity in order to delegitimize the discrimination of Muslims as Muslims with the argument that “the term ‘Muslim’ is used as a way of categorizing certain agents, and creating social formations and definitions over which agents do not have control.” (Meer 2008, 68). Meer is particularly referring to the UK debates concerning the race relations act and the question to what extent the protection against racist discrimination it guarantees may be applied to Muslims. The central argument against its application “was based on the dichotomy between racial and religious identities: since the former are involuntary or ‘natural’, it argued, they are deserving of protection, while the latter, being voluntarily held, are therefore undeserving of protection” (ibid., 63). Muslims are collectively cordoned off via discursive practices of signification and material practices of exclusion because of attributed *muslimness*. This is why Meer and others speak of a racialization of religion and culture in anti-Muslim racism (cf. Meer; Modood 2009; Rana 2007; Shooman 2011). This naturalization of culture and religion becomes most evident in the context of the “war on terror” and its practices of racial profiling, which “perpetuate a logic that demands the ability to define what a Muslim looks like from appearance and visual cues. This is not based purely on superficial cultural markers such as religious practice, clothing, language, and identification. A notion of race is at work in the profiling of Muslims” (Rana 2007, 149).

However, the concept of racialization is problematic insofar as it explains approaches that try to explain contemporary culture-based racisms in analogy to race-based racisms. While we agree that appearance, including phenotype and skin pigmentation, can play a role in some forms of Islamophobia (for example in profiling practices at airports), we dispute that *muslimness* is constructed exclusively, or even primarily, through these. And we reject wholeheartedly the idea that “a notion of race is at work” in anti-Muslim racism. Here, a more broadly defined concept of racism becomes particularly important. Such a concept identifies the specifics of different racist strategies of legitimation and categories of legitimation. Anti-Muslim racism dwells less on racializing than on culturalizing, demonizing, barbarizing—thus updating older patterns of racist exclusion that are indeed older than the concept of “race” itself. It is nevertheless a form of racism, because of its function “within the process of class-specific societalization” (Hund 2006). Particularly in times when
institutional support networks are being dismantled and experiences of precarity are being
generalized as well as parliamentary democracy being tendentially eroded, racism—and
particularly anti-Muslim racism—represents a mode of stabilization of social relations of
domination, and an authoritarian way of dealing with the crisis insofar as it contributes to “a
redirection of attention to another social matter, translating one set of contradictions into
another” (Müller-Uri 2010; vgl. Elfferding 2000).

The demarcation of the Muslim Other and the construction of a common “culture”
based on “shared values” offers an opportunity for identification to those social forces who
otherwise figure as the “social underclass” of society, or are being subjected to political
management by the state as “dangerous classes.” At the same time this allows for a
displacement of the social disavowals as induced by the crisis towards the terrain of “cultural
conflict.” The effect is that social issues are evacuated from political debates; the culturalisation
of social crises via anti-Muslim racism therefore effectively leads to their depolitization.

It does so through coalescing interests of different classes and class fractions into a
fragile alliance. For subaltern classes, anti-Muslim racism offers a possibility to rework
experiences of precarization into “shared certainties about the cultural difference of
Muslims.” Through this, “[they] can not only be sure that this is not ‘about them’, but also
that the political system functions to directly defend the social wealth they are ‘entitled to’”
(Gruppe Soziale Kämpfe 2010) Such “racist symbolic capital” in fact translates into real
material advantages—such as when “people without migratory background” get preferential
treatment in housing or when competing for jobs—while at the same time allowing for the
expansion of the state’s measures of surveillance, control and discipline via popular consent,
established in reference to the danger of “Islamist terrorism.”

For the middle classes, anti-Muslim racism is a means for securing their own position
in times of crisis. “The frequently mentioned example saying that nobody minds if the
cleaning lady wears the headscarf but that this becomes a ‘problem’ when the doctor, lawyer
or teacher wears it, can be taken as a clue as to the possibilities of social access being
negotiated here” (Wagner 2010, 16). Thus the debate around the headscarf and women’s
emancipation can also be seen against the backdrop of a female middle class ascending at the
expense of migrant wage laborers. As long as migrants did precarious work in the low wage
sector, there was no problem. Only when the (former) migrants demanded rights to
participate in society and access to social ascent did their competition come to be formulated
in racist terms. This racism is complemented by class-racist argumentative figures from
neoliberal discourses of usefulness, which direct themselves against all those to be excluded
from ”welfare access” because of their being supposedly not productive (unemployed,
welfare recipients, etc.). Social and migration policies can pick up on these figures and use
them in dealing with the crisis. The class-racist talk of “drop-outs” allows for the
construction of a “community of the industrious” and shifts the discourse towards “welfare
abuse,” arguing that the “socially weak” are responsible for the crisis. Parallel to this, anti-
migrant and anti-Muslim racism also allow for these “proper underclasses” to be integrated
in terms of identity, via the cultural indexing of social problems as the “refusal of
integration” of migrants. This double movement—the delimitation with respect to an outside
and a below is a central feature of racism in capitalist modernity.

The discursive field opened up through this linking of economic discourses of
usefulness with culturalist discourses on migration and integration allows for the respective
strategies of capitalist fractions to be configured and for the dialectic of inclusion and
exclusion to be adjusted in a politically flexible way. It enables a distinction between
“undesired migration” and the “desired” recruitment of highly qualified and assimilable
workers from abroad, while at the same time translating social conflicts into cultural problems of the refusal of integration and effort as concerning parallel migrant societies—while at the same time, no European metropolis can do without a gentrified “migrant neighbourhood” and the marketing of diversity.

There seems to be a general tendency of enhancing culturalist integration policy with the slogan “integration through effort” (cf. Friedrich 2011). This becomes particularly manifest in the figure of the “entrepreneurial migrant” who knows how to mobilize her or his own human resources in relation to the neoliberal subject of the “entrepreneurial self.” As the current Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Integration, Sebastian Kurz, put it: “Integration works through effort. It’s not the origin or the religious background of a person that matters, it’s their character and the willingness to make an effort in work and social life and thus gaining recognition” (Kurz 2011). This in turn implies that the “social situation of some migrants […] can be seen as individual failure, thus propping up racist patterns with classist interpretations. The postulation is as follows: If all migrants would make the same effort as those ‘best practices’, problems would disappear” (Friedrich 2011, 26). At the same time this individualist diagnosis of problems comes to be associated with racist culturalization by way of seeing the unwillingness to perform as a cultural inability to perform. A special meaning is granted to the racist construction of the Muslim Other in this context, reinforced by a culturalist marking as traditionalist, premorden and anti-individual and at the same time as a symbol of non-adaptation and non-subjection to the imperative of self-responsible marketization of the “entrepreneurial self.” The culturalization as well as economization of the social come together in the figure of ‘the Muslim’.

CONCLUSION

The central challenge for anti-racist movements consists in analyzing all these different strategies as dimensions of racist social relations, and bringing together struggles against racist exclusion with those striving for social rights. Such alliances don’t happen by themselves, they have to be politically produced—something that inevitably comes with tensions, frictions and conflicts, since interests, goals, strategies and tactics cannot be inferred from some ‘objective’ social positioning of those concerned (appealing to the working class “as such,” which “knows no homeland,” is of little help here). This is where the difficulty, but also the strength of political anti-racism lies—as opposed to a moralist anti-racism which exhausts itself in outrage and a de-politicizing “politics of offence” (Tyrer 2013, 28). There are severe limits to anti-racist strategies that reduce racism to individual attitudes, prejudices and fears and claim these should be addressed through consciousness-raising. Such approaches easily call on the state as “anti-racist agent.” Recognizing the trap of an “Islamization of debates” is particularly important when it comes to anti-Muslim racism. Those moving onto the terrain of Qur’an exegesis in order to counter critics of Islam with other verses from the Qur’an have already lost. As Stuart Hall has generally remarked, strategies that try to replace negative images by positive ones fail because they “keep oppositions intact” (Hall 2004, 163). At stake are not “wrong images that need to be replaced by right ones, but a set of relations that’s hierarchically ordered; at stake are power relations that hinge on racist interests” (Attia 1994, 221). At a moment when, in Germany, surveys show that 49% of the population looks approvingly towards PEGIDA (Bruns/Glösel/Strobl 2015, 52), this is not merely a theoretical issue. A successful counter-strategy has to rely on recognizing PEGIDA’s Islamophobia as a form of racism, in order to combat it as part of a broader effort of political and social mobilization.
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Wolfgang Aschauer
University of Salzburg

ISLAMOPHOBIA STUDIES JOURNAL
VOLUME 3, NO. 2, Spring 2016, PP. 131-158.

Published by:
Islamophobia Research and Documentation Project,
Center for Race and Gender, University of California, Berkeley.

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The Multidimensional Nature of Islamophobia: A Mixed Method Approach to Constructing the Attitudes Toward Muslims Scale (ATMS)

Wolfgang Aschauer
University of Salzburg

ABSTRACT: Islamophobia is an emerging comparative concept in prejudice research and represents “indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims” (Bleich, 2011, p. 1581). A number of scales on attitudes towards immigrants exist from relevant cross-national research projects (ESS 2002) and surveys among the population (ALLBUS, 2006), but when it comes to the measurement of Islamophobic attitudes or emotions an empirically sound evaluation of Islamophobia is still in its infancy.

In a comprehensive research project the main aim was to construct a differentiated scale encompassing various dimensions of anti-Muslim sentiments. We followed a mixed methods approach and started with a qualitative study. 16 in-depth qualitative interviews consisted of a biographical section as well as a photo-elicited part exploring various dimensions of potential Islamophobic thoughts towards Muslim symbols (e.g. the veil, minarets and terrorism) and areas of potential threats (e.g. demographic scenarios, integration in schools, Muslims eroding the own culture).

After a content analysis of the interviews we tried to figure out the main dimensions of the multifaceted perceptions towards Muslims. We then follow the full process of Likert scaling which involved the pretest of a long list of items (student samples), reducing the items to an appropriate scale (based on item analysis) and testing the factorial structure and reliability of the items (based on a quota sample of the local population of Salzburg). The mixed method design adopted in this project can be seen as a pioneer approach for scale constructing. It stands for a deeper integration of the life worlds of the locals and represents an empirically grounded approach with regard to the extraction of relevant dimensions and selection of appropriate items to measure the multidimensional nature of Islamophobia.

INTRODUCTION: ISLAMOPHOBIA AS A PRESSING ISSUE

Islamophobia is an emerging concept in the research on ethnic prejudice, but an empirically sound elaboration is still in its infancy. It is important to address and further develop this concept for several reasons. The debate on integration—especially in many Western European societies—focuses predominantly on Muslim immigrants, who are often perceived as a threat to Western culture. September 11th is generally seen as a crucial event (Heitmeyer, 2010) because Muslims are “no longer the enemy ‘other’ but, much more contemporarily, the enemy ‘within’” (Allen, 2007). Since the new millennium, several Western states have decided to abandon the concept of multiculturalism, and to introduce rather strict rules on integration, which often equals assimilation of immigrants (Aschauer, 2011). Civil rights are reframed according to new security measures; language examination and knowledge tests, as well as behavioral guidelines, are intended to guarantee a higher level of societal embeddedness. But integration of Muslim immigrants seems to fail in many countries, creating a new underclass in which educational underachievement, underprivileged
positions in the labor market, or even unemployment, are frequent. All of these developments, for mainly structural reasons, are interpreted through a cultural lens, and reflect a new form of cultural racism (Hall, 1989).

But integration problems in Western Europe are not only related to immigrants; they also apply to the majority population. A vague sense of discomfort with current societal developments is spreading all over Europe, and is affecting particularly lower social classes of society. These signs of malaise (Aschauer, 2014) can be explained by contemporary European challenges, namely rapid transformations (in the context of European integration), rising inequalities between groups (as a consequence of neoliberal globalization), and insecurities (in the context of cultural diversity). Within this climate of widespread fear it is not easy for European citizens to remain progressively oriented toward societal challenges, and to leave space for solidarity toward outgroups. We can observe large attitudinal gaps in Western society, often depending on class and education. Perhaps the most robust finding in research is that lower education leads to higher prejudice (Hello, Scheepers & Gijsberts, 2002; Coenders & Scheepers, 2003). A lower socio-economic status is also often found to be correlated with exclusionary attitudes toward outgroups (Semyonov et al. 2004).

Along with the impact of socio-structural factors on exclusionary attitudes, cultural explanations also play a crucial role. Ethnocentrism is clearly related to the need for conformity (as argued by Stouffer, 1949), and authoritarianism (Scheepers, Felling, Peters, 1992). Several studies consistently conclude that the threat of cultural diversity (Raijman et al., 2008) and cultural distance (Schneiders, 2008) seem to increasingly affect the middle-classes, and may be especially relevant to explaining the rise of Islamophobia, at least in Western European states (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004).

In addition to the individual dynamics that are widely confirmed in literature, the political and media discourse also contributes to the negative attitude toward Muslims. Criticism with regard to media coverage refers to the mostly one-sided way of reporting. Empirical studies clearly indicate that Islam, in comparison to other religions, attracts disproportionally more attention. For example, Karola Hafez and Cay Richter (2007), who conducted a media analysis on the image of Islam on German TV (ARD and ZDF), showed that, even on these two public-law television channels, 81 percent of all programming regarding Muslims dealt with negative aspects. Several studies (Boomgarden & Vliegenthart 2007 regarding Holland, for example) also highlight a connection between media reporting and election behavior: the more space that is dedicated to the topic of Europe being “foreignized,” and the more strongly a rejecting attitude toward immigrants is spread by the media, the stronger the support for right-wing populist parties. The right-wing try to exploit vulnerabilities of European citizens through the use of strategies that maintain stability by excluding immigrant groups that are perceived as significant others (Triandafyllidou, 2010). The right-wing simply overestimate demographic future scenarios and predict—without recognizing the dynamic nature of cultures (Fraser, 2003; Hauck, 2006)—an Islamization of Europe.

It is noteworthy, however, that even within the liberal spectrum of society, criticism regarding Islam is often expressed, especially concerning the role of religion. Left-wing politicians fear a rejection of Western emancipatory achievements, and often implicitly see Muslims as backward, unwilling to follow a secular lifestyle, and unwilling to adapt to Western gender roles. Those lines of argument can also be observed in certain academic circles. Various bestselling authors congruently fear an alienation of European values, connected to an Arabization of Europe. But, it must be stated that the main conclusions expressed by those self-appointed critics of Islam are rarely based on empirical facts, and
several authors seem to mix open-ended dynamics in Western societies with ideological statements. Furthermore, Thorsten Gerald Schneiders (2009), who analyzed the main arguments coming from the harsh commentators regarding the role of Islam in Germany, concluded that the convergence of the arguments of several authors is striking. They mainly generalize results, draw dubious conclusions, and overact with polemics. Popular literature, or even that which is considered pseudo-science (Sarrazin, 2010), is particularly challenging because, under the cover of legitimized critique on religion, insulting, and sometimes even misanthropic, statements are transferred to the public. Islamophobia continues to be a pressing issue in Europe, as a result of the high influx of Muslim immigrants and asylum seekers, and as a result of the marginal possibilities of establishing equal contacts between Muslim minorities and the majority population (Pettigrew, 1998). The strategy of creating a bogeyman image of Muslims seems to gain popularity in the Western discourse, and is more and more often used by popular mass media, specific political actors, as well as certain bestselling authors in the academic field.

ISLAMOPHOBIA AS A CHALLENGING CONCEPT

The massive emergence of Islamophobic tendencies is usually traced back to the time of the collapse of the Soviet empire, although some authors connect the origins of Islamophobia to an earlier time (Commission of British Muslims and Islamophobia, 2004; Poyting & Mason, 2007). Nevertheless, Islamophobia remains a challenging concept because—at least empirically—very little is known about its multifaceted nature. From the very beginning, the Runnymede Trust Group (1997) recognized the multidimensionality of the construct. They consider views of Muslims as either open or closed. Based on this distinction, various levels of prejudice are analyzed. An Islamophobic attitude assumes a view of Muslims as a static and monolithic block; it perceives them as different and separated, interprets them as inferior, barbaric and primitive, and construes them as hostile, and therefore, potentially violent and susceptible to terrorism. Finally, Islam is seen in a pejorative attitude as a manipulative political ideology immune to Western criticism (Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, 1997). The main achievement of the often-cited report is to provide separate levels of analysis. Consequently, the construct remains vague because there is no clear distinction between attitudes, discriminatory actions, and exclusionary social practices.

Although the integration of Muslim immigrants is at the top of the agenda in politics and media, there is surprisingly very little valid empirical data. Despite the existence of a number of scales obtained from surveys among the population (e. g., ALLBUS 2006) or from important cross-national research projects (ESS 2002) regarding attitudes toward migrants in general, at the present time there are few efforts underway to develop adequate scales for Islamophobia that consist of comparable items across cultures. As Joel Fetzer and Christopher Soper (2003) highlight: “methodically sophisticated cross-national analysis of mass-level attitudes toward Muslims is virtually nonexistent.” (Fetzer & Soper, 2003). At present, no cross-national survey adopts a differentiated view regarding Islamophobia in Western societies, although there are a number of attempts by the European Union to give this topic a higher priority (see, for example, FRA, 2006).

All cross-national surveys mainly use single indicators, and, until now, only a few studies address the challenge of developing a multidimensional and differentiated scale on Islamophobic attitudes. The Bielefeld-research group (Heitmeyer, 2002-2012; Zick, Küpper & Hövermann, 2011) describes a syndrome of group-focused enmity, which is not only...
responsible for a general devaluation of minorities, but is seen as a crucial factor to explain contemporary lack of solidarity with underprivileged groups in society. The empirical results indicate similar predictors on ethnic prejudice and Islamophobia (see Zick et al., 2008), which strengthens the position that Islamophobia represents one facet of group-focused enmity, and can be measured with a small range of items. Several empirical studies (Stolz 2005; Kühnel & Leibold 2007; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008) conclude that Islamophobia cannot be empirically distinguished from xenophobia, and that the same explanatory factors are responsible for ethnic prejudice and anti-Muslim sentiments. Therefore—adopting solely an empirical perspective—the legitimacy of Islamophobia as a unique concept is still challenged. Marc Hellbling (2010) particularly raises the question of whether critical attitudes toward Muslims illustrate a specific form of prejudice, or may generally be classified as xenophobia. In addition, it is still unclear whether prejudices are actually directed against Islam as a religion, and Muslims from different cultures, or against specific ethnic groups from the Arab world (Gottschalk & Greenberg 2008). Hellbling (2012) thus concludes that a unique position regarding prejudice toward Muslims appears to be unsupportable because those attitudes can hardly be differentiated from general opinions toward immigrants (Hellbling 2012).

Another reason for the reluctance to deal with Islamophobia empirically is the debate on the term and concept itself. The political debate surrounding the phenomenon is highly polarized, and supporters and opponents of Muslim immigration seem to use the term strategically. The main proponents of criticism of Islam see Islamophobia as a discursive weapon to suppress the legitimate criticism of religious practices and fundamentalist tendencies. In their view, freedom of expression is restricted and misinterpreted as a prejudiced opinion. However, as Schneiders (2009) shows, critical arguments toward Islam reflect a gray area between criticism and Islamophobia, at least in the German context. It seems impossible for the public, given their limited knowledge regarding Islam, to distinguish properly between a secular motivated criticism and prejudice. Roland Imhoff and Julia Recker (2012) developed a sophisticated scale to measure "Islamophobia" that closely follows the conception of Runnymede Trust. Their main research aim is to isolate a secular-rational motivated form of criticism of Islam from Islamophobic tendencies. Nevertheless, the final version of the scale is based on student samples, and encompasses rather complicated items.²

A second line of criticism illustrates that there is still no uniform meaning of Islamophobia, and also that the expressions of the concept vary.³ Because the verbal expression of phobia refers to a pathological fear, it is imperative for scale constructing to take, primarily, anxiety and feelings of threat into account. This was also the primary research aim of the scale created by Sherman Lee et. al., (2009), whose objective was the construction of a scale to measure negative feelings toward Muslims and their religion (Lee et. al., 2009). In the psychometrically tested scale of 16 items, two independent dimensions can be distinguished: an affective-behavioral subscale, which is directed at negative emotions and behaviors toward Muslims, and a cognitive subscale, which results in an interpretation of Islam as a dangerous religion. However, the authors follow this strategy by means of similar items, which measure, more or less, the same aspects ("Islam is a dangerous religion," "Islam is an evil religion," "Islam is a religion of hate"). With this strategy it is easy to achieve a high internal consistency and reliability of the scale (Lee et. al., 2009) but the content validity of the scale is limited because of the narrow focus. On the other hand, it can be seen as an advantage to follow a clear concept of prejudice highlighting cognitive, emotional, and behaviour-related judgements. My understanding of Islamophobia also follows this direction, and is in line with Eric Bleich (2011), who conceptualizes Islamophobia as “indiscriminate negative attitudes or
emotions directed at Islam or Muslims.” It is therefore necessary to deal with Islamophobia as a specific aspect of prejudice, and to search for indicators that may encompass a broad range of those negative attitudes and emotions. Referring to this weak empirical basis of research, it can only be assumed that Islamophobia is linked to historical roots of former conflicts, to various forms of cultural threat, to new formations of boundaries between different cultures, to fears of radicalization, violence, and terrorism, or to ethnocentrism and interpretations of backwardness (see also Hafez, 2010).

The objective of this study is, initially, to investigate the cognitive reasoning and the emotional reactions of the local population toward Muslims, and to derive several dimensions of Islamophobia. Next, I used Likert-scaling (Likert, 1932) to develop an empirically sound multidimensional scale. Qualitative and quantitative approaches were thus combined to integrate the life-worlds of the individuals (qualitative stage), and to test the multifaceted nature of Islamophobia (quantitative stage). This comprehensive way of scale-constructing may lead to a multidimensional measurement that includes understandable items, and that is suitable for representative studies. Although the whole study is restricted to the local level, and the final quantitative approach is only based on a quota sample, it can be seen as an alternative, bottom-up approach to developing differentiated items for multidimensional concepts. The Attitudes Toward Muslims Scale (ATMS), which is the core result of this article, can be seen as a preliminary version of an empirical measurement of Islamophobia, which has to be evaluated further in nationwide, or even cross-national, samples.

**RESEARCH DESIGN TO CONSTRUCT AN APPROPRIATE SCALE**

In general, scale construction often follows a top-down strategy. This means that researchers develop indicators independently using different sources of information. Next, those items are comprehensively tested in several pretests, and larger samples and various statistical methods (especially factor analysis, item analysis and reliability analysis) are used to evaluate the quality of the indicators. Finally, the researcher decides whether to combine and reformulate items from available questionnaires, or to use a theory-guided approach to derive indicators from the state of the art in research. Both scales on Islamophobia, which were discussed earlier, follow this second approach. Lee et. al., (2009) indicate that they generated a large number of items based on theories of fear and the literature on anti-Muslim-sentiment (Lee et. al., 2009). Imhoff and Recker (2012) state that they tried to directly operationalize the definition of Islamophobia provided by Runnymede Trust (Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, 1997). All of these top-down approaches may include certain presumptions that require an empirical confirmation. It remains unclear if it is sufficient to highlight only cognitive and affective-behavioral aspects of fear toward Muslims (Lee et. al., 2009), or if the eight closed views of Islam provided by Runnymede Trust (1997) really form a consistent pattern of thought as hypothesized in the Scale for Islamoprejudice and Secular Critique of Islam (Imhoff & Recker, 2012). The approach presented here can be seen as an alternative bottom-up approach to scale construction, and adopts a Mixed-Methods design (Bergman, 2008). To get an insight into major arguments and attitudes of the public, it is necessary to explore the mindsets of the individuals, and to conceptualize a new scale based on those perceptions. This research follows a sequential and explorative strategy, which is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Research design of the study to construct the ATMS (Attitudes Toward Muslims scale)

According to Flick (2011), triangulation may vary with regard to methodological procedures, to the implementation of different methodological steps, and to the emphasis on qualitative and quantitative approaches. Our starting point was a qualitative study to explore the multidimensional characteristics of Islamophobia. We decided to conduct narrative interviews, combined with the strategy of photo-elicit interviewing. The narrative part looked for relationships between the biographical background and contemporary attitudes toward immigrants and Muslims. Photo-elicit-interviewing (Harper, 2002) was chosen to detect specific feelings of threats with regard to Muslims. Additionally, certain requests (similar to a guided interview) addressed specific issues of Islamophobia, in order to get a complete and detailed picture of common resentments toward Muslims. After conducting 16 interviews, the second stage of our research came to the forefront. The interviews were recorded on tape, transcribed, and analyzed using two different approaches. We deliberately chose two alternative strategies to interpret the data. The narrative analysis of the interview material (Lucius-Hoene & Deppermann 2004) was used to uncover the main lines of argumentation and narrative patterns. In a final step, we established a system of superordinate categories in order to derive the crucial dimensions of Islamophobic attitudes. The qualitative content analysis (based on Mayring, 2010) was especially helpful to elaborate the main dimensions of analysis for scale construction, and the narrative analysis was particularly fruitful in revealing specific resentments and feelings of threat regarding Muslims. In general, the combination of the two methods of analysis allowed us to achieve a complementary perspective on certain forms of prejudice.

The main result of the qualitative analysis was the establishment of 11 dimensions of attitudes that cover the main facets of Islamophobia. attitudes toward Muslims seem to be structured across those 11 bipolar lines, which served as the main framework for item construction. One hundred and sixteen items were established and used in a pretest based on a student sample (n = 100). This first quantitative step (Study 2) of the research enabled us to conduct an item analysis, and to select appropriate indicators for large population samples. A reduced version of the scale (35 items) was then evaluated, based on a quota sample (n = 315) of the population (Study 3). The final Attitudes Toward Muslim Scale (ATMS) consists of 24 items, and seems to be a useful instrument to capture the main dimensions of Islamophobia.

All studies took place in Salzburg, a medium-size city in Austria. The first study (qualitative interviews) was conducted between October 2012 and March 2013. The two quantitative surveys (pretest and quota sample) occurred between April 2013 and July 2013.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

First Study: Qualitative Approach: Narrative Interviews with Photo-elicit Technique

The qualitative approach can be seen as a pre-investigative tool to explore the multidimensional facets of Islamophobia. The mode of selective and purposive sampling (Flick, 2009) was used to uncover the broad range of attitudes throughout the population. Selective sampling was implemented to adequately consider gender and different age and education groups, and purposive sampling was applied to encompass radical parts of the population, as well as particularly open-minded persons. With this sampling strategy, we were able to analyze 16 comprehensive interviews as a basis for our qualitative study. In general, there is a slight overrepresentation of female participants (10 interviews), and the interviewees have a disproportionally high educational background. This is mainly due to our selection of four uniform education groups. To cover a highly diverse spectrum of attitudes, we decided to choose equal numbers of people with: a university degree, a qualification for university entrance, an apprenticeship, and a compulsory education. We also succeeded in providing a broad variation regarding age and occupation. The youngest participants were two students of 20 and 21 years of age, while the oldest participant was a retired nurse of 73 years of age. The other interviewees were all active at the Austrian labor market, holding professions such as a freelance interpreter, a project leader in marketing, a civil servant, and an employee in the fashion industry. To enrich our analysis with potentially extreme perspectives, we also selected one 55-year-old concierge (compulsory education) demonstrating a high amount of resentment toward immigrants and Muslims, and, as a counterpart, a 41-year-old theologian with a high level of experience with foreign cultures, and demonstrating a high level of achievement regarding further education and self-fulfillment. Although our results are based on only 16 interviews, we attempted to reach a broad spectrum of the Salzburg population for the qualitative study.

The Structure of the Interview

We decided to adopt a rather unconventional interview mode in order to gain deep insight into the dynamics of critical attitudes toward Muslims. The interviews consisted of three parts: a biographical outline of the respondent, a transition to the specific focus of the study, and the use of photo elicitation (Harper 2002) to highlight the main dimensions of Islamophobic attitudes. This strategy resulted in extraordinarily long interviews (lasting between two and four hours), and enabled us to explore the complex dynamics of attitude formation leading to certain forms of prejudice. The interview began with an almost entirely open beginning, and was conducted with minimal influencing of the subject by the interviewer. The objective for the initial part of the interview was to develop a relationship of trust, while collecting important background information (i.e., the relevance of socialization as a basis for approaches to cultural diversity). The central part of the interview can be described as a problem-centered approach, where exmanent requests gently guide the respondent to the main direction of the research. The photo-elicit part is characterized by a higher level of structuration. Douglas Harper (2002), the pioneer of photo-elicited research, maintains that pictures activate a deeper level of consciousness, and may provoke more spontaneous and emotional responses. They attract attention in a longer interview, and therefore, avoid boredom and fatigue. We used all forms of photographs, ranging from illustrations reflecting the public discourse in response to professional pictures, to amateur shots. We tried to address various forms of threats, e.g., pictures reflecting Muslim symbols such as minarets
and the hijab, or pictures depicting a family with many children, which suggested the threat of demographic changes. Figure 2 shows one example that refers to the significance of Muslim symbols in Austria. It is a picture of Telfs, in Tyrol, where a minaret was built in 2006. The photograph provokes ambivalent feelings because it is seriously manipulated, and the minaret looks far larger than in reality, compared to the church in the background.

Figure 2: Picture of the minaret in Telfs (Tyrol)

Regarding topics with a potential to be emotionally charged, it is necessary to keep the influence of the interviewer low by avoiding suggestive questions. We only made one stimulating statement while presenting the pictures: "Please tell me what you see in the photograph and express your thoughts and feelings that emerge while you look at the picture." With this strategy, we tried to provoke emotional reactions that reflect the real opinions of the respondents that are hidden behind the façade of societal norms and values of equality. This becomes clear when we look at some statements, given immediately after presenting certain pictures. The quote below refers to a statement as a reaction to the picture of young Muslim women. They are all standing in a happy mood behind a teakettle, and all of them are wearing headscarves.

“Yes, that picture looks quite funny (4). They are—what should I say—that is the Turkish spirit, what should I say, they look funny (2), the women look like this (2) and so it is.”

Male, 55 years, compulsory school, concierge, row 1266-1268

The process of detecting emotions hidden behind the curtain of speaking in a politically correct way is clearly reflected in this quote from the interview. The concierge tries to speak in a neutral way, and tries to describe the cultural habit of wearing the headscarf. Feelings of discomfort dealing with this picture are reflected in a deceleration of answers. The pauses between the sentences (shown in seconds within the brackets) illustrate that the interviewee tries to hide his discomfort with Muslims at the beginning of the photo-elicit part of the interview. The more pictures we used, the more the respondent began to clearly
communicate his critical attitudes toward Islam (see further quotes below). Thus, we eventually succeeded in provoking emotional reactions, and being able to explore the interviewee’s fears with regard to the influx of Muslim immigrants.

Exploring the Main Dimensions of Islamophobia

Unfortunately, it is not possible to provide more detail regarding the biographical relationships inherent in current forms of prejudice, or the dynamics of attitude formation during the interviews, or the individual characteristics of ethnocentrism. Our goal was limited to highlighting the main results of our qualitative study, i.e., the empirically grounded structure of multifaceted perceptions on Islam. We tried to center the main statements of the respondents along bipolar dimensions, which appeared clearly in the interviews. In total, we developed 11 different dimensions, thereby reflecting the multidimensional nature of Islamophobia. These dimensions served as a framework for item construction. There are always two poles (openness vs. closeness) that mark the endpoints of the continuum. These pairs of opposite thinking (from tolerance to prejudice) reflect the increasingly polarized attitudes prevalent in Western societies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Left pole (tolerance)</th>
<th>Right pole (resentments)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural enrichment</td>
<td>Cultural threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigning status as minority group</td>
<td>Presumptions of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational view of radical tendencies</td>
<td>Exaggerated fears of radicalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceiving disadvantages</td>
<td>Perceiving privileges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favoring equal rights</td>
<td>Favoring legal discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance regarding Muslim symbols</td>
<td>Discomfort regarding Muslim symbols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion formation based on experience</td>
<td>Diffuse justification of prejudice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal appreciation of different cultures</td>
<td>Perceptions of backwardness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural openness</td>
<td>Cultural closeness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepting different gender roles</td>
<td>Support of Western gender relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowance of cultural autonomy</td>
<td>Demands for assimilation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: The 11 bipolar dimensions of tolerant attitudes vs. resentment toward Muslims

The first crucial fear representing the core of Islamophobia, as revealed in the interviews, was feelings of a cultural threat. This central dimension is intertwined with diffuse patterns, such as presumptions of conspiracy scenarios (striving for power), or fears of fundamentalism. People assume that Muslims have far-reaching networks in Austrian society, and that there is the danger of radicalization. Besides these often-exaggerated expressions of a cultural threat, we also find realistic threat scenarios coming into the forefront, particularly for people with fears of social descent. Although highly educated individuals often assign to Muslims the status of a minority group (being disadvantaged and even discriminated against), lower-educated respondents presume that Muslim networks will gain more power. It seems that they are often particularly susceptible to right-wing discourses highlighting competition in the labor and housing sectors, and they frequently assume that Muslims obtain privileges by fraud and without achievement. In several interviews the resentment toward giving benefits to immigrants, compared to those available to the host population, is clearly expressed. In economically critical times when resources are scarce, many people seem to fear that immigrants take unfair advantage of the welfare state for their own gain.
“I know from the people who work at social security offices, I mean from a girlfriend who works there: They come again. They come over and over again. And even if they get the clear message that it will not work out, they come again and again.”  

female, 54 years, compulsory school, nurse, row 325-328

On the other hand, several opinions expressed by respondents highlight the pluralization of attitudes within individualized European societies (Münch, 2010), and no uniform picture of a prejudiced view emerges. The educational level is often identified as one key determinant of prejudice, but only a few studies address the question as to what causal mechanisms are responsible for this often-confirmed relationship (Schaefer, 1996). In a new study, Thomas Meeussen, de Vroome and Marc Hooghe (2013) discovered that cognitive skills seem to be relevant to coping with social complexity, and to feeling more secure in different interaction settings. Also shown in this qualitative study was the fact that highly qualified people always try to maintain a differentiated perspective. They realize that they do not know enough about other cultures to enable making general statements, and they see intercultural contacts as an ongoing learning process.

“I like to get to know other people to meet people from other culture. I can learn that the world is full of diversity. It is always an enrichment to get to know people from other cultures and it is also an enrichment for myself.”  

male, 41 years, university degree, theologian, row 794-797

In general, people express ambiguous feelings concerning the rights and duties of Muslims (favoring equal rights or opting for discrimination) in the Austrian society. On the one hand, they widely accept the right of religious freedom, but on the other hand, Muslims should practice their religion only in a private context (tolerance vs. discomfort with religious symbols). The visibility of religious symbols in the public is seen as a pure provocation. This acceptance, and parallel corrosion, of certain norms and values in Western society confirms the theoretical approach of Sutterlüty (2012) on contemporary paradoxical developments of capitalist societies. A young woman supports a ban of the burka, and justifies her position in the following way:

“Because you do not see anything of the person any more. It is—as I said before—over the top. I think that in a Christian country, you should not push too hard your cultural habits.”  

female, 20 years, A-levels, employee, row 189-191

On the other end of the spectrum, many respondents recognize tendencies of discrimination. They fear that Muslims have to withdraw from the public because their cultural recognition in society is more and more violated.

“I noticed on the street when women are wearing headscarves, they make themselves small, they fear to attract attention, they carry their bags close to their bodies, they try to go fast and always go at the border. Maybe that is just a feeling, I do not know.”  

female, 21 years, A-levels, student, row 240-245
Another dimension that emerged, and which can be seen as a new facet of Islamophobia, is opinion formations based on one’s own experience vs. statements that justify prejudice based on diffuse comparisons. People often seem to follow a “tooth for a tooth” and “eye for an eye” mentality. They search for simple reasons to soothe their consciences when they dare to make radical statements.

“I don’t accept minarets and do you know why? Because in Turkey they burn down churches as well. That’s common practise there. They have tried to build churches there and they burnt them down. They destroy them by fire because they are not interested.”

*male, 55 years, compulsory school, civil servant, row 1354-1357*

The attitudinal spectrum of experiencing Muslims as a cultural enrichment vs. as a cultural threat (together with fears of the minority group gaining power or drifting toward radicalization), and the challenge of giving minority groups equal rights, religious liberties, and allowing them to demonstrate their religion in the public, is supplemented by a third main facet of Islamophobia. These last dimensions clearly refer to overglorified feelings of the West compared to Islam, and therefore, to ethnocentrism. We can detect arguments representing an equal appreciation of different cultures vs. perceptions of Muslim backwardness, and accepting different gender roles vs. support for Western gender attitudes. Feelings of superiority are very prevalent; the civil servant even equates the Muslim population to animals. Integration in the school system is seen critically (“these dogs always lag behind,” row 1906) and comparisons to animals are also used to describe gender relations in the Muslim world (“a donkey has a higher value than a woman in the Turkish community,” row 1404-1405). These opinions go hand in hand with a clear demand for assimilation. It was a very common belief among all respondents that Muslims strictly have to adapt to the host society, and that cultural autonomy should be allowed only to a limited extent.

The dimensions of attitudes of respondents toward Muslims, which have been examined very briefly, reflect the major areas of discourse regarding Muslims in the Austrian population. Centering opinions along bipolar dimensions has the advantage of facilitating item construction, and of being able to develop crucial indicators reflecting positive and negative opinions held by the public. The next study provides an overview of our transition from qualitative to quantitative methods. We transformed the heterogeneous opinions toward Muslims into suitable indicators that are appropriate to measure attitudes toward Muslims by using a sophisticated scale.

Second Study: Scale Construction and Item Analysis Based on a Pretest (n = 100)

The 11 bipolar dimensions, which were illustrated previously, were used as a framework for item construction. To achieve an adequate scale we used the method of Likert-scaling (Likert, 1932). With this approach it is necessary to develop a broad range of items, to select the appropriate items, and to explore the underlying dimensions, based on specific methods of item analysis. We decided to develop approximately 10 items for each dimension that had emerged from the main arguments of the individuals in justifying their expressed opinions. Then, we conducted a small survey (based on a student sample of 100 respondents), where we tested a long version of the scale (116 items). We established short and understandable items that refer solely to one single issue, and we tried to address all relevant topics associated with the contemporary discourse on Muslims in Austria.

Some
indicators clearly refer to cultural threat (e.g., “Muslims have already too much to say in Austria;” “A mosque does not fit into an Austrian village”) while others represent classical prejudiced views (“Islam cannot be combined with our Christian culture;” “I have the feeling that Muslims do have privileges with regard to social benefits.”). Other items relate to certain emotions in the intercultural sphere (e.g., “I get angry when I see a Muslim woman with many children;” “I am happy that I can buy and eat Turkish food in Salzburg.”). A six-point scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 6 (totally agree) was chosen to avoid the tendency to select a neutral position. The respondents were required to express their (rather) tolerant or (rather) critical opinion.

In the first step, all items with a high number of missing values, or a highly skewed distribution, or with low discrimination values, were deleted. To test the dimensionality of the remaining items, we computed a PCA with Promax rotation (assuming that the underlying dimensions correlate with each other) (Kopp & Lois, 2009). The PCA confirms that there is one strong factor of Islamophobia encompassing several dimensions. Thus, the pretest demonstrated that it is not possible to discriminate empirically between all the dimensions found in the qualitative study. A total of 21 items and 7 dimensions can be integrated in one superordinate factor, which we simply call multifaceted anti-Islam perceptions. This predominant superordinate factor is composed of various negative feelings toward Muslims (such as perceptions of a cultural threat, fear of terrorism, feelings of discomfort with Muslim symbols, presumptions of their power) and cognitive strategies to justify prejudice (diffuse comparisons, opting for discrimination).

Interestingly however, we succeeded in establishing two slightly different factors. A separate construct of ethnocentrism appears, combined with critical attitudes toward gender relations in the Muslim world, although this factor is highly correlated with general Islamophobia ($r = 0.65$). People tend to especially highlight the backwardness of Muslims, and express concern that women are predominantly oppressed in Islam. A third factor can also be isolated, reflecting cultural openness and perceiving disadvantages for Muslims. This factor is negatively correlated to both dimensions ($r = -0.58$ to general Islamophobia and $r = -0.48$ to ethnocentrism). The pretest indicates that there are at least three different factors that represent open vs. closed views toward Muslims. Nevertheless, there is one superior complex of critical views toward Muslims, integrating a broad range of items.

In total, we selected 33 items for our preliminary Islamophobia scale. As a result of the high intercorrelation of the items, it was possible to achieve high Cronbach alpha values for every subscale. The following table demonstrates that it is possible to measure all different dimensions of Islamophobia using three items each. All measurements result in a high reliability coefficient, at least based on the sample of 100 individuals.
The first empirical test of our preliminary scale led to two important conclusions. First, the pretest confirmed that all analytic dimensions found in the qualitative study can be reliably measured with a short number of items (see Table 3). On the other hand, it is not possible to distinguish empirically between the 11 dimensions we found in our qualitative study. Islamophobia seems to be composed of three superordinate, and highly interconnected, dimensions. There is one higher order factor of multifaceted anti-Islam perceptions, and this factor is supplemented by strong feelings of ethnocentrism, views of cultural closeness, and perceiving no disadvantages for Muslims. A larger-scale study of the Salzburg population, based on a quota sample, was designed to confirm our preliminary results and to further evaluate the scale. We draw conclusions about how strongly the different dimensions of Islamophobia are interrelated (evaluating the convergent validity of the multidimensional concept), and try to demonstrate which facets of critical attitudes are particularly widespread within the population. In a second step, we attempt to test, using a multi-trait-multi-method matrix, whether Islamophobia can be distinguished from certain other forms of prejudice (evaluating the discriminant validity of the concept). Finally, using a multiple regression design, we analyze which crucial sociodemographic, socio-structural factors, and value orientations are particularly responsible in explaining Islamophobia, and whether the same factors, or specific predictors, are predominantly relevant, compared to general ethnic prejudice (evaluating the criterion validity of our concept).

Third Study: Scale Evaluation and Validation Based a Survey of Ordinary Citizens (n = 315)

For the final study, we chose to conduct a study based on a quota sample of selected inhabitants in the city of Salzburg. In total, 315 people with a native background participated in the study (excluding four Muslims in the sample). With regard to gender, the sample may be considered to be largely coherent with the socio-demographic characteristics of the inhabitants of Salzburg. Concerning age and education, the sample cannot be seen as being representative because of a higher proportion of younger people and a higher proportion of highly educated individuals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cronbachs Alpha</th>
<th>Number Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discomfort toward Muslim symbols</td>
<td>0.945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural openness</td>
<td>0.886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Western gender relations</td>
<td>0.882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural threat</td>
<td>0.881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demands for assimilation</td>
<td>0.881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist threat</td>
<td>0.874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presumptions of power</td>
<td>0.858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffuse comparisons</td>
<td>0.854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on backwardness</td>
<td>0.829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions of disadvantages</td>
<td>0.817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality vs. Discrimination</td>
<td>0.814</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Reliability coefficient (Cronbach alpha) for the 11 subscales to measure Islamophobic tendencies
Evaluation of the Scale

The first objective of the previous study was to test the quality of the items for large representative samples and for people with diverse social backgrounds. Based on an item analysis, we refined the scale once again and reduced the number of suitable indicators. The final version of the Attitudes Toward Muslim Scale (ATMS) consists of 24 items, covering 12 dimensions of Islamophobic attitudes. Besides the 11 dimensions, which were found in the qualitative study and which were each measured with two items, we decided to form another dimension composed of two classical indicators, “Muslims are a strain on the welfare system,” and “Muslims increase crime problems” in our scale. Using the dimension “Specific Islamophobia vs. general ethnic prejudice” it is possible to analyze if ethnocentrism forms a separate construct, or if general resentment toward immigrants is highly interconnected to prejudice toward Muslims.

The PCA with Promax rotation (Kopp & Lois, 2009) based on the quota sample mainly confirms the latent dimensions, which we had already found in the pretest. Again, a three-factor solution emerges with a strong first factor of multifaceted anti-Islam perceptions. All items expressing feelings of threat (regarding cultural infiltration, cultural closeness, and presumptions of power), and all cognitive arguments to justify prejudice (discomfort regarding Muslim symbols, discriminatory attitudes, and diffuse comparisons), exert a high loading on this first superordinate factor. Also, the two classical items that should allow discriminating between ethnic prejudice and anti-Muslim sentiment, (“Muslims are a strain to the welfare system,” and “Muslims increase crime problems”) explicitly belong to this construct of multifaceted anti-Muslim perceptions. But again, a second factor can be confirmed (quite strongly correlated with the first factor, $r = 0.77$) including “backwardness,” and “demands for assimilation.” Interestingly, aspects highlighting the “threat of terrorism and radicalization,” and “gender roles” lie somewhat in between the two
main concepts to measure Islamophobic attitudes. “Discomfort with religious symbols,” and “threat of terrorism” belong more strongly to the first factor of multifaceted anti-Islam perceptions, while “support for Western gender relations” has equal loadings on both factors. When considering impressions of “backwardness,” and “demands for assimilation,” we can assign those four items clearly to the second dimension. “Perceptions of disadvantages” form a third factor, which is only composed of two items, and only moderately correlated (-0.47 to multifaceted anti-Islam perceptions, and -0.41 to ethnocentrism and assimilation).

Table 4 gives an overview of the results of the exploratory factor analysis, and illustrates the final Attitudes Toward Muslims Scale. All items that were used in the study, and that belong to the final scale, are listed in the table, and their correlations with the superordinate dimensions (factor loadings > 0.3) are reported. The loadings on the three factors clearly demonstrate that it is only possible to discriminate three dimensions of Islamophobia that are still highly correlated.

So why, then, is it useful to focus on 12 different dimensions, and to construct this differentiated scale of 24 items? The last figure shows that, although the dimensions are highly interconnected, the extent of prejudice clearly varies with regard to certain aspects. The majority of citizens express clear demands for assimilation, and highlight the backwardness of Islam compared to European culture. The image that Muslims belong to a counter-world, and that they have difficulties in adapting to Western values, is highly prevalent among the public. When it comes to gender relations, religious symbols, presumptions of power, and fears of terrorism, the respondents express slightly more criticism than tolerance. On the other hand, the inhabitants of Salzburg often see disadvantages for Muslims; they try to act rather open toward Muslims; they often avoid diffuse comparisons; they favor equality; and they do not perceive a cultural threat to the city. A comprehensive measurement of Islamophobia should recognize those differences and should determine which areas of discourse are particularly relevant in specific countries.

![Figure 3: Mean judgements on different dimensions of Islamophobic attitudes](image-url)
Table 4: Factor loadings of all selected items (PCA with Promax-rotation) (Quota sample of Salzburg citizens, n = 315), all factor loadings < 0.3 are omitted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of Analysis</th>
<th>Item selection</th>
<th>Multifaceted anti-Islam perceptions</th>
<th>Impressions of backwardness and demands for assimilation</th>
<th>Perceptions of discrimination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Muslims are a strain to the welfare system.</td>
<td>0.780</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Muslims increase crime problems.</td>
<td>0.698</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural threat</td>
<td>3. The cultural life of a country is enriched by Muslims.</td>
<td>-0.631</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. I get angry when I see a Muslim woman with many children.</td>
<td>0.925</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>5. Muslims in Austria should have the same rights to exercise their religion as everybody else.</td>
<td>-0.949</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Muslims in Austria should have the same rights for social benefits as everybody else.</td>
<td>-0.943</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffuse comparisons</td>
<td>7. We should not tolerate Muslim houses of prayer because churches are also often not accepted in Islamic states.</td>
<td>0.849</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. We should not guarantee too many rights to Muslims, because Christians are oppressed in Muslim countries.</td>
<td>0.797</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural openness</td>
<td>9. I am happy that I can buy and eat Turkish food in Salzburg.</td>
<td>-0.838</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. I can personally learn something from contacts with Muslims.</td>
<td>-0.727</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presumptions of power</td>
<td>11. Muslims have already too much to say in Austria.</td>
<td>0.751</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. There are already too many Muslims in our country.</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discomfort toward religious symbols</td>
<td>13. The building of mosques should be respected in Austria.</td>
<td>-0.682</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. Building minarets should be forbidden in Austria.</td>
<td>0.571</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist threat</td>
<td>15. The Islam represents a terrorist threat for the Western world.</td>
<td>0.557</td>
<td>0.356</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16. We should vigilantly observe Muslims in Austria.</td>
<td>0.530</td>
<td>0.340</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender roles</td>
<td>17. Turkish females should be legally allowed to wear a headscarf at their working places.</td>
<td>-0.368</td>
<td>-0.418</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18. Every Muslim women should be allowed to wear a headscarf, no matter where.</td>
<td>-0.371</td>
<td>-0.374</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backwardness</td>
<td>19. Compared to other religions the Islam seems to be backward.</td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20. Muslims should adapt themselves toward our progress.</td>
<td>0.935</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand for Assimilation</td>
<td>21. Turkish immigrants adapt too little to our way of living.</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22. Muslims are not capable to adapt themselves to the contemporary world.</td>
<td>0.392</td>
<td>0.528</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions of disadvantages</td>
<td>23. Muslims in Austria are often devalued due to their religious affiliation.</td>
<td>0.898</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24. Muslims are discriminated in Austria.</td>
<td>0.669</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The Distinction between Ethnic Prejudice and Islamophobia

We have seen in the first section of Study 3 that the 24 items reflecting attitudes toward Muslims reach a high convergent validity, and are suitable to measure three slightly different superordinate factors of Islamophobia. In the next step of the scale evaluation, a modified multitrait-multimethod matrix\(^3\) is illustrated, in order to test the discriminant validity of the concept. As mentioned before, we used the first three items of Table 4 three times in the survey, replacing the term “Muslim” with “Immigrants,” and “Turkish people.” Thus, we can compare the responses toward those nine items, and evaluate the correlations between them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Immigrants Culture</th>
<th>Immigrants Crime</th>
<th>Immigrants Welfare State</th>
<th>Muslims Culture</th>
<th>Muslims Crime</th>
<th>Muslims Welfare State</th>
<th>Turks Culture</th>
<th>Turks Crime</th>
<th>Turks Welfare State</th>
<th>Ethnic Prejudice</th>
<th>Islamophobia</th>
<th>Attitudes Turks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural life undermined immigrants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants increase crime problems.</td>
<td>.507** 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants strain to welfare system.</td>
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\(^3\) All correlations turned out to be highly significant (p > 0.01)

Correlations between the indicators of the same concept are bold marked

Table 5: A modified multitrait-multimethod matrix to evaluate the validity of the concepts (quota sample, n = 315)

In this modified multi-trait-multi-method matrix, two conditions have to be fulfilled to guarantee a high convergent and discriminant validity of the concepts. First, the correlations among the indicators for the same constructs (ethnic prejudice, Islamophobia, and attitudes toward Turkish people) should be high enough (r > 0.5) to derive a high convergent validity of those concepts. Second, the correlations within the concepts have to be higher than the correlations to the indicators of the other concepts. This condition must be fulfilled in order to allow us to propose a discriminant validity of the concepts. If we look at the correlations (marked in bold) measuring the relation of the indicators within the
concept, convergent validity is clearly fulfilled. All correlations between the items are strong, which leads to a high reliability for the three measurements as well (see the Cronbach alpha values at the diagonal at the end of the table). On the other hand, we clearly fail to achieve a high discriminant validity of the concepts. The correlations referring to the same items (except the terms “Muslims” and “Turkish people” have been interchanged) are often higher than the correlations referring specifically to immigrants, Muslims, or the Turkish community. The lack of discriminant validity is also visible in the last three correlations at the bottom of the table. The correlations between the three concepts (each measured by the three mentioned items) are far too high to propose diverse responses to ethnic groups. This is a sign that people seem to discriminate slightly between certain forms of prejudice (with regard to cultural infiltration, increasing crime rates, or impacts on the welfare state) but not between Muslims, Turkish people, or ethnic groups in general.

All judgements seem to be indicators of a superordinate structure of prejudices, confirming the thesis of a syndrome of general ethnic enmity (Zick, Pettigrew & Wagner, 2008). This assumption is further strengthened because even the mean judgements across all specific items are quite similar. The values are often located close to the midpoint of the scale (3.5 on a six-point scale from 1 to 6) demonstrating the highly-polarized attitudes of Western individuals. It seems that the people do not dare to direct their antipathy toward specific immigrant groups because ethnic prejudice is always slightly higher than resentment toward Muslims, or critical attitudes toward the Turkish community. On the other hand, the indicators of cultural infiltration represent a small counter trend. More respondents express the opinion that cultural life is more strongly undermined by Muslims or Turks than by immigrants in general.

Figure 4: Mean comparison of identical indicators measuring ethnic prejudice, resentment toward Turks, and Muslims.
As a result of the high correlation between the indicators, and the similar mean judgements on all items, it is difficult to empirically establish an analytic border between ethnic prejudice in general, and Islamophobia in particular. A final methodological strategy should provide some evidence about criterion validity. Two multiple regressions were run to measure which sociodemographic and socio-structural predictors, and which value orientations, are particularly relevant to explain a high degree of prejudice toward Turks and Muslims. Additionally, three value orientations (namely conservation values, materialism and hedonism, and creativity and engagement, based on the concept of Klages, 1992) were integrated in the models to measure the influence on the different aspects of prejudice found in this study. Materialism and hedonism refer to social dominance orientation. As Sidanius & Pratto (1999) propose, power orientation is a key factor that leads to a strong identification with the majority. Dominance-orientated individuals tend to exclude groups in order to do well in competition. It is also assumed that conservation values exert an influence on prejudice. Eldad Davidov et al., (2008) used the higher-order values (self-transcendence and conservation) to predict attitudes toward immigrants. Although self-transcendence values, such as universalism, are related to positive attitudes toward immigrants, conservation values exert a negative influence (Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995). These results are not surprising, and can easily be linked to our explanatory variables. Although engagement is connected to universalism and tolerance, conservation values are related to authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1988), which has been seen as an important explanatory factor since the beginning of empirical research on prejudice (Adorno et al., 1950).

We chose to select seven indicators at the socio-demographic level, namely age, gender (male vs. female), marital status, children in own household, domicile (countryside vs. city center), country of birth (foreign vs. native), and role of religion in life (from 1 = not important to 5 = very important). At the structural level we used four levels of education, five levels of occupational status, and a subjective social status measurement (evaluating income and job position in relation to others). The three value orientations, i.e., conservatism (Cronbach α = 0.80), materialism (Cronbach α = 0.62), and engagement (Cronbach α = 0.56) were measured with four items each, demonstrating a rather satisfactory internal consistency of the scales. We tested the influence of those predictors on five dependent variables, to judge if the same, or different, explanatory variables exert an influence on ethnic prejudice, attitudes toward the Turkish population, and the three dimensions of Islamophobia (multifaceted anti-Islam perceptions, impressions of backwardness, and demands for assimilation and no perceptions of discrimination). As a result of the high number of explanatory factors, the sample size—using the listwise-procedure—was reduced to some extent.

All results of the regression analysis are illustrated in Table 4. The first row of the table presents the explanatory power of the predictors. At least some predictors exert a considerable influence on all factors, leading to high effect sizes between 16.1 percent (no perceptions of discrimination of Muslims) and 43.5 percent (ethnic prejudice). But, in general, we can find only three consistent predictors that considerably explain ethnic prejudice and Islamophobia. The first predictor is education, where people with an apprenticeship predominantly demonstrate a higher degree of prejudice. Concerning the “labor market position” variable, the working class, particularly, expresses a higher amount of prejudice and Islamophobia. The most important predictors are value orientations.
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Table 6: Predictors of ethnic prejudice, attitudes toward the Turkish population and three dimensions of Islamophobia
Standardized coefficients (unstandardized coefficients in brackets)
Significant predictors are marked in bold (+ = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01).
Although conservative values are a particularly strong influence factor with regard to all dependent variables, a high importance placed upon creativity and societal engagement considerably reduces prejudice. Materialism is highly relevant as well, but this value dimension exerts no influence on perceptions of discrimination regarding Muslims. Besides the structural position in society and (cultural) values the sociodemographic indicators lose relevance. Female participants tend to express a slightly higher degree of Islamophobia, while persons being married perceive less discrimination toward Muslims. The small influences of age do not reach significance, and no effect was found concerning domicile, children, country of birth, and role of religion.

In general, the criterion validity of all facets of prejudice used in this study is clearly confirmed. The predictors are widely consistent with the state of the art in research, and are able to explain a considerable amount of variance with regard to all dependent variables. On the other hand, the results demonstrate once again that it is not possible to distinguish between the various forms of prejudice toward certain groups, at least in the city of Salzburg. The similarity of the predictors to the effect sizes is striking, and leads to the conclusion that predominantly the same predictors are relevant to explain differences in prejudiced views, no matter if the target group is Muslims, Turkish people, or immigrants in general.

DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS

The empirical results concerning the evaluation and validation of the scale (Study 3) seem to point out that it is not necessary to construct a sophisticated scale on attitudes toward Muslims. The results clearly indicate that all dimensions of prejudice analyzed in our study are closely connected, and similar explanatory factors are able to explain the variance of prejudice regardless if they are directed toward ethnic groups in general, or Muslims in particular. When it comes to the evaluation of criterion validity, we can draw two important conclusions. On the one hand, it is clearly beneficial to measure similar constructs, such as ethnic prejudice and Islamophobia, each with several items to achieve methodically sound results and to prevent measurement errors. The effect sizes of the independent predictors are remarkable, and clearly demonstrate that the structural position in society, and cultural values, are particularly relevant to explain variance in prejudice. On the other hand, more or less the same predictors are relevant in explaining ethnic prejudice, attitudes toward the Turkish population, and Islamophobia. This result confirms the work of Helbling (2010, 2012), who found practically the same predictors in his studies conducted in Switzerland. In this regard, a critique of superficial measurements (Zick, Küpper & Hövermann, 2011) is only partially justified. It seems that a few general indicators on attitudes toward Muslims are sufficient in large-scale surveys to get a first impression of the empirical importance of the phenomenon of Islamophobia within certain societal groups, and in different societies. Besides the relevance of similar explanatory factors and the lacking discriminant validity between the concepts also the mean judgements of the respondents to certain items concerning Muslims, Turkish people or immigrants in general appeared to be similar in this study. This result is rather surprising because the political discourse on immigration focuses predominantly on Muslims, which has been high on the media agenda in Austria for several years. The results imply that people in Austria may directly associate immigrants with Muslims, and thus, these people make no clear distinction between a general sentiment toward ethnic groups and specific fears toward Muslims. The aspect of cultural infiltration was the only issue where attitudes toward Muslims and Turks were more critical compared to general attitudes toward immigrants. This result goes hand in hand with certain studies
that strongly emphasize assigning a higher value to explanatory factors focusing on cultural threat in contemporary research on ethnocentrism, compared to the value assigned to economically based factors (Raijman et. al., 2008; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004; Manevska & Achterberg, 2011). Furthermore, this small-scale study points out that cultural factors (when referring to values) exert a higher influence than aspects of the social structure, and are far more relevant than sociodemographic characteristics. People opting for creativity and societal engagement seem to favor tolerant worldviews, while conservative values and materialist orientations are particularly relevant when it comes to prejudiced views, perceptions of backwardness, and demands for assimilation. The results widely confirm the evidence of former studies that education is a highly relevant predictor of ethnic prejudice (Hello et. al., 2002, Coenders & Scheepers, 2003) and that psychological characteristics grounded in personality (such as values, Schwartz, 1992) can give fruitful explanations of contemporary fears of cultural infiltrations.

Of course, the regression design that was adopted in this study has several limits. This local study solely tested the significance of basic socio-structural characteristics and value orientations. Furthermore, there are a number of alternative explanations, such as group-threat theory (Quillian, 1995), contact theory (Pettigrew, 1998) or relative deprivation (Pettigrew et. al., 2008) that were not considered in the models. Contemporary studies on ethnic prejudice that rely on representative or even cross-national samples should especially try to take societal developments into account, and should integrate those dynamics into their study design (see, for example, Billet, Meulemann & De Witte, 2014). With those enriched study designs, it would perhaps be possible to derive specific explanatory factors that are particularly relevant to explaining Islamophobia (Strabac & Listhaug, 2008).

When it comes to the nature of Islamophobia itself, our study shows that there is at least a slight distinction between multifaceted anti-Islam perceptions, impressions of backwardness, and perceiving disadvantages of Muslims. Particularly, the distinction between Islamophobia and ethnocentrism is important for further research because perceptions of backwardness with regard to Muslims, and demands for assimilation, seem to be widespread, and reflect rather common opinions of the public. The third factor, “perceiving disadvantages” correlates negatively with the other dimensions. Observing discriminations, therefore, goes hand in hand with cultural openness. If the local population is willing to see intercultural contacts as enrichment, they are also open-minded enough to recognize the underprivileged situation of Muslim minorities in Austria. If Islamophobia represents the core of future empirical studies, there is still the need to develop sophisticated scales, such as the scale of Lee et. al., (2009, 2013), Imhoff & Recker (2012) and our preliminary “Attitudes Toward Muslims Scale” (ATMS). It is only possible to detect those slightly discriminant factors with a differentiated scale that recognizes the multifaceted nature of prejudices toward Muslims. The scale presented in this article demonstrates that one can capture 12 dimensions adequately with 24 items. In relation to the scale of Imhoff & Recker (2012), the items are constructed based on the mindsets of individuals, and, in contrast to other scales, are quite simple, short, and easy to understand. In our view, the ATMS is applicable for representative samples.

The comprehensive mixed-methods approach adopted in this study has shown—compared to classical strategies of scale construction—that it is possible to achieve added value using qualitative research to explore the argumentation behind certain forms of prejudice. Qualitative research may serve as a fruitful future concept for scale construction. It has the advantage that it integrates the lifeworld of the individuals, and it empirically justifies the use of several dimensions. This bottom-up development of relevant dimensions
of analysis facilitates a culture-specific approach to certain topics. The dimensions highlight major issues in the Austrian discourse on Islam, and can be seen as an important basis for international comparisons. Rather than reporting international snapshots on Islamophobia that are based on single items (Aschauer, 2011; Zick, Küpper & Hövermann, 2011), it is far more useful to analyse the multifaceted nature of a concept in single countries. This article is a first step in this direction of research. Further challenges in the future include testing the relevance of this scale in different cultural contexts. Qualitative and quantitative methods that follow a similar approach should be used more often to determine if there is an intersection of major issues on Islam in several states, which would allow comparisons across countries. If the discourse is highly diverse among Western and Eastern states, it would be an indication that we should view Islamophobia preferably in a culture-sensitive perspective, rather than in a cross-cultural perspective. Although it seems sufficient to use a limited number of items to explain different degrees of Islamophobia among the public, a larger scale would therefore be suitable to explore the prevalence of certain attitudes in local contexts. A mixed-method design stands for an emic research strategy (Genkova, 2012), which is always necessary to explore new phenomena. If similar evidence is found in other cultural contexts, then using established scales for measuring attitudes toward Muslims in a cross-national perspective would be a major step forward.
ENDNOTES


2 Imhoff & Recker (2012) propose for instance the following item to measure prejudice: “Muslim cultures have so fundamentally different values, that it is difficult to identify common aims or ideals.” The secular-rational critique is measured by the following statement: “The rigid Islamic gender division should not be conceded to – neither in the public health sector nor in physical education.” (vgl. Imhoff & Recker, 2012, 815). These items require an increased level of education for an adequate understanding and seem therefore not suitable for representative surveys.

3 Echebarria-Ecabe & Fernandez Guede (2006) describe their scale as an "anti-Arab Prejudice measure" although numerous items are relating to Islam.

4 The construction of the Attitudes toward Muslims Scale is based on a research project in the department of Sociology at the University of Salzburg. Together with my colleague Elisabeth Donat I assumed the role of a supervisor of eleven students, who contributed to the project. They acted as interviewers in all three studies and supported us in item development, data collection, and item analysis. I deeply thank Kristof Becker, Birgit Birnbacher, Magdalena Gieserich, Martina Griesmayr, Janine Heinz, Susanna Jankovic, Michael Lechner, Regina Maurer, Katrin Mörtl, Julian Radam and Pia-Maria Wiesbauer for their engaged work.

5 Telfs is a small village of 15,000 inhabitants in Tyrol but a significant part of the population (about 3,000 inhabitants) have a Muslim background. The construction of the minaret was a major topic in Austrian media, being addressed in films and heavily discussed by the public.

6 In general, all indicators with five categories are often misinterpreted as Likert-scales. A “real” Likert-scale must follow all of the steps that were implemented in this study (see Schnell, Hill & Esser, 1999, p. 181ff.)

7 We intentionally decided to refer specifically to the Turkish population with regard to some items as well. We assume that the Salzburg population equalizes Muslims quite often with Turks because Turkish minorities are by far the most important Muslim group in Salzburg. We tried to test if specific attitudes directed toward the Turkish population form a discriminant factor but we found no differences between specific attitudes toward Turks and general attitudes toward Muslims.

8 For all statistical procedures SPSS (Version 22) was used.

9 As in prior studies, students of the sociological department at the University of Salzburg acted as interviewers, and fulfilled the quota based on sex, age, education and city districts.

10 Results referring to the whole sample should be treated with caution because they are not based on a probability sample of the Salzburg population. The data referring to mean values were weighted based on age and education to correct for major deviations.

11 Along with one other indicator measuring cultural threat, “The cultural life of a country is enriched by Muslims” all three items were also used to measure ethnic prejudice and attitudes toward the Turkish population. Those classical items are present in many different Europe-wide surveys and are often used in quantitative research. With this strategy it was possible to distinguish clearly between all three factors because we repeated the same items in different sections of the survey while replacing the term “Muslim” with the term “immigrants” or “Turkish people.”

12 The results were weighted with regard to age and education to get a rough picture of the prevalence of critical attitudes among the public. Representative conclusions regarding the extent of prejudice in Salzburg should still be treated with caution, because the study is not based on a probability sample.
A sophisticated multitrait-multimethod matrix requires the use of different methods (e.g., oral interview, written questionnaire, and telephone interview) to judge the quality of the concepts. In practice it is very common to depict a modified matrix only illustrating the relations between different concepts measured with several indicators in one particular survey (see further Schnell, Hill & Esser, 1999, S. 151-156).

This selection of sociodemographic and socio-structural predictors is based on consistent evidence in the research on ethnic prejudice (see first section of the article).

We constructed three scales using the items that are illustrated in Table 5. To prevent high missing values it was considered sufficient if at least one item was answered by the participants of the survey.

According to Allison (2002) the listwise-procedure can be seen as a robust method for multiple regression analysis to predict the effect sizes of various explanatory factors.

Additionally, people who are divorced seem to respect cultural diversity slightly more but this result is based on a rather small group (n =22) and should be treated with caution.

Of course the relevance of this variable in a study conducted in a city is limited. More than three quarters of the participants lived in the city of Salzburg, and more than 80 percent were born in Austria. The people indicating having been born in a foreign country mainly mentioned Germany. Therefore, small differences between domicile and country of birth are plausible.

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The Paradox of Equal Belonging of Muslims

Coskun Canan
Naika Foroutan
Humboldt University, Berlin

ISLAMOPHOBIA STUDIES JOURNAL

Published by:
Islamophobia Research and Documentation Project,
Center for Race and Gender, University of California, Berkeley.

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**The Paradox of Equal Belonging of Muslims**

Coskun Canan  
Naïka Foroutan  
*Humboldt University, Berlin*

**ABSTRACT:** The goal of this article is to demonstrate the paradox of equal belonging of Muslims. Adapting Axel Honneth and Ferdinand Sutterlütty’s model of normative paradox, we show how the ongoing process of social integration of Muslims produces reverse effects of disrespect. The refusal to grant fundamental rights to minorities calls into question not only the recently created image of Germany as a new nation of immigrants, but also constitutional principles of the democratic state. While German legislation clearly protects the rights of minorities, when it comes to the attitudes of the population in Germany toward Muslims as the biggest religious minority in the country, there is a reservoir of antidemocratic attitudes that must be taken into account. This article presents the first results of a representative telephone survey conducted among German citizens, with more than 8,000 respondents.

**INTRODUCTION**

“We are Christians, we are Muslims, we are Jews, we are Charlie!” were the words on the banner held by people who gathered in front of the Brandenburg Gate on January 13, 2015 for the vigil to commemorate the victims of the terrorist attack in Paris. Four days prior, Islamic extremists killed twelve people in front of and inside the offices of the French satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo*, shot and killed a police officer on the street, and murdered four people in a Jewish grocery store. The vigil in Berlin had been organized by the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, and the Turkish Community in Germany, as a gesture of tolerance, freedom of opinion, human rights, and as a stand against religious fanaticism. The goal was to clearly show that the murderers in Paris had, in no way, acted in the name of all Muslims, but as representatives of a radical ideology that they promoted as their true Islam, on the basis of which they deemed countless Muslims to be outside of the “true faith,” and thus legitimate targets for deadly attacks. Although ISIS terrorist groups and so-called lone wolves actively seek to target Western individuals in certain countries, and, in some cases, in Europe, according to studies, the overwhelming majority of victims of Islamist terror are Muslims (Neumann 2014). As stated in US government reports, "In cases where the religious affiliation of terrorism casualties could be determined, Muslims suffered between 82 and 97 percent of terrorism-related fatalities over the past five years" (National Counterterrorism Center 2012). In Western countries that have significant immigrant populations, and that have been partially affected by Islamist terror, fear often leads people to seek the responsibility for the terrorist attacks within Islam itself. Muslims in Germany, however, are clearly positioning themselves outside of this scenario, and refuse to regard Islam and Islamic extremism as identical to one another. Aiman Mazyek, head of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, took a clear stance in his speech:
With their act, they [the terrorists] have committed the greatest blasphemy. With their actions, they have betrayed Islam and dragged its principles through the mud. [...] We will not allow our faith to be abused. [...] And we, Non-Muslims and Muslims, will work even harder than before and be critics of our society and communities. Young people will invest more in education and volunteer to help Germany progress. [...] We are united by the fact that we oppose violence and intolerance [...] We are all Germany! (Mazyek, January 13, 2015).

The Shiite umbrella organization also condemned the attacks as an act against humanity: “With this horrible act the attackers have derided and insulted the Prophet Muhammad and the religion he proclaimed, Islam, more so than the caricaturists could ever have done. This attack is an act against humanity and simultaneously an attack on the values of Islam” (Islamic Community of Shiite Communities in Germany, Jan. 8, 2015). The Coordinating Council of German Muslims (which represents the four major umbrella organizations DITIB, VIKZ, the Islamic Council, and the ZMD, and acts as a point of contact in politics and society) announced, “Terror has no place in any religion. We strongly condemn this cowardly act. Our condolences and our deepest sympathy go out to the bereaved” (Pürülü, Jan. 7, 2015).

The opening passage of this Introduction serves to illustrate that Muslims in Germany take an active role in communicating that they perceive themselves as part of the democratic society, where they stand side by side with other representatives of society to condemn terroristic attacks that, by their means, are also directed towards them. In parallel with these clearly defined positions, and with the reflective processes within Muslim communities about reform and efforts to interpret the Koran and to fight over interpretational sovereignty, the wave of national, right-wing movements against a so-called Islamization of Europe continues to grow.

Starting in the winter of 2014, political “pedestrians,” who come together under the banner of PEGIDA, which stands for “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident,” began drawing attention to themselves and attempted to bundle the numerous and diffuse fears circulating among the German population. German politicians, for the most part, took an apologetic tone, instead of resolutely defending the boundaries of established democratic norms, according to which it is not permitted to defame people based on their national or ethnic origins. This lenient reaction to PEGIDA served to somehow acknowledge and justify the movement’s origin, which was borne in feelings of alienation among a population that fears being “swamped” by foreigners and by cultures that are perceived as contrary to the European way of life. The consensus was that these fears must be taken seriously, despite the percentage of Muslims in Germany being only approximately five percent (Haug, Müßig, and Stichs 2009).

But, we must go further back in history if we are to truly understand this situation: Germany did not turn into a country of immigrants overnight; the notion of being “swamped” by foreigners does not seem fitting to describe the process as it actually occurred. Ten years after World War II, Germany initiated an intensive recruitment of foreign workfare—called “guest workers.” After noticing that these people were not going back to their home countries, but were staying in Germany and even bringing their families, the government decided to impose a ban on recruitment in 1973. By the time of the recruitment ban (Anwerbestopp), 14 million migrants had already arrived in Germany, and only a few million had left (Bade and Oltmer 2003). Sixty years of migration history, if we start
counting from the first recruitment treaty of 1955, have transformed Germany into an immigrant society by empirical facticity. However, considering the political debate and popular attitudes, it seems that there is still a way to go until this facticity is also accepted affectively. In political terms, the first time Germany was described as an immigrant society occurred in 2001, although the country did not yet regard itself as such a society at that time. This was reflected in the defensive debates surrounding the reform of Germany’s citizenship legislation (2001), a result of which was that use of the principle of *ius sanguinis* (which means that a person could become a German citizen/national despite not being born in Germany, but who had at least one parent who was a German citizen, and which had been applied since 1913) was transformed into the right to choose a citizenship (*Optionsrecht*) by means of the principle of *ius soli*, which made it much easier to become a German national even if one had not been born as one. The discussions about a “German mainstream culture” (*Leitkultur*) that occurred during the citizenship reform debates highlighted the narrative and the cultural changes that would still need to be addressed within the majority society before Germany could consider itself a culturally diverse immigrant society, not only in the empirical sense, but also in terms of its self-understanding.

The year 2006 can be regarded as a turning point within the discourse on this topic: Germany’s role as host of the World Cup championship, and the coining of the slogan, “The world as a guest among friends,” was accompanied by a new perspective among Germans of their country being a welcoming place, where they made an effort to be perceived as open to the world, colorful, and friendly. Politically, this new orientation was supported by the first German Islam Conference (DIK), specifically created in 2006 by the Interior Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, to counter increasing alienation between Muslim and non-Muslim members of the population. The five years following 9/11 can be characterized as a time period of strong mistrust toward Muslims, with a series of security measures being installed by Otto Schily, the former minister of interior, in order to maintain surveillance of the Muslim population in Germany (Bleich 2009). Some scholars even criticized the DIK as being an event supporting reductionism in the light of security politics (Teczan 2012; Schiffauer 2008; Hafez 2014). Nevertheless, in that same year, 2006, the first-ever Integration Summit was held in the Chancellery, during which the phrase, “Integration is not a one-way street” was created. This can be regarded as an instance of paradigm-change, as, until then, integration had been described and perceived as mainly being an obligation on the part of migrants to assimilate into German society (Joppke 2007). The political culture in Germany began to become more pluralistic and diverse. In the wake of the Integration Summit, increasing numbers of organizations for migrants and associations became involved in the process, and their roles as participating, demanding, and constitutive participants also led to more visibility for migrant activists within the political discourse (Thränhardt 2013).

In light of these developments, it was all the more astounding to witness the success of an anti-Muslim book published in 2010 by Thilo Sarrazin, a former board member of the German Federal Bank, which presented a generally derogatory and culturally essentializing message (Heinz and Kluge 2012). The book, as well as the subsequent debates it unleashed, revealed entrenched lines of conflict regarding the question of whether or not cultural, ethnic, religious, and national minorities belonged to Germany. Within the following public debates, one could observe the instability of the narrative that Germany, in fact, was a country of immigration. The discourse focused on the central question of whether the largest religious minority in Germany—the Muslims and their religion of Islam—belonged to Germany or not. This question was hypothesized based on the integration ability of Muslims into German, or Western, culture. Central stereotypes of Muslims that were
discussed intensely within the public sphere during the Sarrazin-Debates were centered around violent behavior, segregation tendencies, and lack of educational aspiration (Mühe 2012; Meng 2015).

These stereotypes of Muslims being unable to integrate, combined with the message that German society is allegedly being foreignized—all linked with the accusation that politicians are simply sitting idly by and “betraying the nation”—have been repeatedly maneuvered into the discursive space and engaged with in the media since November 2013, as a result of widespread citizens’ protests under the banner of PEGIDA. Since the publication of Sarrazin’s book in 2010, certain stereotypes manifested within the public space, and are increasingly blazing a trail in political publications and driving the mobilization of right-wing movements (Geiges, Marg, and Walter 2015; Popp and Wassermann 2015).

This wave of stereotypes in the public discourse makes visible how fragile the aforementioned, and only recently achieved, self-understanding as a country of immigration is within German society. The readiness to be an open country of immigration seems to be continually called into question when it comes to the specific topic of Muslims in Germany. This religious minority seems to be a great challenge to the narrative of the new immigrant society. The outgrouping of Muslims can be observed within several controversial debates about the cultural, spatial, and symbolic recognition of religious diversity. “When it comes to Germany, we can observe a paradox of pluralism, whereby, on the one hand, pluralism is welcomed by the majority of the population, but on the other hand, it is simultaneously limited in regard to the largest minority group, in line with the motto: “We want diversity—but without Muslims!”

In light of this situation, two questions arise: 1) How does such a paradox come to be, and 2) What are the reasons for it? This article attempts to answer these two questions. In the following, we will outline Axel Honneth and Ferdinand Sutterlüty’s model of the normative paradox, and apply it to the recognition of religious rights of Muslims. This will be followed by a discussion about the possible reasons for the normative paradox in the case of Muslims.

THE MODEL OF THE NORMATIVE PARADOX

In his theory of recognition, Honneth delineates the three types of recognition that subjects require: love, rights, and solidarity. Subjects demand these in order to attain self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem, as part of successful identity building. According to Honneth, subjects attain self-confidence through recognition in their emotional relationships, self-respect through recognition in the sphere of rights, and self-esteem through intersubjective recognition as subjects with individual abilities and achievements (Honneth 1995). Normative paradoxes are created when legitimate demands for recognition produce counter-effects during the process of their implementation (Hartmann 2002). Honneth and Sutterlüty name four conditions that must be fulfilled in order for a normative paradox to exist (Honneth and Sutterlüty 2011, 73): 1) In the case of claims for recognition, “it must be possible to reconstruct the normative intentions;” 2) The implementation of claims for recognition “must be interpreted as normative progress according to broad understanding of society;” 3) The implementation must bring about “unwanted” and “unintended consequences caused by changing socio-economic, socio-structural and cultural contextual conditions […] that are not in line with the original goals or even diametrically opposed to them;” 4) The “initial guiding moral claims and ideals must continue to be
valid.” One example of a normative paradox pointed to by Honneth and Sutterlüty is the finding of Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) in their study “Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture,” whereby general achievement criteria in the educational system do not serve to decrease social inequalities and class privileges, but rather contribute to their perpetuation, as recurrent class-based differences form part of the evaluation of pupils and students (Honneth and Sutterlüty 2011, 78).

THE PARADOX OF THE EQUAL BELONGING OF MUSLIMS

The normative paradox being analyzed here occurs within the dimension of social esteem, and so we will briefly discuss this dimension in the following text. According to Honneth, subjects obtain self-esteem through mutual recognition of individual abilities and achievements. These conditions of recognition require the existence of a shared value horizon against which practices can be deemed to be worthy of recognition (Honneth 1995, 126-27). What Honneth has in mind here are constitutional societies with values and norms that provide equal amounts of freedom and autonomy for every member, and in which individuals can realize their aspirations in harmony with these values (Honneth 2002; 2014). This approach has been criticized as relativistic (Kauppinen 2002). Honneth also recognized this weakness in his theory, and clarified that his approach is based on the assumption that, in a historical comparison, constitutional and liberal societies provide the best conditions for individual fulfillment through reciprocal recognition in various dimensions (Honneth 2002). According to this view, lawful life practices that are incompatible with the values of the respective society cannot expect to receive social appreciation. In the first instance this is not a problem, if one starts with the assumption that, in modern civic-capitalistic societies, the provision of social appreciation is mainly derived from the generally shared merit principle (Honneth 2011). As a result, an individual can experience general social appreciation for merit-based life practices, and aspects of social appreciation for other forms of lawful life practices that do not correspond to the generally shared value horizon (Laitinen 2006). Problems begin to arise when subjects, and their individual abilities and achievements, experience general devaluation as a result of their belonging to a group that is associated with value-incompatible practices. This leads to disrespect that contradicts the value horizon of a liberal society (see Honneth 1995; Honneth and Stojanov 2007). Thus, on the one hand, there are lawful practices that cannot expect to be met with general social appreciation, while, on the other hand, it is against the rules of the society for these practices to be maligned.

The normative paradox of the equal belonging of Muslims consists of the claim for more recognition that arises as a result of the process of social integration. This claim is part of the generally shared self-understanding of a liberal democratic society. However, in the concrete case of its implementation, this claim experiences a negative valuation.

This argumentation will now be analyzed and supported with empirical data in relation to the cases of a circumcision ban, mosque construction, and the wearing of the headscarf by female teachers. These are main elements in the public discussion about the belonging of Muslims to German society in general, but are also concrete aspects when it comes to the acceptance of religious diversity. All of these elements are related to religious rights derived from the basic right to freedom of religion. These rights are legitimized through constitutional law or democratic means, from which the normative claim arises regarding the recognition owed to these practices, at least in the sense that they not be stigmatized or maligned. Seen from a historical perspective, the fact that such practices are not disrespected in such a manner can be regarded as normative progress for a society.
Paradoxically, however, the widely shared normative claim of Muslims to belonging, which derives from the basic right to religious freedom, is devalued in many parts of the population. In light of this situation, we will now elaborate on the aforementioned cases in more detail. The empirical data presented here stem from a nationwide representative telephone survey (dual-frame RDD) with 8,270 German-speaking participants aged 16 years and older, conducted between 24th of September 2013, and 15th of April 2014. The response rate was 15 percent. Decreasing and minimal response rates are an internationally observable phenomenon (Leeuw and Heer 2002). However, low response rates do not mean that the results of the survey are necessarily skewed (Keeter et al. 2006). Data were weighted to adjust for unequal probabilities of selection, and for over- or undersampling of certain subgroups (the variables used were sex, age, education, professional education, and federal state).

Circumcision

One of the main debates in the field of religion and politics over the last few years has centered on the question of religious circumcision for boys. This practice is part of both Islam and Judaism and represents a fundamental part of these religions (Rohe 2012; Knobloch 2012). This practice was tolerated in Germany for many years without legal regulation. In 2012, however, the district court of Cologne ruled that circumcision is a form of bodily harm, which led to a widespread and controversial debate in public. In this context, it was repeatedly claimed that Jewish and Muslim parents were disregarding the basic rights of their children, and that the wellbeing of their children was less important to them than their traditions. The debate’s construction of a veritable dualism between “German legal thought” and “Jewish-Muslim ritual” (Darnstädt 2012) went so far that the Central Council of Jews in Germany regarded it as a flaring up of anti-Semitism, and even Chancellor Angela Merkel intervened to warn against the introduction of a nationwide ban on circumcision (Jones). In the end, the German Bundestag passed a law allowing parents to have their children circumcised without a medical reason being required. The Bundestag justified the law in a resolution that stated “Jewish and Muslim religious life must continue to be possible in Germany” (Deutscher Bundestag 2012b).

Figure 1: Recognition of religious rights of Muslims – circumcision (N=8,270)

These attitudes about banning circumcision clearly show how the population is struggling with the right of cultural autonomy for religious minorities, which is prototypical for a post-migration society in which competing norms and values are being negotiated. This attitude is reflected in our survey results, which show that, almost three years after the circumcision debates, 60.4 percent of respondents still want to legally prohibit the circumcision of boys.
The draft legislation by the federal government “on the extent of personal care during circumcision of a male child” (Deutscher Bundestag 2012a) found a majority agreeing with the Bundestag that it should be banned. Despite final legislation maintaining the legality of religious circumcision, the majority of the population continues to remain in opposition. It is clear that the negative image of circumcision employed in the public debate continues to have an effect. We can therefore conclude that the exclusionary discourse shapes attitudes more so than the current state of legislation.

Mosque Construction

While the issue of circumcision equally affects two religious minorities in Germany—Jews and Muslims—there have been several socio-political disputes over the last few years that concerned only the right of Muslims to visibly live their faith in Germany. This includes recurring debates about the construction of representative mosques.

There are currently 2,600 mosques in Germany (Häusler 2011), most of them located in back courtyards, on industrial sites, or in former stores (Leggewie, Joost, and Rech 2002). As they do not possess domes or minarets, they are not immediately recognizable as mosques from the outside.

The visible and representative mosques that have been constructed since the 1990s are an expression of the fact that Muslims have increasingly regarded Germany as their new home (Kraft 2002; Rommelspacher 2009). Prestigious mosque structures have repeatedly been the source of great conflicts, for example in the cities and neighborhoods of Cologne-Ehrenfeld, Duisburg-Marxloh, Berlin-Heinersdorf or Leipzig-Gohlis. In addition to the actual mosque building, the possibility of the muezzin call and the construction of minarets were particularly polemicized during these conflicts. The ban on minarets that was firmly established in the Swiss constitution via referendum in 2009 (Behloul 2010), further fueled the German debate.5

Mosque construction projects are of great significance in this context because it is in this arena that negotiations occur regarding the symbolic position within the urban space granted to Muslims by the established non-Muslim majority population (Leggewie, Joost, and Rech 2002).

As shown by the numbers in the graph below, 42.2 percent of the total population of Germany agrees with limiting the construction of publicly visible mosques:

Figure 2: Recognition of religious rights of Muslims—mosque construction (N=8,270)
The acceptance of the construction of publicly visible mosques represents a gauge of the recognition of Muslim life in Germany from an urban planning and spatial perspective. The construction of visible mosques, therefore, represents an equalization of Islam with other religions, because the presence of visible buildings of other religions, such as Christianity and Judaism, is deemed a matter of course in Germany and is not the subject of public debates. Here we are talking about the completely practical recognition of the fact that Muslims and Islam belong in Germany, and belong in the cityscape, to the same extent that other religions and their members belong. In regard to this question, we see that about 40 percent of the population in Germany is not willing to grant Muslims this degree of spatial recognition. It is possible that the spatial presence leads to competition with those who feel that their prerogative, in terms of symbolic establishment, in the public space is being challenged (Spielhaus and Färber 2006). As a result, a conflict-laden situation has arisen between, on the one hand, the negotiation of the democratically legitimate fundamental right (namely the right to not be prevented from freely practicing one’s religion), and on the other hand, the concept of not visibly changing the social space in a way that would reflect religious plurality. It must be noted that this exclusion is mainly observable in regard to Muslims and not toward other religious minorities.

The Headscarf

Although the issue of circumcision affects the private life of religious believers, and the construction of mosques affects the public presence of Muslim life in the social space, there are also a number of conflicts that revolve specifically around the relationship between state and religion. These conflicts became apparent in the debates on the level of neutrality in schools when it comes to questions of religion and worldview, debates that have been held in the last few years regarding crucifixes that, even today, still hang in most classrooms in Bavaria, as well as the wearing of a headscarf by female Muslim teachers. Both of these conflicts ultimately progressed to the level of the Federal Constitutional Court.

In March 2015, the Federal Constitutional Court made public its decision that, when it comes to adherence to religious regulations regarding the covering of the body, even teachers can refer to the basic right to freedom of religion (1 BvR 471/10 and 1 BvR 1181/10). According to this ruling, the wearing of a headscarf by a Muslim teacher is protected by the right to religious freedom guaranteed in the constitution.

In the political conflict surrounding the wearing of the headscarf by teachers, participants continually debate what role and significance the headscarf truly has in Islam and among Muslim women. One answer from the perspective of Muslim women was provided by the study, “Muslim Life in Germany” (MLD), commissioned by the German Islam Conference (DIK), according to which more than one quarter (27.6 percent) of all Muslim women in Germany wear a headscarf (Haug, Müssig, and Stichs 2009, 186). The main motive for wearing a headscarf, cited by 92.3 percent of respondents, was that covering the head is a religious obligation. In second place, cited by 42.3 percent of respondents, was the reason that a headscarf provides security to the wearer. The third most frequently noted reason was the wish to be recognizable as a Muslim. Expectations on the part of others, such as family members and/or spouses, was given a subordinate place among the answers, with only 6 to 7 percent of respondents offering this as a reason (Haug, Müssig, and Stichs 2009, 197). Based on this study, for most Muslim women in Germany who wear the headscarf it is a self-determined act of religious expression. However, almost half (48.6 percent) of the
German population thinks that teachers should not wear headscarves. As these data stem from a time prior to the headscarf decision made public in March 2015, it is possible that changes in opinion have since occurred in regard to this issue. A survey that was conducted several days after the repeal of the headscarf ban by the Federal Constitutional Court implies that such a change has occurred, and comes to the conclusion that a majority of 53 percent of respondents are in favor of the court’s decision, while a minority of 37 percent believe the decision to be wrong (TNS/Emnid 2015). Whether attitudes toward the wearing of the headscarf by female teachers changed permanently, or whether the change came about as a result of the court’s decision, is a question that requires further research. What is notable about these results is the fact that, in comparison to our survey, the number of respondents who agree with the wearing of the headscarf barely increased, while the number of people who reject the headscarf has somewhat decreased.

![Figure 3: Recognition of religious rights of Muslims – headscarf (N=8,270)](image)

We have arrived at the paradox of the equal belonging of Muslims via theoretical deductions based on the assumption that constitutional law and the Federal Constitutional Court are central institutions of a liberal democratic society, and that these institutions are generally recognized within that society. The acceptance of these institutions can be illustrated on the basis of empirical data. Representative surveys show that 91 percent of respondents place great trust in the Basic Law, and that 86 percent place great trust in the Federal Constitutional Court (Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach 2014, 2). Furthermore, 85 percent of respondents report that they are proud of the freedom and of the rule of law in Germany (Vorländer 2009, 15). These widely accepted constitutional institutions legitimized both the circumcision of boys for religious reasons, as well as the construction of religious buildings, and most recently, the wearing of the headscarf by female teachers. We were able to show, however, that these three rights are viewed disparagingly by a large part of the population, and that a willingness to restrict these rights exists within the population. The resulting situation can, therefore, be identified as constituting a paradox of equal belonging of Muslims. This paradox is also reflected in the high levels of agreement of respondents with the statement “Muslims in Germany have the right to make claims.” Sixty-seven percent of respondents agreed with this statement.
The response to the statement “Muslims should receive more recognition from us” confirmed this view, with 68 percent of respondents agreeing with this statement, which also implies that there is a lack of recognition afforded to Muslims.

Despite anti-Muslim sentiment that has been empirically proven to exist, and to reach all the way into the center of society (Zick and Klein 2014; Decker, Kiess, and Brähler 2014; Pollack et al. 2014; Foroutan 2012), the German population is also characterized by a high level of agreement (almost 70 percent of the population) with the idea that Muslims in
Germany are worthy of more recognition. However, when the population is presented with demands for specific religious rights, the result, paradoxically, is a reversal of opinion among the population. This reversal is demonstrated by the responses that show that 60 percent of the population would ban circumcision, almost half would ban the wearing of the headscarf by teachers, and more than 40 percent would limit the construction of mosques. Here we can clearly see that the attitude of the population is incongruent with German legislation, which is built on the concept of a plural democracy with rights for minorities—which includes the right to religious self-determination (Basic Law, Article 4(1), (2)).

**POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE PARADOX OF THE EQUAL BELONGING OF MUSLIMS**

We were unable to find any studies that deal with the normative paradox of the recognition of Muslims. Sutterlüty (2011) applies the model of normative paradox to interethnic relationships, and provides the first clues to possible reasons for diversity-based paradoxes. In his fieldwork conducted in two city districts with high ethnic-cultural diversity and a high proportion of socially underprivileged population groups, he finds a “paradox of ethnic equality.” Thus, “German residents” in principle agree that members of other ethnic population groups should have equal opportunities for access to the central activity areas of society, but the realization of that equality principle in terms of social upward mobility for minority groups leads to negative and exclusionary classifications by the majority group. In this process, the majority group does not visibly and logically devaluate, or exclude the minority ethnic group as such, but instead attributes negative behavioral characteristics to it.

Sutterlüty sees the motivations for the negative classification of ethnic minorities as resulting from economic competition, as well as from beliefs about ethnicity based on heritage. We would like to offer two explanations for the normative paradox of the equal belonging of Muslims in which these factors may also play a role. We cannot test these explanations empirically with our data, but they appear sufficiently plausible in terms of their theoretical nature. The paradoxes to which we refer arise as a result of a lack of democratic awareness, or despite existing democratic awareness.

Ideally speaking, liberal democracies embody the ideals of a free society based on a constitutional framework (Fukuyama 1992). Though the path to this ideal state is arduous (Fraser 1990), liberal democracies are characterized by achievements such as freedom of association, religion, speech, mobility, and political organization, which provide individuals and minorities with opportunities for self-realization and with protection (Kymlicka and Cohen-Almagor 2000). In light of these achievements, and based on the equality principle, this means that, “For all their ongoing dissent on questions of world views and religious doctrines, citizens are meant to respect one another as free and equal members of their political community” (Habermas 2006, 5). It is conceivable that many citizens are not aware of these aspects of the democratic process. For example, Honneth proposes that one explanation of the racism among young people in Eastern Germany is a lack of democratic awareness within socialization practices (Honneth and Stojanov 2007). Following on from this explanation, one could surmise that the reason for the observed paradox regarding equal belonging of Muslims stems from a lack of democratic awareness among parts of the population, which leads to these groups failing to identify the religious rights of Muslims as being part of the democratic process that should be respected.
When democratic awareness based on the religious rights of minorities does exist, i.e., when subjects consciously regard the provision of religious rights as part of democratic processes, then the disrespect of constitutionally legitimized behavioral practices can be seen as an anti-democratic act. If this disrespect is only enacted toward certain groups, i.e., Muslims or Jews, then this behavior can be identified as Islamophobia or anti-Semitism (Shooman 2014), because this behavior involves the disparaging of Muslim and Jewish life practices that are grounded in the constitutional right to religious freedom. In this sense, the paradox observed here may lie in the fact that the democratic self-understanding of citizens stops when it comes to specific religious practices. In other words, society is generally accepting of Muslims, but there are obstacles that get in the way.

CONCLUSION

In this article, we analyzed the normative paradox of the equal belonging of Muslims within the field of social acceptance. The act of disrespecting lawful religious practices of Muslims does not fit into the value horizon of a liberal democratic society, and yet it does happen. These negative attitudes may not have any broad social consequences at first, and may, perhaps, only be observed by affected Muslims, but they possess the potential to challenge overarching democratic principles.

The citizens of Germany have exclusionary positions toward Muslims as visible political agents. Sixty percent of the respondents believe that the ritual of circumcision for boys should be legally banned. Nearly half of respondents (48 percent) support the statement that female teachers should not wear a headscarf, and 42 percent support restricting the construction of mosques. However, the practice of religious rituals and the construction of sacred buildings in the public space are civic and religious basic rights, and the urge to limit them is a sign of a lack of democratic awareness.

The attacks on mosques over the last few months in Germany, as well as the qualitative intensification of verbal protest, i.e., in defamatory missives to public representatives of Muslim minority groups, their alliance partners (journalists, scholars, activists), and Muslim individuals, and the increase in anti-Islamic protests, such as in the wake of PEGIDA marches, all point to the fact that a part of the population is decidedly willing to turn their attitudes into action. Heterogeneous societies shaped by immigration discourses must do more to educate their populations about basic democratic rights, and must more clearly address the dangers of disrespect and exclusion present to immigrant societies.
ENDNOTES

1 We can observe a great openness and engagement toward refugees at the moment (Köcher 2015). However, at this point we cannot foresee whether this fundamental willingness to help will affect the attitudes of people toward Muslims in general. At the same time, we can also observe attacks on refugee accommodations. Upcoming research on the transformation process in Germany during the refugee crisis will examine the impact this has had on attitudes toward Muslims.

2 For a critical discussion, see Fraser and Honneth 2003.

3 The study was conducted by the Berlin Institute for Integration and Migration Research at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. The technical report (Beigang, Kalkum, and Schrenker 2014) with a detailed description of the methodology and implementation of the survey can be obtained under the following link: https://www.projekte.hu-berlin.de/de/junited/Forschung/repraesentativbefragung/methodenbericht

4 The categories “agree,” “disagree” and “no response” are aggregates of multiple answer choices: The category “agree” includes the answers “completely agree” and “mostly agree;” the category “disagree” includes the responses “completely disagree” and “mostly disagree;” and the category “no response” includes the answers “don’t know” and “refusals.” Due to potential rounding errors, the sum of all responses cited in the study may not always correspond to the total value of 100 percent.

5 This was reflected in the debate on Islam criticism in Germany at the beginning of 2010. See the compilation of the Heymat Project: http://www.heymat.hu-berlin.de/debatte_islamkritik, last accessed on 26.11.2014.

6 These differences could also result from methodological reasons, such as differently worded questions.

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Islamophobia and Criticism of Islam: An Empirical Study of Explanations Using Representative Surveys from Germany

A. Heyder
M. Eisentraut
University of Marburg, Germany

-ISLAMOPHOBIA STUDIES JOURNAL-
VOLUME 3, NO. 2, Spring 2016, PP. 178-198.

Published by:
Islamophobia Research and Documentation Project,
Center for Race and Gender, University of California, Berkeley.

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Islamophobia and Criticism of Islam: An Empirical Study of Explanations Using Representative Surveys from Germany

A. Heyder
M. Eisentraut
University of Marburg, Germany

ABSTRACT: The phenomenon of Islamophobia has been a widely discussed topic in scientific research, politics, and media over the last decade. Especially in Germany, a country with high levels of immigration, and with Muslims constituting the largest foreign community of faith, the discourse concerning the integration of Islamic culture has been prominent on the political and public agenda. Recently, discussions have reached a very intense level with respect to the current acting protest movement “PEGIDA” (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the occident) in Dresden. One of the most heavily discussed issues at present is the question of whether this movement is anti-Islamic, or does it just criticize the Islamic culture or religion without dealing with social prejudices.

Based on three representative surveys from Germany (2005, 2007, and 2011), this study examines several causes of Islamophobia. Specifically, different forms of criticism of Islam are investigated including the effects of education and age using structural equation modeling.

INTRODUCTION

There is a large potential for prejudice against Muslims and their religion, which has been demonstrated beyond just scientific studies. For example, in Germany, one can observe this by the recurrent protest marches of the so-called “PEGIDA” (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the occident) movement. This group has found high resonance in parts of the population, and, since its start in October 2014, it has attracted up to 25,000 followers who have articulated their fear of Islam and a foreign infiltration of the country. Meanwhile, there are already offshoots emerging, such as the so-called “Pegida UK” in Great Britain. Faced with these developments, the subject of Islamophobia is of high relevance to the present situation.

This study attempts to expose the phenomenon of Islamophobia on different levels. Therefore, we will first address what “Islamophobia” means in the societal, theoretical, and empirical areas. In addition, we propose several aspects to differentiate between Islamophobia and critical attitudes toward Muslims and Islam. Subsequently, we will briefly elucidate three of the most important explanatory factors for social prejudice: authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and anomia.

This empirical study is based on three German representative surveys from 2005, 2007, and 2011 stemming from the German long-term project entitled “Group Focused Enmity” (GFE—for an overview see Zick et al., 2008). The analyses, using the data of 2005, deal with the differences between Islamophobia, and secular and gender-referred criticism of Islam (for an intensive discussion about the role of women in the Muslim world see Abu-Lughod, 2002). Using surveys from 2007 and 2011, we attempt to replicate parts of these results. All three analyses include authoritarianism, anomia, and social dominance as predictors for Islamophobia. In addition, we control for effects of age and education. The final section addresses the question of whether the relationships between the predictors and Islamophobia are stable over the three time points.
Without going into a far-reaching discussion about the definition of Islamophobia, or related constructs like anti-Islamism, hostility against Islam, or anti-Muslim hostility (see further articles in this and former volumes, also see Islamophobia Studies Yearbook and several articles in Patterns of Prejudice), we will briefly address the origin of the term Islamophobia as well as the origin of the phenomenon itself. From the perspective of philosophy of science, there is no right or wrong definition. It is rather a question of framing a useful nominal definition for scientific purposes.

The term “Islamophobia”—related to the English term “xenophobia”—initially became popular in the sciences, and in the broader political and public spheres because of a report from the British think tank, Runnymede Trust (1997—for an intensive discussion on the conceptualization of Islamophobia, see Sayyid, 2014). Substantively, the report discusses prejudice against, and fear of, Muslim populations in Western societies. This particular year was not the beginning of the phenomenon, but it was the first time that a large publication dealt with the subject and labeled it Islamophobia (Allen, 2010). Thereafter, the term “Islamophobia” has stood for a debate between two extreme views. On the one hand, every kind of criticism of Islam or Muslims is generally condemned as hostility against Muslims and the Islamic religion; on the other hand, the decline of the occident is conjured because of the growing Muslim populations in Western societies, and this danger must be combated, often with the use of force. Both positions are based on a variety of reasons and justifications, which can be political or personal (Allen, 2010).

The origins of the Western fear of Islam go far back in history, and are related to what is currently discussed in the context of the phenomenon of Islamophobia. It is a modern continuation of the feelings initialized by the shock of Christians as a result of Islamic expansion in the 7th century. This first dissemination of a new, concurring world religion is the fundament of the current widespread fear known as the “forward march of Islam, a fear that was revived, for example, in the 16th century when the Ottoman Turks massively invaded Europe. This very long tradition of distrust and fear of Muslims in Europe experienced a new dramatic peak after the events of 9/11, a terrorist act that had much more far-reaching and severe consequences for the USA than for Europe. Thus, at the beginning of the new millennium, intense debates about the future role of Muslims in Western societies again became commonplace, as they also did in Germany.

One reason for the polarization associated with Islam in the German population is that Muslims comprise the largest immigration group in that country, which results in issues of conflict such as integration, culture, and religion. The difficult relationship between German policy and the public with respect to the subject of Islam and integration is obvious in various public debates in the media, especially after spectacular Islamist attacks, or during the “hot” periods right before elections. Beyond clear anti-Muslim statements, the discussions deal with the question of where the division takes place between Islamophobia and the criticism of Islam. People can have prejudicial attitudes toward Muslims and their religion but this is different from a critical attitude toward Muslims and Islam.

ISLAMOPHOBIA AND PREJUDICE

If Islamophobia is not simply the same as a severe form of a critical attitude, the question arises as to what social prejudice is. Gordon W. Allport, one of the fathers of the field of prejudice research, defines it as, "...an avertive or hostile attitude toward a person who
belongs to a group, simply because he belongs to that group, and is therefore presumed to have the objectionable qualities ascribed to the group” (1954). Without diving into the vast literature on attitudes, stereotypes, prejudice, discrimination, and so on (Allport, 1954; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Brown, 1995; Dovidio et al., 1996; Schütz and Six, 1996; Duckitt et al., 2002), we will very briefly describe the term prejudice in the context in which we use it here.

Almost all of the experts in the social research field share at least the conceptual view that prejudice is an attitude. With reference to the “three-components-model” (Rosenberg and Hovland, 1960), attitudes consist of an affective, cognitive, and conative component. Following this general concept, we view cognitive negative stereotypes, affective antipathy, dislike and readiness, or intention for discriminatory behavior, as components of prejudicial attitudes. This can also be found in the definition given by Brown (1995): “[…] the holding of derogatory social attitudes or cognitive beliefs, the expression of negative affect, or the display of hostile or discriminatory behavior toward members of a group on account of their membership of that group.” (ibid.:8). Nonetheless, we do not share the view that real behavior is part of a prejudicial attitude, and, therefore, we do not place importance on the difference between attitude and behavior. As Allport has noted in this sense, “Although most barking […] does not lead to biting, yet there is never a bite without previous barking” (1954).

**ISLAMOPHOBIA VERSUS CRITICISM OF ISLAM**

What is the difference, therefore, between Islamophobia and criticism of Islam? As clarified above, the first, clearly, can be called social prejudice. And, generally speaking, the latter can be called a cognitive belief about critical aspects with respect to rules, norms, and practices within parts (some groups, some states, etc.) of the collective community of Islamic peoples (“Ummah”) but without using negative group-based stereotypes attributing these negative aspects to all the members of the whole community. Recently, using representative survey data, Jürgen Leibold and Steffen Kühnel (2008) conducted the first empirical study in Germany that differentiated between Islamophobia and the criticism of Islam.

There is an obvious parallel with respect to the difference between social prejudice and the fact-based criticism of Israel in the field of research on anti-Semitism (for a discussion about similarities between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, see Klug, 2014). In a nutshell, A. Heyder and colleagues have previously conducted a study in 2005 based on the concept of “communication latency” of anti-Semitism, developed by Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb (1986). In the course of this study they postulated theory-driven differentiated criteria with respect to the criticism of Israel that had nothing to do with anti-Semitism, and they tested the assumptions with empirical representative data for Germany (Heyder and Iser, 2005; Heyder et al. 2005). Transformed to the purposes of the present study, criticism of Islam has to be regarded as part of an anti-Islamic attitude if it includes at least one of the following elements:

1. **Social prejudice**, the use of anti-Islamic negative stereotypes, affective antipathy, or dislike and readiness or intention for discriminatory behavior. Negative attributes are ascribed to Muslim people in general on account of their membership in the Islamic community. Example: Because the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” is aggressive and violent, all Muslims are aggressive and violent.
2. The application of **double standards in judging the policies of Islamic states**. Particular political measures or practices are criticized in Islamic states but not in other
countries. Example: The practice of the death penalty in Saudi Arabia and the USA (just to mention two states beside dozens of others).

3. The generalization of anti-Islamic prejudices to all the Islamic states, making these states into a “collective Islam.” Characteristics that serve to justify prejudices against Muslims are generalized to Islamic states and are instrumentalized to convict and isolate Islamic countries. Example: Islamic countries are violent.

4. The opposite case is also feasible following the same logic, namely, when the criticism of some Islamic states is projected onto all Muslims and they are held responsible for some states’ actions. Here, criticism of some Islamic countries’ policies is instrumentalized to justify prejudices against all Muslims. Example: The practice of the death penalty in an Islamic state justifies negative stereotypes about Muslim people.

**PREDICTORS FOR ISLAMOPHOBIA**

There are several theoretical explanations that have been applied in relation to the prediction of prejudice against specific groups including the “theory of anomie” (Durkheim 1970 [orig. 1897], Merton 1938), the “authoritarian personality” (Fromm, 1941, Adorno et al., 1950), “relative deprivation theory” (Stouffer et al., 1949), “contact hypotheses” (Allport, 1954), “social identity theory” (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), “social dominance theory” (Sidanius et al., 1991), or “integrated threat theory” (Stephan and Stephan, 2000), just to mention a few of the more well-known approaches. At the time of this writing, thousands of books and articles, presenting a multitude of empirical research reports and theoretical discussions to cover and modify these theories, have been presented. Some of these theoretical approaches were also integrated into the GFE project.

For purposes of inviting comparison, our study includes the following theoretical approaches and concepts: authoritarianism, anomia, and social dominance orientation. In addition to these, we include the well-known “demographic” factors of level of education and age of respondents.

**AUTHORITARIANISM**

“The authoritarian personality” (TAP, Adorno et al. 1950) can be called the “milestone of empirical social research” (Fahrenberg and Steiner 2004). It is still one of the most-applied theories for the explanation of social prejudice.

The origin of this theory goes back to the studies in the 1930s by Erich Fromm (1941). Adorno et al. (1950) assumes that a particular type of parental upbringing produces a particular type of personality. According to TAP, the childhood surroundings represent the strongest influence in the development of the authoritarian personality. This psychological influence is shaped primarily by socialization in the parental home and a parental style of upbringing characterized by a strong emphasis on conformity to conventional moral ideas and “good behavior,” that is associated with the use of strong punishments for disciplining children (Adorno et al., 1950), although other socialization processes in the wider family, school, and peer groups also play a role in the development of authoritarianism. The authoritarian personality is also characterized by a strongly submissive attitude toward authority, a simplifying and rigid cognitive style, and a strong tendency to hold right-wing and racist ideas. This is linked to a further feature of the authoritarian personality: a pronounced willingness to entertain prejudices toward all that is “foreign” or “different” and everyone who “thinks differently.”
The research conducted by the authors of TAP was largely guided by the assumption “that the political, economic, and social convictions of an individual often form a broad and coherent pattern, as if bound together by a ‘mentality’ or ‘spirit,’ and that this pattern is an expression of deep-lying trends in his personality” (Adorno et al., 1950). In their thorough analysis of TAP, William Stone and Lawrence Smith (1993) conclude that the essence of the authoritarian personality is that such individuals submit to the authorities they respect, and oppress out-groups no matter the composition. In other words, the out-groups suffering discrimination may be Muslims, Jews, foreigners, homosexuals, disabled people, or other stereotyped groups.

Bob Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1998) has reformulated Theodor Adorno et al.’s (1950) theory, and refuses the assumption of a “deep-lying trend in personality.” Rather, he talks about a socially-learned and modifiable attitude, called right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). Furthermore, he has reduced the original nine dimensions to just three: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. The second of these dimensions was assessed in the GFE surveys. Authoritarian aggression consists of a refusing attitude against all parts of a society that are perceived as unpleasant, such as “outsiders,” “troublemakers,” or “criminals.” This leads to a devaluation of, and hostility against, “outgroups” as, in this case, the Muslims living in Germany (e.g. Leibold and Kühnel, 2008; Leibold et al., 2012).

**SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION**

Although it represents the outcome of twenty-five years of research, the Social Dominance Theory (SDT) of Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto (Sidanius et al., 1991, Sidanius and Pratto, 1999, Sidanius et al., 2004, Pratto et al., 2006, Ho et al., 2012) is very new in comparison to the classical theory of the authoritarian personality. Sidanius and Pratto regard their interdisciplinary theory as a synthesis of different approaches that have developed in the field of intergroup attitude research.

SDT emanates from the fundamental assumption that all human societies are structured as systems of group-based social hierarchies. In a nutshell, this means that the hierarchical social structure comprises one or more dominant and hegemonic groups at the top of society, with one or more subordinate groups located in the bottom social strata. The dominant groups are characterized by over-proportional possession of positive values, of “all those material and symbolic things for which people strive” (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). SDT also assumes that dominant groups have the greatest interest in stabilizing the system and the associated differences in status.

Three processes play a stabilizing role: *Aggregated individual discrimination* describes everyday discrimination against particular socially constructed groups in society, such as foreigners, disabled people, homosexuals, etc. Collectively, these individual acts of everyday discrimination lead to a stabilization of group-based inequality. *Aggregated institutional discrimination* relates to a society’s institutions, with all their rules, procedures, and unequal treatment of different groups. These institutions may be private, such as shops, businesses, and banks, or public and state institutions such as schools, courts, and job centers, etc. Finally, *behavioral asymmetry* reinforces the system of group-based hierarchies through the ways minorities and subordinate groups can be repressed, manipulated, and controlled by the dominant groups. Here, “asymmetry” means the differences in the behavior repertoires between individuals belonging to the respective groups, with their different degrees of access.
to resources of social power. This unequal distribution of options reinforces and amplifies the group-based hierarchical relationships within the social system.

These stabilizing processes occur within three stratification systems, the so-called trimorphic structure of group-based social hierarchy (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). In the age system, the adults generally have greater power and influence, and, consequently, dominate children and younger adults. In the gender system, the men, who have more political and social power, dominate the women. In the third system, the arbitrary set system, processes are governed by group memberships and differences, which are socially constructed through particular characteristics.

Lastly, the system of group-based hierarchies, social inequality, and acts of discrimination is justified morally and intellectually by means of legitimizing myths (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) that are composed of attitudes, social values, convictions, stereotypes, and ideologies. Negative attitudes toward minorities living in a society, in the sense of social prejudices, also fall under this broad definition of myths. The relationship to social dominance orientation can be found in its definition: “SDO is defined as the degree to which individuals desire and support group-based hierarchy and the domination of ‘inferior’ groups by ‘superior’ groups.”

ANOMIA

Anomia is a societal condition of absence of clear societal norms and values and of disorientation. This can be an overall societal status of anomie, which primarily can be found in transitional countries, or, also, can be the anomic situation of an individual who is uprooted from his or her habitual social environment (Wasmuth and Waldmann, 2005: 24). Early on, Emile Durkheim postulated anomic suicide, which results from the discrepancy between the needs of an individual and the possibilities to realize these needs (1970 [Orig. 1897]). Although Durkheim and, in reference to him, Merton (1938) relate the term “anomie” to the macro level, Srole (1956) labeled the individual condition as anomia. Here, the anomia-scale is an indicator for the subjective condition of anomia. However, this scale does not really measure the lack of norms of anomie, but, instead, the subjective assessment of one’s own chances in the future, or the individual meaninglessness (Friedrichs, 2004).

Anomia was used as a predictor for social prejudice in numerous classical studies (e.g., Srole, 1956, Roberts and Rokeach, 1956, McDill, 1961). In recent years, this predictor has also been utilized in several publications in Germany (e.g., Kühnel and Schmidt, 2002, Hüpping, 2006, Legge and Heitmeyer, 2012). Hüpping, for example, explains the causal effect of anomia on Islamophobia as follows. On the background of an increasing desire for the past, and related fixed patterns of cultural values and norms, the entry of Islam into the Western culture is viewed as responsible for the decline of formerly existing rules and other aids for orientation (Hüpping, 2006). Taking into account that attitudes toward Muslims should also be influenced by situative societal circumstances, the stability between the relationship of anomia and Islamophobia is of special interest in empirical analyses.

To measure the condition of anomie, items are frequently used that express the feeling of difficulty to distinguish between right and wrong in the context of complex societies suffering from the lack of fixed tenets and traditional values and norms. The latter gives meaning and orientation to the individual and order for society. Thus, the attitudes are not immanent in the personality as such but are a consequence of experiencing deep feelings of insecurity, of anomie conditions (Hüpping, 2006). In this sense, anomia is clearly different from other predictors of Islamophobia because it is much more affected by situative influences, compared to authoritarianism or social dominance orientation.
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE LATENT CONSTRUCTS

In the following summary, we will show how the three predictive latent constructs are theoretically interrelated, which has consequences for empirical analyses. This clarification is sometimes missing in empirical research, and this represents an obstruction to theory testing and theoretical derivatives. With reference to the question of the (causal) relationship between social dominance orientation (SDO), (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), (Altemeyer, 1981), different approaches can be found in the literature (e.g., Sidanius and Pratto, 1999; Pratto et al., 2006; Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001). Following John Duckitt (2001) and Küpper and Zick (2005), we assume that both constructs equally explain prejudices of social minorities. They represent complementary perspectives, and are in a close relation with the devaluation of out-groups. Empirically, their relationship is correlative rather than causal. SDO and RWA are both regarded here as generalized or ideological attitudes (see Duckitt et al., 2002; Six et al., 2001).

However, the relationship between anomia and RWA is much more difficult to clarify. The literature and the empirical results are not undisputed. Basically, there are two opposing theoretical models. Herbert McCloskey and Hohn Schaar (1965) postulate that anomia influences RWA. They describe anomia as a psychological condition that is characterized by a desperate search for clear rules and stable circumstances. The world is perceived as unsteady and too complex - a condition that causes a generalized aggression consisting of a combination of anger and fear. Hence, on the one hand, authoritarian individuals tend to develop anomic feelings because an authoritarian attitude is associated with a strong desire for secureness and fixed structures, and on the other hand, any elements that could threaten this secureness will be confronted with aggression and hostility. This theoretical idea can also be transformed to SDO. Individuals with a strong SDO should equally be susceptible to anomic conditions because they also strive for stable societal structures in the form of group-based hierarchies. An alternative view, proposed by Leo Srole (1956) and Peer Scheepers et al. (1992), suggests that authoritarianism causes anomia. Schlüter et al. summarize: “Individuals who feel normless and meaningless adopt authoritarian attitudes in order to regain orientation in an environment perceived as increasingly complex and irritating. Thus, according to this perspective, authoritarianism serves as a coping-mechanism for individuals who are anomic.” (2007). These authors have tested latent autoregressive, cross-lagged, models using data from a three-wave panel study including authoritarianism and anomia. One of their main results was: “Thus, we conclude that in this study McClosky and Schaar’s suggestion (1965) that it is authoritarianism which causes anomia gains most support, albeit the data revealed some evidence for a reverse effect of anomia.” (2007). Later, Voelkle et al. performed a similar analysis using a five-wave panel design. Their results support the former analyses: “Thus, our results support the hypothesis of McClosky and Schaar (1965) that it is more likely that authoritarianism causes anomia than vice versa.” (2012). According to these findings, we also postulate that authoritarianism causes anomia. This, even when not tested with panel data, is also valid for social dominance orientation, taking into account that both latent constructs share conceptually common aspects.

RWA, SDO, and also anomia should have a causal influence on Islamophobia, which has been empirically demonstrated in several German studies (e.g. Leibold et. al., 2012, Hüpping, 2006). Instead, we postulate that these predictors should have little or no effect on
critical attitudes toward Islam. Criticism of Islam cannot be equated with Islamophobia, as explicated above.

On the basis of the theoretical background delineated above, we derive the following main hypotheses, which will be empirically tested:

- H1: Islamophobia is empirically distinct from different forms of criticism of Islam.
- H2: The higher the level of authoritarian attitude of a person, the stronger is his or her tendency toward Islamophobia.
- H3: The higher the level of social dominance orientation of a person, the stronger is his or her tendency toward Islamophobia.
- H4: The higher the level of anomia of a person, the stronger is his or her tendency toward Islamophobia.
- H5: The higher the level of social dominance orientation of a person, the stronger is his or her anomia.
- H6: The higher the level of authoritarian attitude of a person, the stronger is his or her anomia.
- H7: The predictors for Islamophobia should have little or no effect on critical attitudes toward Islam.

**EMPIRICAL ANALYSES**

In the following section we present the empirical analyses to test the above derived hypotheses. It is divided into three subsections. The analyses using the 2005 data deal with the differences between Islamophobia and secular and equality-referred criticism of Islam. Using the 2007 and 2011 data, we attempt to replicate parts of these results. All of the three analyses include authoritarianism, anomia, and social dominance as predictors for Islamophobia. In addition, we control for age and education effects. The last subsection deals with the question of whether the relationships between the predictors and Islamophobia are stable over the three time points.

All of the descriptive results were produced using the statistical package SPSS. The causal relationship analyses were done by using structural equation models (SEM, Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1989). The software, also distributed by SPSS, is called AMOS (Arbuckle, 2009).

**ISLAMOPHOBIA, SECULAR AND EQUALITY-REFERRED CRITICISM OF ISLAM (2005)**

In the scientific literature, one can find several different empirical operationalizations for measuring Islamophobia. In this study, we will only present the measurement of Islamophobia with reference to the surveys used herein. Different concepts and measurements can be found, for example, in Imhoff and Recker (2012) or Lee et al. (2009).

In the course of the German long-term project “group focused enmity” (GFE—for an overview see Zick et al., 2008), ten representative surveys were conducted between 2002 and 2011. Beside several latent constructs, which are part of the so called “syndrome of group focused enmity,” including racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, heterophobia, and prejudices against jobless, homeless, or handicapped people, the research team developed different items for measuring Islamophobia. During the project time period of 10
years, only one short scale consisting of two items was continuously recorded for Islamophobia. In addition, other item formulations were used in some of the GFE surveys from time to time. The two items, which should measure the core of an Islamophobic attitude are: “One should prohibit the immigration of Muslims to Germany,” and, “Because of the many Muslims here, I sometimes feel like a stranger in my own country” (see Leibold and Kühnel, 2003). The first statement reflects the undesirability of Muslim immigrants in Germany, and represents the conative component of an attitude. It measures, not a concrete behavioral intention, but a political claim for the strict prohibition of immigration of Muslims. The second puts stress on the strangeness of Muslims in relation to the autochthon German population. It represents the feelings of fear and threat as the affective component of a prejudicial attitude (for a criticism of these items, see Pfahl-Traughber, 2011).

All item formulations of the attitudes are reported in Table 1. As an overview, we show the means for the three different levels of education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamophobia</td>
<td>n=375</td>
<td>n=588</td>
<td>n=775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because of the many Muslims here, I sometimes feel like a stranger in my own country. (total: m=2,27; s=1,05)</td>
<td>m=2,44</td>
<td>m=2,25</td>
<td>m=1,82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One should prohibit the immigration of Muslims to Germany. (total: m = 2,10; s = 0,90)</td>
<td>m = 2,23</td>
<td>m = 2,14</td>
<td>m = 1,72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anomia</td>
<td>m = 3,08*</td>
<td>m = 2,92*</td>
<td>m = 2,57*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowadays, everything has become so much in disarray that one does not know where one actually stands. (total: m = 2,92; s = 0,90)</td>
<td>m = 3,31*</td>
<td>m = 2,88*</td>
<td>m = 2,51*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matters have become so difficult these days that one does not know what is going on. (total: m = 2,93; s = 0,89)</td>
<td>m = 3,07*</td>
<td>m = 2,83*</td>
<td>m = 2,42*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the past everything was better because one knew what one had to do. (total: m = 2,88; s = 0,96)</td>
<td>m = 3,07*</td>
<td>m = 2,83*</td>
<td>m = 2,42*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social dominance orientation (SDO)</td>
<td>m = 2,01*</td>
<td>m = 1,76*</td>
<td>m = 1,43*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some groups in the population are worth less than others. (total: m = 1,80; s = 0,96)</td>
<td>m = 3,68*</td>
<td>m = 3,51*</td>
<td>m = 3,05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian aggression (RWA)</td>
<td>m = 3,49*</td>
<td>m = 3,28*</td>
<td>m = 2,70*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimes should be punished more harshly. (total: m = 3,50; s = 0,76)</td>
<td>m = 3,59</td>
<td>m = 3,59</td>
<td>m = 3,59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In order to preserve law and order, it is necessary to act harder against outsiders and troublemakers. (total: m = 3,26; s = 0,87)</td>
<td>m = 3,51</td>
<td>m = 3,58</td>
<td>m = 3,63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular criticism of Islam</td>
<td>m = 3,51</td>
<td>m = 3,58</td>
<td>m = 3,63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims must accept the separation of religion and state in Germany. (total: m = 3,57; s = 0,70)</td>
<td>m = 3,59</td>
<td>m = 3,69</td>
<td>m = 3,72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims must accept that religion might have no influence on case law in Germany. (total: m = 3,65; s = 0,62)</td>
<td>m = 3,56</td>
<td>m = 3,56</td>
<td>m = 3,46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality-referred criticism of Islam</td>
<td>m = 3,21</td>
<td>m = 3,37*</td>
<td>m = 3,21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim parents do not have the right to forbid their daughters to participate in sport activities at school. (total: m = 3,27; s = 0,97)</td>
<td>m = 3,21</td>
<td>m = 3,37*</td>
<td>m = 3,21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims in Germany must accept the equality between men and women. (total: m = 3,57; s = 0,70)</td>
<td>m = 3,56</td>
<td>m = 3,56</td>
<td>m = 3,46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Item formulations and descriptive statistics for the latent constructs

m = means, s = standard deviation

* = the mean is significantly different (5 % probability level) from the other two groups.

Response options ranged from “do not agree at all” (1) to “agree totally” (4).
One can see that the agreement with the items of nearly all the latent constructs decrease with the level of education, thus corroborating a well-known result in the field of prejudice research in the last decades. However, this is not valid for two forms of criticism: secular and gender equality-referred criticism of Islam. Here, we can find almost no differences between the educational groups, and this finding is a first indication of the existing distinction between Islamophobia and criticism of Islam.

The SEM analysis, including the two different forms of criticism of Islam, underlines the difference between them and the social prejudice of Islamophobia. The latter is significantly influenced by all the independent variables (total effects must be taken into account, see table 2). But this is not valid for the two facets of criticism of Islam. In contrast to Islamophobia, these forms of criticism can only be poorly explained by the predictors of anomia, SDO, and RWA. The explained variance ($R^2$) is .02 for the secular and .08 for the gender critique - which is very low compared to the value of .52 for Islamophobia. This is an indication that criticism of Islam is not only theoretically but also empirically different from Islamophobia. This finding is especially true for the secular critique because only one significant effect exists, namely the causal effect from the respondent’s age (not included in the figure). Despite the fact that the influence is quite low (16), it clearly shows that the older the respondents are, the more they tend to have a critical attitude toward Islam, based on secular principles. Several age effects can be responsible for this result, e.g., cohort effects or life cycle effects (see endnote 2). This would be a question for further analyses.

The gender equality-referred criticism of Islam is influenced by RWA in a remarkable way and this leads to the question of why a classical predictor for social prejudice is influencing this kind of criticism. One can only speculate on this finding. One reason could lie in the fact that authoritarian people place great importance on conventions (the third dimension of RWA: conventionalism, see Altemeyer, 1988, 1998) and strict norms, especially within the family, and the kind of upbringing the children are subjected to. Forbidding children to participate in sport activities in school is not in line with these fixed norms within

**Figure 1:** Path diagram of the causal relationships (2005)
(standardized regression coefficients + explained variances: $R^2$)
* Explained by age, see table 2.
the family. However, this cannot explain the effect on the second item in the gender equality section. Further analyses should be done on this item.

The empirical analysis of the 2005 data demonstrated that the majority of the postulated hypotheses are preliminary confirmed. H1: Islamophobia is empirically distinct from different forms of criticism of Islam, even if there are quite weak correlations between Islamophobia and the critical attitudes (not included in the figure, see endnote 9). In other words, people can have both Islamophobic attitudes and critical attitudes toward Islam. H2, H3, and H4: The higher the level of authoritarian attitude, social dominance orientation, and anomia of a person, the stronger is his or her tendency for Islamophobia. These hypotheses are also confirmed, which is indicated by the significant direct effects from SDO, anomia, and RWA on Islamophobia ($R^2 = .14, .32$, and $.43$, respectively). The same can be said for H5 and H6. The higher the level of social dominance orientation and authoritarian attitude of a person, the stronger is his or her anomia. SDO and RWA both have significant effects on anomia ($R^2 = .14$ and $.44$, respectively).

Lastly, regarding H7, the predictors for Islamophobia should have no, or almost no, effect on critical attitudes toward Islam. This hypothesis is only partly confirmed. One exception can be detected, which is that there is a medium effect from RWA on the equality-referred criticism of Islam, as mentioned above. Beside this deviant result, all predictors for Islamophobia have no causal effect on the secular criticism of Islam and the gender equality-referred criticism. This also underlines the distinctness of Islamophobia as social prejudice and the criticism of Islam as an attitude, which is an attitude mostly independent of typical social prejudice predictors.

To provide a final impression regarding the overall causal influences, taking into account direct and indirect effects, we present the so-called standardized total effects. As an example (without presenting the underlying statistical details to demonstrate how these effects emerge, see figure 1): SDO has two direct effects—one on anomia and one on Islamophobia.

Hence, there is an additional so-called indirect effect from SDO via anomia on Islamophobia. Taking the indirect and direct effects into account, the total effect of SDO on Islamophobia is. (see table 2). One can see that the strongest predictor for Islamophobia is RWA, followed by anomia, education, SDO, and age of respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>SDO</th>
<th>RWA</th>
<th>Anomia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anomia</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Crit.</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular Crit.</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamophobia</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2:** Standardized total effects on the latent constructs

**EMPIRICAL REPLICATIONS (2007 and 2011)**

As mentioned above, utilizing the data from 2007 and 2011, we will reproduce and try to confirm the results from the 2005 analysis. Compared to the previous model, the one for 2007 has a few changes because additional items were not used in every GFE survey. The most obvious difference between the model of 2005 and the later ones is that the items
measuring the two different facets of Islam critique are no longer included, as they were only used in the 2005 survey. The next difference is that SDO was measured via three indicators in 2007 and 2011 instead of one, which not only gives the latent construct more variance but also changes its substantive content.\(^{11}\)

![Figure 3: Path diagram of the causal relationships (2007)](image)

The consequences of these mandatory changes resulting from the available data can clearly be detected in the model. SDO, now measured with three items, has become a much stronger predictor for Islamophobia, and its (total) effect on Islamophobia is almost as equally high as RWA (see figure 2 and table 3). In this respect, H2, H3, and H4 are confirmed again. Moreover, the effects of education and age are almost the same as in the 2005 model.

Nonetheless, there is one major difference between 2005 and 2007 with respect to H5 (The higher the level of social dominance orientation of a person, the stronger is his or her anomia): Analyses using the 2007 and 2011 data did not support this hypothesis. RWA still has a direct effect on anomia (H6) but the causal effect of SDO on anomia is no longer significant. This result demonstrates the impact of a change in the number of indicators on analytical outcomes.\(^{13}\) However, the results strongly confirm the core hypotheses of the predictors for Islamophobia, and therewith, the quality of the theories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>SDO</th>
<th>RWA</th>
<th>Anomia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anomia</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamophobia</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3:** Standardized total effects on the latent constructs (2007)
In looking at the model for 2011, compared to 2007, the same hypotheses are confirmed. This is true for H2, H3, and H4: The higher the level of authoritarian attitude, social dominance orientation, and anomia of a person, the stronger is his or her tendency for Islamophobia. RWA, again, acts as the strongest predictor for Islamophobia. The explained variance for Islamophobia (54%) is the highest of all models (see figure 3).

![Figure 3: Path diagram of the causal relationships (2011)
(standardized regression coefficients + explained variances: $R^2$)](image)

As in the 2007 model, SDO was measured by three items, whereas anomia was only measured by two.\(^{15}\) Again, H5 (the higher the level of social dominance orientation of a person, the stronger is his or her anomia) could not be confirmed. However, RWA still has a strong, significant direct effect on anomia (H6). Overall, the majority of the hypotheses could be confirmed using the 2011 data. The effect of SDO on anomia, which only appears in the 2005 model, should be the subject of further empirical analysis. This is also true for the partial differences in the effects of education and age on RWA, SDO, and anomia. The overall effects of those two predictors on Islamophobia are almost the same for all three models (see tables 2, 3, and 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>RWA</th>
<th>SDO</th>
<th>Anomia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anomia</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.37</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamophobia</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.34</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Standardized total effects on the latent constructs (2011)
THE STABILITY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS

The analyses, up to now, have only examined the hypotheses for the three time points separately. By implementing structural equation modeling, we can test for significant differences between groups. In other words, one can answer the question of whether the detected differences of the causal relationships in the three models are at random, or if the relationships differ over time. The goal of a so-called multiple group comparison is to find differences in the effects between the latent constructs when comparing several groups. These groups can be, for example, different grades of education, age groups, or countries. In our case, the three different samples of the 2005, 2007, and 2011 surveys are being compared to determine if the stability of Islamophobia can be measured and predicted over time.

Figure 4: Path diagram of the causal relationships (all samples) (standardized regression coefficients + explained variances: $R^2$ of 2005/2007/2011)\(^{16}\)

The explained variances ($R^2$) of Islamophobia are fairly high, with values ranging from .43 to .51. This demonstrates the extraordinary importance of the latent constructs and the theories behind them. Anomia, SDO, and especially RWA are strong predictors of Islamophobic attitudes.

The somewhat weak effects of SDO on Islamophobia can be explained by the fact that SDO is only measured by one indicator in the comparison model using all three data sets. The respondent’s age has very small, but significant, effects on the education level (negative) and on RWA (positive).

Table 5: The different relationships between groups (unstandardized regression coefficients)\(^{17}\)
The latter result can be explained by the change in the parenting style in Germany since the 1970s, which is still quite common today. This is known as "anti-autoritäre Erziehung," i.e., anti-authoritarian upbringing. Child rearing today, and in the last few decades, has been much less characterized by a strong emphasis on conformity to conventional moral ideas, to authoritarian submission, and a punitive style of upbringing than it was forty or fifty years ago. The negative causal effect between age and education is due to the educational expansion that has been taking place in Germany since the 1960s, which led to more people having higher levels of education. This process is also still ongoing.

The comparison of the relationships between the different data sets from 2005, 2007, and 2011 demonstrates - most importantly - that Islamophobia can be predicted over various samples and years in a very stable manner. Table 5 contains only those parameters that are not invariant over time. In other words, all the causal relationships are not different across the three samples, with the exception of the values in table 5. This is really an astonishing result and strongly supports the theories of the authoritarian personality, anomie, and social dominance theory (see figure 4 and table 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>SDO</th>
<th>RWA</th>
<th>Anomia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.15/-15/-15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>.04/.03/.03</td>
<td>-.25/-18/-20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>.16/.15/.15</td>
<td>-.40/-40/-38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anomia</td>
<td>.09/.09/.10</td>
<td>-.31/-38/-36</td>
<td>.13/-36</td>
<td>.43/.36/.49</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Standardized total effects on the latent constructs (2005/2007/2011)

Keeping in mind that the integration of Muslims in Germany is a very multifaceted topic with a constantly changing media and political context, the stability of the causal effects on Islamophobia is a very interesting empirical finding. In contrast to Islamophobia, the prediction of anomia happens to be fairly unstable over the different years. Both the causal effect of education and the causal effect of RWA on anomia are not invariant between the groups (see table 5). Also, as mentioned above, there is only one significant effect of SDO on anomia (2005). This shows that anomia is a latent construct that is strongly influenced by situational aspects and the condition of society and, therefore, cannot be explained as being stable, as, for example, can RWA, which, in contrast to anomia, is more deep-seated in one’s personality. It is also notable that the only stable effect of education is the one on authoritarianism. This underlines the importance of the educational and social background and the environment on the development of an authoritarian attitude.

CONCLUSION

Islamophobia was not only a major topic of scientific research the last few years, but was also a buzzword in many public and political debates. The phenomenon of the “enemy image Muslim” is not new in Western societies—in fact, it has its beginnings in the Christian view of Muslims in the Middle Ages. However, especially in Germany, the subject matter could not be more current and explosive than it is today, as can be seen in the prevailing debates about Islamist terrorists on the one side, and the growing Islamophobic movements in Europe, like PEGIDA, on the other. Especially under these circumstances, it is imperative that scientific research uncovers the reasons behind Islamophobia, which is a relatively
widespread social prejudice in the German population. As long as Islamophobia persists, this will hinder the successful and peaceful integration of the Muslim community into Germany.

There are three main goals of this study: 1) to demonstrate the empirical distinctness between Islamophobia and a rational critique of Islam, 2) to examine some of the most important empirical predictors of Islamophobia, and 3) to reproduce the findings and to test the empirical stability of the predictors across different samples. For this purpose, representative data for the German population from the years 2005, 2007, and 2011 were analyzed.

The first important distinction to point out is that criticism of Islam is not the same as Islamophobia. The empirical results preliminarily confirm one of our derived hypotheses, which is that Islamophobia is empirically distinct from different forms of criticism of Islam. Further empirical research should be done to substantiate this finding.

Second, empirically speaking, Islamophobia can be explained quite well by the three latent constructs of authoritarianism (RWA), anomia, and social dominance orientation (SDO). The explained variance of Islamophobia is very high (with values between .43 and .54) in all three analyses. The most important predictor is RWA, followed by anomia and SDO.

Third, the replications of the theory-driven empirical analyses, and the test of the stability of the causal relationships, strongly support the central hypotheses. The higher the level of an authoritarian attitude, anomia, and social dominance orientation of a person, the stronger is his or her tendency for Islamophobia. This is one of the most important findings in this study. The mentioned relationships are stable over time and, therefore, strongly support the theories of the authoritarian personality, anomie, and social dominance theory.

The classical predictor for prejudices, authoritarianism, is not only the most stable latent construct that can be measured across different samples but also the one that has, by far, the largest effect on Islamophobia. From the scientific perspective, this is good news because these results support the theoretical background and the concept of an authoritarian attitude as a predictor for social prejudice. From a social or ethic perspective, however, this is a result that implies that Islamophobia will remain a stable phenomenon in Germany for years to come. This is because authoritarianism is still a widespread, deep-seated, personality attitude in the German population, which is shaped by the educational background, the parental style of upbringing, and the political culture as a whole. The conclusion reached is that Islamophobia, with authoritarianism as its strongest predictor, will only change if the value orientations in the society also change in a constant way.
The empirical analyses are based on the representative data sets of the GFE project (“Group Focused Enmity”) of the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence, University of Bielefeld, Germany. The survey was supported by a consortium of foundations headed by the Volkswagen Stiftung. We thank Prof. Dr. Peter Schmidt and Prof. Dr. Ulrich Wagner for their critical and very helpful comments.

Level of education and age are important predictors in the context of social prejudice. These variables are theoretically quite complex because they represent different aspects which are not directly measured. For example, cognitive abilities or value orientations with respect to education (for more details, see Heyder, 2003) or different age effects like life cycle, period, or cohort effects (see Glenn, 2005). Unfortunately, we cannot go into these details and will use the two variables as “control variables” which is not satisfying from a scientific standpoint. Nonetheless, it is a pragmatic decision on the background of this article which tries to give an empirical overview and principal insights to empirical studies on Islamophobia in the social sciences. We also have tested whether gender, a similar complex variable, has an effect on Islamophobia but found none or only very weak effects.


Alternative approaches in contrast to the assumptions of Adorno et al. were also formulated by Lipset (1959) in his „theory of working class authoritarianism“ and by Detlef Oesterreich which is known as the “authoritarian reaction” (see Oesterreich, 2005, 1996).

Especially when using multiple regression models which cannot take into account the relationships between the independent variables.

Beside these models, also a correlative relationship or a so-called interaction effect could be the case. The latter constellation can be proved using the data on hand. The causal influence of RWA on Islamophobia is higher when the respondents have high values on the anomia-scale compared with respondents with low scores. Nonetheless, the causality cannot be answered using survey data, whereas panel-data is much better suited to clarify this question.

Short scales like this are the result of intensive pre-tests with smaller samples of about 200 or 300 respondents. Usually, in the GFE project, several items were tested via confirmatory factor analyses. After that, the “best” items were selected with respect to the central quality criteria of validity and reliability.

Standardized regression coefficients vary from -1 to +1 and represent linear relationships. 0 indicates no causal influence at all (excluded from the model). The higher the values are, the stronger are the causal influences. SDO and RWA are correlated via their residuals with .24. Islamophobia, Secular Criticism and Gender Criticism are also intercorrelated via their residuals with values between .16 and .61. The control variables education and age are not included in the figure., For their direct effects and overall influences, see table 2. The fit measures of this final model are: chi-square/df: 3.1; gfi: .98; agfi: .97; cfi: .98; rmsea: .03; p-close: 1.0. These values are very satisfactory (see e.g. Arbuckle, 2009).

The factor loadings for all the latent constructs and their indicators (validity coefficients) vary from .50 to .87 and are therefore sufficient to high.

The two additional items are: “Some groups in the population are more useful than others” and “The groups at the bottom of society should stay at the bottom.”

SDO and RWA are correlated via their residuals with .39. The control variables education and age are not included in the figure. See for their direct effects and overall influences, table 3. The fit measures of this final model are: chi-square/df: 3.2; gfi: .99; agfi: .98; cfi: .98; rmsea: .04; p-close: .99. These values are very satisfying
The factor loadings for all the latent constructs and their indicators (validity coefficients) vary from .58 to .89 and are therefore sufficient to high.

13 In addition, anomia has “lost” one indicator as a result of its missing distinctness to other constructs: “In the past everything was better because one knew what one had to do.” There were significant factor loadings to other latent constructs. Because of this result, one indicator was excluded from the model.

14 SDO and RWA are correlated via their residuals with .48. The control variables education and age are not included in the figure. See, for their direct effects and overall influences, table 4. The fit measures of this final model are: chi-square/df: 2.2; gfi: .98; agfi: .97; cfi: .98; rmsea: .04; p-close: .96. These values indicate a very satisfactory model fit. The factor loadings for all the latent constructs and their indicators (validity coefficients) vary from .60 to .91 and are therefore sufficient to high.

15 Again, one indicator of anomia was excluded from the model for the same reasons which were detected in 2007.

16 The fit measures of this final model are: chi-square/df: 2.6; gfi: .99; agfi: .98; cfi: .99; rmsea: .02; p-close: 1.0. These values indicate a very satisfactory model fit (see e.g. Arbuckle, 2009).

17 Tests for significant parameter estimates differences must be done with the unstandardized coefficients (for the mathematical rationale, see Bollen, 1989).

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From “Mohammedan Despotism” to “Creeping Sharia:” Cultural (Re)Productions of Islamophobia in the United States

Stephanie Wright
University of California, Santa Barbara
From “Mohammedan Despotism” to “Creeping Sharia:” Cultural (Re)Productions of Islamophobia in the United States

Stephanie Wright
University of California, Santa Barbara

ABSTRACT: Narratives about creeping sharia have emerged in recent years as a defining feature of anti-Islamic discourses in the United States. This article analyzes these contemporary developments in light of the broader historical and discursive practices through which Americans have imagined both Islam and themselves. It examines how an imagining of Islam as an inherently political religion has served not only to contest and define the religious identity of the US, but also to police the boundaries of religion among its citizens. It does so with reference to two cases: first, the debates over the US Constitution in 1787-88; and second, anti-Mormon polemics in the mid-nineteenth century. While the debates in these cases deployed Islam for multiple and opposing political ends, they shared assumptions about the political (and therefore tyrannical) nature of Islam. Examining this common enframing of Islam in nineteenth-century contexts can provide important insights into the mechanisms by which anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic discourses have been perpetuated in the United States.
Biopolitics: regulation of Mormon polygamy linked with concerns about racial purity;^1^ link between polygamy and theocratic despotism racialized in Oriental terms.^2^

In a major foreign policy speech delivered in May 2011, Republican presidential hopeful Rick Santorum described *creeping sharia* as an “existential threat to America.”^3^ He was not alone: by this time, five out of the nine major Republican candidates had denounced *creeping sharia* in the United States.^4^ Yet in February 2012, former New York Times editor Bill Keller satirized Santorum’s comments, accusing him of “creeping up on a Christian version of sharia law.”^5^ While mobilized for opposing political agendas, these remarks reveal the common assumptions and strategies that have driven the discursive deployment of sharia in the post-9/11 US context. Secular liberals and conservative Christians alike have invoked sharia in public discourse to signify a religious law both foreign and antithetical to American political principles. Whether deployed seriously or satirically, these polemics have been enframed by a shared representation of Islam as incapable of, or hostile to, the separation of religion and politics. This frame structures a discursive engagement that presents sharia as the antithetical pole of American political values—however these are conceived. Representing sharia as what America is not, paradoxically, has ensured sharia’s ongoing relevance to debates about what America is.

This article situates the contemporary discourse of *creeping sharia* within a broader genealogy of US discourses about Islam. Since the nation’s founding, the specter of “Mohammedanism” has functioned as a rhetorical conceit against which Americans—like their European counterparts—have imagined and defined their own political system. In the United States, the imagining of Islam as both a spiritual and temporal system has provided a stable backdrop for images of Oriental and/or Islamic despotism. The tracing of Islam’s despotism to the (con)fusion of religion and politics made the former a powerful rhetorical vector for debating the place of religion in the United States. Invoked both for and against a “wall of separation between religion and politics,” “Mohammedanism” was a popular and polyvalent trope that performed several kinds of cultural work in the nineteenth century.^6^ This article examines how nineteenth-century Americans strategically appropriated Islam not only to debate the religious identity of the state, but also to police the boundaries of religion among its citizens. It does so by considering two cases: first, the debates over the US Constitution in 1787-88; and second, anti-Mormon polemics in the mid-nineteenth century. While these debates deployed “Mahometanism” for multiple, and often opposing, political ends, they shared assumptions about the political (and therefore tyrannical) nature of Islam. Examining this common enframing of Islam in nineteenth-century contexts can provide important insights into the mechanisms by which anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic discourses have been perpetuated in the United States.

A Common Frame? Islam as the “Anti-Secular”Since 9/11, the perception of Islam as antithetical to American political normativities has fueled anti-Muslim discourses and policies in the United States. Yet as scholars have widely recognized, there is also a sense in which “Islamophobia” is nothing new.^7^ The rise of Islamophobia during the “War on Terror” and its aftermath has propelled a burgeoning scholarship on the history of Islamophobia in Western contexts.^8^ Together with the earlier literature on Orientalism, these works provide evidence for persisting patterns of hostility towards Muslims and Islam in Christian Europe, and later, in the United States.^9^

Although there can be little doubt as to the prevalence of anti-Muslim sentiment in European writings, other scholars have argued that a more balanced, accurate, or “positive” attitude towards Muslims began to emerge among some European writers from the early
modern period. This literature provides a corrective to the earlier focus on “negative” stereotypes about Islam, yet it also makes the latter’s persistence even more puzzling, and raises the question: Given the availability of accurate and positive narratives about Islam from at least the eighteenth century, why did distorted and defamatory versions continue to prevail? One clue to this paradox lies in Edward Said’s celebrated theory of “Orientalism.” Said famously defined “Orientalism” not as the objective study of the “Orient,” but as primarily the product of a Western consciousness, the “distribution of [Western] geopolitical awareness” into a variety of textual and cultural forms. Understanding American representations of Islam as primarily a refraction of an American consciousness requires that we consider the emergence of positive narratives not simply as an overcoming of inherited biases, but rather as expressions of a different set of Western concerns and interests. Timothy Marr’s study of “American Islamicism,” a term he uses to refer to “Islamic Orientalism,” provides a detailed and sophisticated historical account from this perspective. Marr argues persuasively that “Islamicist” imagery plays an important, yet understudied, role in the construction of American nationalism, and documents how Americans applied this imagery—positive or negative—to a variety of domestic contexts, ranging from slavery to temperance, gender roles, and Mormonism.

Aside from showing how positive representations of Islam performed as a creative form of cultural self-criticism, Marr’s work also signals how these representations were deployed within—and not against—a narrative of “Islamicist despotism.” Building from Marr’s insights, I suggest that “Islamicist despotism” might be best understood, not as one of several persistent landmarks in the topos of American Islamicism, but rather as an enframing discourse for cultural representations of Islam in the United States. The metanarrative of “Islamicist despotism,” moreover, has been inextricably entwined with concerns and debates surrounding what we might anachronistically describe as “secularism.” Pervasive and progressivist accounts have often linked the rise of secularism, born in the cradle of the “Enlightenment,” to an increase in scientific objectivity and religious pluralism. It is ironic, then, that one of the most tenacious stereotypes about Islam to have survived the “Age of Reason” is that it is “anti-secular.” The narrative of creeping sharia is one extreme outworking of this perception, and offers insights into the ways in which it frames and fuels Islamophobia in the United States.

WHAT’S SO “CREEPY” ABOUT “SHARIA?”: CONTEMPORARY NARRATIVES

Neither public anxieties about creeping sharia, nor attempts to politically capitalize on these anxieties, make sense outside a framework that naturalizes Islam as an ineluctably political religion. This frame, which has come to shape American representations of Islam, is entangled with a broader architecture of power relations and identity formations that its deployment helps to sustain. Comments by both pro-secular liberals and Christian conservatives provide evidence for the ways in which creeping sharia relies upon, and reinforces, the perception that Islam has an opposition to the separation of religion and politics.

Newt Gingrich, former Congressional representative for Georgia, was the first of the future Republican candidates to warn of a “sharia” conspiracy underway in the United States. In July 2010, Gingrich wrote of a radical Islamist jihad already afoot in the land of liberty. Its goal: to establish the “totalitarian supremacy” of “sharia,” a system of law explicitly at odds with core American and Western values.” This was not, however, the “jihad” with which Gingrich’s readers were familiar (namely, terrorism). Rather, it was a
“cultural, political, and legal jihad that seeks the same totalitarian goal [of imposing sharia] even while claiming to repudiate violence”

The alleged theatre for this covert holy war heightened the drama of Gingrich’s revelations. The Park 51 project—labeled the “Ground Zero Mosque” by its opponents—catapulted creeping sharia onto the national media landscape and infused it with the significance of a battle over sacred ground. The religious overtones of “desecration” among the opponents of the project were often accompanied by accusations that its developers were not the “secular” Muslims that they appeared to be. In his June 2010 article, Gingrich denounced the project’s key developer, Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, as a radical Islamist. While acknowledging that “many Muslims... recognize the distinction between their personal beliefs and the laws that govern all people of all faiths,” Gingrich asserted that “radical Islamists”—like Rauf—consider it “their sacred duty to achieve [sharia’s] totalitarian supremacy” on American soil. This is because, as Gingrich claims in that same article, they [Muslims] see politics and religion as inseparable in a way that is difficult for Americans to understand

The true desecration of the “Ground Zero Mosque,” as Gingrich frames it, lies less in a violation of sacred space than in a violation of secular boundaries. Unlike “American” religions, Gingrich suggests, “radical Islamism” is more than simply a religious belief. It is a comprehensive political, economic, and religious movement that seeks to impose sharia—Islamic law—upon all aspects of global society.” For Gingrich, the distinguishing feature of “radical” Islam lies in its transgressing of the secular bounds between “private religious belief” and public political behavior. For others—and perhaps a larger number—this transgression is simply a feature of Islam itself. As Rick Santorum wrote in August 2010: “Islam is not just a religion, it is also a political doctrine; it is also a way of governance. That’s what sharia is all about.”

While both Gingrich and Santorum invoked stereotypes about Islam’s “anti-secular” nature to defend their crusade against creeping sharia, neither rejects the role of religion in the state. They denounced sharia as antithetical to “American civilization,” understood not as a secular state, but as a Christian nation. Yet, if the Right cast sharia as the antithesis of “Christian America,” liberals were quick to question the distinction. Inverting the conspiratorial logic of creeping sharia, comedian Dean Obeidallah denounced Santorum’s “Judeo-Christian sharia” as an “existential threat” to “one of the bedrock principles of our nation”—the separation of church and state. Obeidallah, a Muslim himself, deployed sharia to castigate Santorum, and to defend a very different vision of American nationhood. Yet, his remarks do not challenge—and indeed, tacitly reinscribe—an image of sharia as antithetical to American (secular) principles. Depictions of sharia as a totalitarian politico-religious system have functioned not only to affirm Islam’s essential “otherness” to a “Christian America,” but also, paradoxically, to ridicule those who contest the place of Muslims within a secular and multi-cultural state.

*ISLAM IN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, 1787-88*

This pattern, in which American citizens draw strategically from a common arsenal of Islamicist discourse for divergent political purposes, finds a precedent in the debates over the disestablishment of religion in the US Constitution. The nation’s early debates on the place of religion in the political system provide insight not only into the rhetorical precursors of creeping sharia, but the mechanisms through which anti-Islamic narratives are perpetuated.

The 1787-88 US constitutional debates, however, provided one of the first occasions for Islam’s deployment in the service of national politics. References to “Mahomet” or his
followers, although relatively infrequent, appear almost always in these debates in connection with issues of religion and the state. The representations and conceptions of Islam in the US constitutional debates were the product of a far longer history whose evolution, in the American context, can be understood through four interconnected currents. Each of these, while encompassing considerable diversity within itself, fashions Islam according to divergent imperatives and in different registers. The first current is an evangelical Protestant tradition in which Islam (paired invariably with Catholicism) embodies imposture, idolatry, and violent enthusiasm; the second is a radical English Whig tradition, which deploys Islam to emphasize the dangers of centralized government and established religion; the third is a tradition among defenders of religious toleration, who uphold Islam as a militant and political religion antithetical to the tolerant and world-renouncing nature of “true” Christianity; and the fourth current consist of threads of French and English Enlightenment thought, which emphasize Islamic “despotism” as the result of fusing secular and spiritual power.

Early national Americans drew from some or all of these currents in different ways, according to their own social, religious, and political situation. The heterogeneous and versatile discourses from which early national Americans borrowed, however, were bound by a number of common conceptual threads. Arguably the most important of these, with respect to political debates, derived from European discourses on “Mahometan law.” Across the spectrum of political and theological positions encompassed within these four discursive traditions, there was a substantial agreement about the origins and character of the “law of Mahomet.” Early modern Europeans agreed that the prophet Muhammad had invented his teachings to achieve absolute political and religious power over the credulous Arabs. Muhammad’s false law, the early modern Europeans claimed, was contained in his “Alkoran,” which claimed to reveal the words of God but which was, in fact, a fabricated Alkoran created to ensure total obedience to its ambitious author. Adherents of “Mahometanism” viewed the implementation of this law as a religious obligation, and saw it as their duty to spread the faith by the sword. The “law of Mahomet,” these authors claimed, was based on the fusion of spiritual and temporal authority in the person of Muhammad, who instrumentalized religion for love of power, sensuality, and wealth.

Early modern European accounts of “Mahometan law” overwhelmingly portrayed it as a system that fused religious with political power. In light of this history, it should not be surprising that post-revolutionary American politicians invoked Islam most often when discussing the proper relation of religion to the newly founded state. Within US constitutional debates, “Mahometanism” surfaced primarily in relation to two questions: first, whether a “religious test” would be required to hold political office, and second, whether the federal state would establish an official national religion. Within these debates, Islam could support both the permitting and the prohibiting of religious tests, and the establishment and disestablishment of religion more generally.

The issues of disestablishment and religious tests were closely connected. Those who favored the establishment of (Protestant) Christianity in the United States tended to support religious tests as necessary to protect the Christian character of the nation. The admission of non-Protestants to public office, from this perspective, threatened not only to undermine the nation’s Protestant identity, but the very freedoms that Protestantism had established there. A Constitution that allowed “Jews, Turks, and Heathens to enter into public office, and be seated at the head of the government of the United States,” some argued, would open the door for non-Protestants to seize the reins of government, exposing Protestants to the threat of persecution and religious tyranny. In this rhetorical strategy, “Turks,” “Mahometans,” and “Moors” were seen as being among a host of religious outsiders whose
faith, or lack thereof, marked their national loyalties as suspect. In addition to the plainly hypothetical figures of the “Mahometan,” the “Jew,” and the “Heathen,” pro-establishment writers invoked more familiar—and arguably more threatening—figures. A New Hampshire writer protested that, “according to [the constitutional provision banning religious tests] we may have a Papist, a Mohomatan [sic], a Deist, yea an Atheist at the helm of Government.”

Through this hierarchy of religious deviance, the author implies that even the false belief of the Muslim was preferable to the unbelief of the Deist or the Atheist.

Although post-revolutionary anxieties focused more on Deist than sharia creep, the popular association of Islam with violence and conquest served equally well to evoke the potential catastrophes of permitting non-Protestants—and particularly non-theists—to accede to public office. Opponents of disestablishment expressed anxieties about the consequences of untethering government from the moral hitching post of religion. As one Bostonian essayist fretted: “All religion is expressly rejected, from the Constitution. Was there ever any State or kingdom, that could subsist, without adopting some system of religion?” Yet others maintained that the pro-establishment argument also revealed deep-rooted suspicions about whether non-Protestants, and particularly Catholics, could separate the dictates of faith from the imperatives of politics.

Like contemporary anti-sharia enthusiasts, pro-establishment writers cast Christianity as a safeguard against the perils of tyranny. Paradoxically, the imagining of Protestantism as based on free enquiry, individual liberty, and tolerance had been cemented in part through its dialectical opposition with Islam and Catholicism, whose followers were held to evince a slavish loyalty to the absolute spiritual and political authority of their religious leaders. The historical marriage of “Mahometanism” and “Papism” in American Protestant polemics provides an interesting contrast to the 2012 landscape, which saw two Catholic senators (Gingrich and Santorum) aligning themselves with evangelical Protestants against Islam. In the constitutional debates, though, the opposition of Protestant free enquiry to Papal/Mahometan infallibility served to emphasize the dangers of granting full political citizenship to Catholics, as well as to Muslims, whose presumed obedience to a foreign religio-political authority raised questions about their political loyalties.

Thomas Jefferson had anticipated these arguments in the introduction of his 1776 bill to disestablish the Church of England in the state of Virginia. While affirming that it was a “civil offense for a citizen to acknowledge a foreign prince, Jefferson denied that religious devotion, of any type, “would necessarily corrupt civic loyalty.” A number of anti-establishment figures echoed Jefferson’s rejection of any necessary connection between religious faith and civic virtue during the federal constitutional debates. The Federalist leader James Iredell, for instance, argued that “a man may be of different religious sentiments from our own, without being a bad member of society.” The Baptist preacher and champion of disestablishment, John Leland, demanded to know why a man should “be proscribed, or any wife disgraced, for being a Jew, a Turk, a Pagan, or a Christian of any denomination, when his talents and veracity as a civilian, entitles him to the confidence of the public?”

Affirming that even a Turk could become a good citizen was part of a broader strategy to debunk pro-establishment arguments. Yet, while anti-establishment writers refuted the pro-establishment camp’s characterization of “the Turk” or “the Mahometan,” they did not reject the representation of Islam as a tyrannical, persecutory, and expansionist religion. On the contrary, anti-establishment writers endorsed and appropriated the pro-establishment faction’s caricature for their own political purposes. Again, this tendency finds a precedent in the 1776 bill for the disestablishment of Anglicanism in Virginia. In his notes for that bill, Jefferson affirmed Islam’s fundamental antipathy to free enquiry, writing that,
“If Mahomet forbade free argument—Mahometanism prevented Reformation.”31 He also reiterated the parallel between Islam and Catholicism as the twin antitheses to a Protestant ethic of spiritual liberty.32 Yet, whereas the supporters of establishment used these tropes to present the establishment of Christianity as a shield against religious and political tyranny, Jefferson did so to denounce the act of establishment as itself tyrannical. Tyranny, in Jefferson’s account, derived not from the ethos of one religion or another, but from the establishment of any religion whatsoever. Drawing on the writings of radical English Whigs, who invoked the Muslim monarchies of Turkey and Persia as evidence that “the sorest Tyrants have been they, who united in one person the Royalty and Priesthood,” Jefferson denounced the established Anglican Church as embodying the same religious tyranny that its advocates saw it as preventing.33 Particularly objectionable for Jefferson were the financial implications of establishment for those outside the established church. Under the existing legislature, all Virginians were required to pay taxes for the upkeep of the Anglican establishment, whether or not they themselves were members. In Jefferson’s words, “To compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors,” as the established Church of England did, “is sinful and tyrannical.”34

Whereas Jefferson cited Islam as one among several examples of the tyranny of religious establishment, the Baptist preacher John Leland cast the matter in more explicitly Christian terms. It is not surprising, given Leland’s position, that he turned particular imagining of Christ’s true mission as inspiration for his argument. Nor is it surprising that Leland contrasted Christ’s mission to that of Muhammad: “Mahomet called in the use of the law and the sword, to convert people to his religion; but Jesus did not—does not.”35 Leland’s argument situates him within a lineage of Christian apologetics that upheld Christ’s renunciation of the world, and willing submission to suffering, as proof of both his divine status and of the truth of his revelations. In its polemical form, this literature contrasted Christ’s life with that of Muhammad, whose alleged worldliness was proof of his status as a religious impostor.36 James Iredell echoed Leland’s portrayal of Christianity in the constitutional debates, arguing that “the divine Author of our religion never wished for its support by worldly authority.”37 To establish religion in the United States, according to Leland and Iredell, would be not merely to repeat the mistakes of Mahometanism and Papism (as Jefferson would have it). Rather, it would also be to corrupt the message of true Christianity.

**DISCIPLINING THE DOMESTIC DEVIANT: ISLAM IN ANTI-MORMON POLEMICS**

In its final form, the US Constitution prohibited both the federal establishment of religion and the requirement of religious tests for public office. Although supporters of this outcome had invoked Muslims to insist that religious nonconformity had no bearing on political participation, their arguments reinscribed a fantasy of Islamic despotism that cast a shadow over the loyalty of the imagined Muslim citizen. Nineteenth century Americans inherited and replicated perceptions of Islam as an absolute tyranny that ruled over every aspect of the believer’s life. This shared cultural imaginary of Islam was important, not only in the discursive construction of the new nation’s identity, but to the disciplining of its citizenry.

Historians of American religion have long emphasized the constitutive role of religious “outsiders” in shaping national myths and institutions.38 This dynamic has also been important in American imaginings of the right relationship between religion and politics. The language of a separation between church and state, as Phillip Hamburger has shown, came to prominence not in the constitutional period, but in the mid-nineteenth century, in direct
response to fears of Catholicism. The re-imagining of American religious liberty in terms of separation depended on a counter-image of Catholicism as embodying, in the words of one nineteenth-century writer, an “adulterous connection between the Church and the State—between the Throne and the Altar.” The policing of the relationship between religion and politics in the nineteenth-century United States, as this quote suggests, was bound up with the regulation of sexual morality. Nowhere, perhaps, was this coupling more apparent than in the campaign against Mormon polygamy from the mid-nineteenth century. Nineteenth-century American Protestants constructed their visions of both political and sexual governance in dialectic opposition to representations of Catholicism and Mormonism. In both cases, they drew rhetorical weapons from a well-stocked cache of anti-Islamic imagery.

Antipolygamists’ insistence on monogamous marriage as “the spiritual center of governance” expressed and influenced the tightening link between private morality and state law in the nineteenth-century imagination. The battle over polygamy, as Sarah Barringer Gordon has argued, permanently affected the legal relationship between church and state in the United States, while simultaneously enabling and affirming new kinds of federal control in the private sphere. Similarly, J. Spencer Fluhman has shown how anti-Mormonism functioned to “reenshrine the myth of antiestablishmentarian religious freedom alongside bold calls to marshal state power in the suppression of minority religious practice.” Anti-Mormon polemics impelled an imagining of church/state separation as integral to American republicanism, while simultaneously promoting the state’s authority to discipline the religious and sexual practices of its subjects.

The figuring of Mormonism as an “American Islam” performed a critical role in both of these processes. A number of scholars have highlighted how Protestants’ imaginings of Islam structured their engagement with “the Mormon question” in the nineteenth-century United States. Of particular interest here, however, is the ways in which “Islamicist” discourses helped to filter Protestant imaginaries of Mormon politics. The linking of Islamic despotism with the fusion of spiritual and temporal authority, which had been deployed on both sides of the constitutional debates on establishment, acquired new relevance as a template for Protestant representations of Mormonism as autocratic theocracy. Polygamy, in this imaginary, was not merely the domestic counterpart of political despotism, as was the case for the Enlightenment philosophes. It was also the proof of Mormonism’s fundamental rejection of the secular authority of the United States government. These “Islamicist,” anti-Mormon discourses reveal resonances with contemporary narratives about creeping sharia.

Anti-Mormon writers often assumed that their readers knew what they meant when they claimed that Joseph Smith, prophet and founder of the Church of Latter-Day Saints, was “determined to pursue a path similar to that of Mahomet.” This assumption attests to the wide circulation of Islamicist imagery in the nineteenth-century American imagination. For those who offered more detail, however, it is clear that sexual lasciviousness and political ambition provided two of the key ingredients by which Smith was recast as the “American Mahomet.” In an exposé-style novel, Orvilla S. Belisle has Smith declare, “I will tread down mine enemies and make me a way over their bodies—and make it from the Rocky Mountains to the Atlantic Ocean one gore of blood; and, as Mohammed, whose motto in treating for peace was the Alkoran or the sword, mine shall be Joseph Smith, or the sword!” Caricatures of Muhammad as an imposter, enthusiast, and militant conqueror were readily transposed onto Smith, and the analogues multiplied to encompass numerous aspects of his biography. Smith’s first wife, Emma, was called “Khadija;” the Book of Mormon was described as an “Alcoran;” the Mormon’s flight into Utah named a “heji-ra;” and, of course, the polygamous Mormon household exoticized as “seraglos” and “harems.” According to
former LDS leader John C. Bennett, “the most extraordinary and infamous feature of the
social and religious system established by the Mormon Prophet, and the one in which he
most closely resembles his master and model, Mahomet, is the secret regulations he has
formed for directing the relations of the sexes.”

Reducing Smith’s theological claims to worldly ambitions—whether sexual, military,
pecuniary, or political—replicated a well-established strategy of Christian anti-Muslim
polemics. Yet, if this approach sought to “unmask” Mormon religious claims as driven by
temporal desires, it did not attenuate fears of Mormon fanaticism. Rather, as in the literature
on Islam, the discursive tensions between political opportunism and blind fanaticism were
mediated through the parallel construction of despotism and slavery. The despot—whether
Muhammad, or Joseph Smith, or the latter’s successor, Brigham Young, “professes to
receive from a divine source an authorization to do whatever his false professorship may
desire, and thus proselyte a poor, ignorant multitude of followers.”

Ignorance, in this account, was the breeding grounds for imposture.

The gendered fantasy of Mormonism’s despotism/slavery relied not only on
imaginings of Islam and Muhammad, but on contemporaneous Muslim rulers. Traveler
George W. Pine offered a detailed comparison between the “absolute monarchy” of
Brigham Young and the Turkish Sultan. He declared Young’s government to be “taken from
[the Turks’] Koran, and entirely Oriental. The supreme government of ‘Latter Day Saints’
seems to consist of a President and a Prophet united, who is Brigham Young, a revelator and
viceregent of heaven.” Similarly, Pine claimed, “The Koran of Turkey gives the Sultan but
four wives, but the Sultan gives it a liberal construction, and takes as many as his fancy
dictates. Brigham Young gives his Koran a very liberal construction, and also takes as many
wives as his fancy dictates.”

Pine’s narrative indicates how an imagery of Islamic despotism, linked to the fusion
of spiritual and temporal authority in politics and the home, structured nineteenth-century
Protestants’ engagement with Mormonism. Crucially, however, Pine’s account sought not
merely to classify Mormonism, but to respond to the political issue of government inter-
vention in the Territory of Utah. At the time of Pine’s travels between 1865 and 1867, Utah
was in transition from federal occupation, to which it had been subjected for most of the
Civil War (1861-65). This occupation had followed the Utah War of 1857-58, when a con-
tingent of US government troops had forcibly removed Brigham Young from his position as
governor, and replaced him with the federally appointed Alfred Cumming. In 1862,
moreover, President Lincoln signed the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act prohibiting polygamous
marriage and limiting church ownership of land in the territories to $50,000. While the bill
remained unenforced during the Civil War, it signaled the US government’s increasing
assertiveness in the face of nonconformist sexual and political practices of its citizenry.

Pine’s work is also typical of its moment in its optimism for Mormonism’s gradual,
and peaceful, disappearance. Like many American Protestants who viewed Mormonism as a
“dark spot on our now clear-shining sky of a free civilization,” Pine expressed confidence
that the “peculiar” practices of Mormonism would vanish of their own accord as the “iron
track” of the railway brought progress and civilization to their midst. The persistence of
Mormonism—and of polygamy—had largely eroded these hopes by the early twentieth
century. Yet, even from the 1870s, anti-Mormon polemicists had begun to speak of
polygamy as the symptom of a deeper conflict. William Hickman, an excommunicated Latter
Day Saint, wrote in 1872: “The organization of the Mormon Church is such that it cannot
exist under a republican government or in a civilized country without constant collision… It
is idle to talk of any compromise, such as Statehood by abandoning Polygamy. The Church
is a political entity claiming absolute temporal power within its jurisdiction; it must subjugate or be subjugated; it must rule the country it occupies or cease to exist. The conflict is in some shape inevitable. Mormonism is Mahommedanism Yankeeized.\textsuperscript{51}

The resonances between Hickmann’s 1872 description of Mormonism and Gingrich’s 2010 denunciation of creeping sharia are worthy of note. Like Gingrich, Hickmann cautions his readers to be vigilant against a menace that seeks to undermine the United States not by force, but by taking advantage of its freedoms: “What Mahomet sought by his followers’ swords, [Mormonism] seeks by subtle means, by perverting the machinery of free government.”\textsuperscript{52} Both Hickmann and Gingrich warn against the dissemblings of an internal enemy that, despite its pacific appearances, is bent on the destruction and domination of the entire American nation. The threat, in both instances, derives from a system that recognizes no separation between religion and politics and, as such, rejects the secular authority of the United States government.

The story of an inevitable clash between Mormon theocracy and American democracy retained currency well into the twentieth century. Utah political and former Latter Day Saints member Frank J. Cannon’s 1913 exposé of the Church reaffirmed the connection between polygamy and theocratic despotism as the twin pillars of Mormonism’s antipathy to the free principles of the United States. The “troubles of Mormonism,” Cannon claimed, “always have sprung from two sources; its claim to despotic and exclusive authority in civil affairs, and its teaching and practice in polygamy… To the thoughtful student of affairs, the two offenses are one.”\textsuperscript{53} At the same time, Cannon re-emphasized Mormonism’s close kinship to “Mohammedanism,” arguing that the former was “destined to copy its Oriental prototype in political and domestic matters, as well as in theological ones.”\textsuperscript{54} In the early decades of the twentieth century, then, Islam retained its significance as a template for imagining an antitype to “American” political and sexual values. It also continued to lend support for the state disciplining of its citizens’ sexual and religious practices.

CONCLUSION

Representations of Islam and Muslims in the nineteenth-century United States shed light on the mechanisms by which Islamophobic narratives have been sustained and perpetuated in political discourse, even by those who explicitly defend the rights of Muslims as full and equal participants in the civic sphere. Although the Constitution ultimately disestablished religion, and guaranteed the political and legal equality of Muslim citizens in the United States, its authors perpetuated an imagining of Islam as antithetical to the separation of religion and politics. While denying any necessary connection between individual religious belief and civic merit, these writers reinforced negative attitudes toward those whose membership within an “established” religion provided grounds for suspicion about political loyalties. As immigration and the rise of new religious movements gave rise to greater diversity in American society, an increasing number of domestic religious minorities—most notably, Mormons and Catholics—were enfolded within this category of the politically suspect. Throughout the nineteenth century, Islam remained a widely available frame that informed how American (and generally Protestant) elites imagined and disciplined religious “outsiders” that were found increasingly within the body politic.

The 2012 Republican primaries provide a glimpse of both continuity and change in the ways that these dynamics have played out for particular religious groups. This campaign saw two Catholic senators—Newt Gingrich and Rick Santorum—emerge as the vanguard of the anti-sharia movement. This marks a considerable departure from the earlier twinnings of Catholicism and Islam in American Protestant polemics. By contrast, the two Mormon
candidates—Mitt Romney and Jon Huntsman Jr.—remained markedly silent on the issue of sharia during their presidential campaigns. They were not the only ones to do so—Ron Paul and Rick Perry also declined to comment on the issue—and may well have had a variety of sound reasons for their campaign decisions. The continued salience of the Islam-Mormonism comparison, however, might have provided one such reason. During Romney’s presidential campaign, Bill Maher remarked that Mormonism was more similar to Islam than Christianity. Just a month before the elections, a former Latter Day Saints member argued in the Huffington Post that voters should care about Romney’s religion because, “for Mormons, there really is no such thing as separation of church and state.” Both the parallels to Islam, and the fears of Mormon opposition to American secularism, remained current in American political discourse in the 2012 republican primaries.

In both the nineteenth century and the contemporary context, a limited and reductive consensus about Islam served as a lynchpin for a variety of conflicting political arguments. Obeidallah’s satirization of creeping sharia, referenced earlier, mirrors the strategies of anti-establishment writers of the constitutional era, not only in seeking to invite ridicule, but in its implicit agreement with the conservative characterization of Islam as opposing the secular principles of the United States. The perpetuation of this deeply entrenched narrative may have important consequences for the ways in which US political elites seek to govern American Muslim populations. An extreme but illustrative example of this is General William Boykin’s argument that Muslims should be exempt from protection under the First Amendment because “Islam itself is not just a religion—it’s a totalitarian way of life.” Although most United States citizens have remained sceptical of a creeping sharia threat, the seeming consensus about sharia’s relation to secular values may help to explain why a majority of Americans, in February 2011, agreed that congressional hearings on extremism in the Muslim community were a “good idea,” despite lack of evidence for such extremism. Although this is a far cry from the conspiracy theories of the Right, this response is indicative of non-Muslim Americans’ deep-rooted suspicion both of Islamic law, and of American Muslims.

ENDNOTES


15 Gingrich, “No Mosque at Ground Zero.”


18 The role of Islam in debates over the US Constitution forms the subject of a chapter in Denise Spellberg’s *Thomas Jefferson’s Qur’an: Islam and the Founders* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013), and I am greatly indebted to the author for her work in locating primary sources on this subject. My analysis of the significance of Islam in early national America, however, departs significantly from Spellberg. Whereas Spellberg interprets Islam as a test case about the limits of inclusion, I suggest that Islam became important as one of several vectors for debating the appropriate mechanisms for political exclusion.


20 The most widely influential text from this tradition was John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon’s *Cato’s Letters, or, Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious, and Other Important Subjects*, 4 vols. (London, 1720-23).


22 For more detail on these polemics in the French context, see Stephanie Wright, “From “Mahometan Tyranny” to “Oriental Despotism:” The Secularization of Islam in French Political Thought, 1610-1798,”


24 Storing, The Complete Anti-Federalist, 4:221


28 Quoted in Spellberg, Thomas Jefferson’s Qur’an, 111; italics mine.

29 Quoted in ibid., 173-74.


32 Ibid.


34 Jefferson, Papers, 1:547.


37 Iredell, quoted in Spellberg, Thomas Jefferson’s Qur’an, 175.

38 One of the earliest studies in this direction was R. Laurence Moore’s Religious Outsiders and the Making of Americans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).


40 Quoted in ibid., 236.


44 Notably in Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, Book XVI.


46 Orvilla S. Belisle, Orvilla S. Belisle, The Prophet; or, Mormonism Unveiled (Philadelphia: WM. White Smith, 1855), 257.

47 John C. Bennett, The History of the Saints (Boston: Leland & Whiting, 1842), 218.

48 George W. Pine, Beyond the West, 324.

49 Ibid., 324-25.

50 Ibid., 332-33.


52 Ibid., 16.

53 Frank J. Cannon, Brigham Young and His Mormon Empire 1913), 27.

54 Ibid., 30; italics added.


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Professor of Islamic Law and Theology, Zaytuna College